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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Before investigating the naturalistic interpretation of religion by
| John Dewey it is necessary that we deal briefly with certain introductory
matters, — Dewey’s life and achievements, the problems with which the
dissertation is concerned, the meaning of the terms used, the organization
of the study, previous investigations of the subject, the sources of this
investigation, and a consideration of the early period of Dewey’s develop-
ment, when he held religious views other than those which now characterize
him. Chapter I is devoted to these tasks.
A. JOHN DEWEY
John Dewey, whose interpretation of religion we are to investigate,
was born in Burlington, Vermont, October 20, 1859. * He received his early
education in the sa-rae city and matriculated at the University of Vermont.
It was a theologically liberal college under the dominance of the Scottish
school. 2 In his senior year there Dewey made his first acquaintance
with philosophy under the guidance of Professor H. A. P. Torrey, an
1. WWA, XVIII, 713
2. J. Dewey, Art. 85, 14. Hereafter articles whose authorship is not
designated will be those of Dewey himself.
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iexponent of intuitionalism. 3 After his graduation in 1879 he spent a
year at public-school teaching and private study, during which he decided
to make philosophy his life-work. 4
The following year he enrolled at Johns Hopkins University "to enter
upon that new thing, ’graduate work.’"
5
There Dewey fell under the in-
fluence of Hegelianism for the first time. The professor of philosophy,
George Sylvester Morris (on leave of absence from the University of
Michigan), possessed a firm belief, Dewey tells us, in the "demonstrated"
truth of the substance of German idealism. 6 Morris had had Trendelenburg
as his teacher at Berlin, and hence his Hegelianism was tinged with
Aristotelianism. But he conveyed to his student a lasting respect for
7Hegel. The early eighties were a period, too, of reaction against atomic
3. Op. cit., 15. It is interesting to note, however, in the light of
Dewey’s later philosophical development, that he attributes the awaken-
Jl
ing of his interests in philosophy to a course in natural science.
There was a course given in his junior year, he says in recollection of
college days, "that had excited a taste that in retrospect may be
called philosophical. That was a rather short course, without labora-
tory work, in Physiology, a book of Huxley’s being the text. It is
difficult to speak with exactitude about what happened to me intellectu-
ally so many years ago, but I have an impression that there was derived
from that study a sense of interdependence and interrelated unity that
gave form to intellectual stirrings that had been previously inchoate,
and created a kind of type or model of a view of things to which
material in any field ought to conform. Subconsciously, at least, I
was led to desire a world and a life that would have the same proper-
ties as had the human organism in the picture of it derived from study
of Huxley’s treatment. At all events, I got great stimulation from
the study, more than from anything I had had contact with before; and
as no desire was awakened in me to continue that particular branch of
learning, I date from this time the awakening of a distinctive philo-
sophic interest." Ibid, 13.
4. Ibid, 16; cf. S. Buchanan, Art. 1, 286.
5. Loc. cit.
6. Ibid, 18.
7. Op. cit., 19.
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3individualism and sensationalist ic empiricism, "the time of Thomas Hill
Green, of the two Cairds, of Wallace, of the appearance of the Essays in
Philosophic Criticism."8 Dewey found himself swept along by the thought-
current of the day and became an Hegelian. His first published writings
fall within this period, published naturally enough by the Hegelian organ.
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy
,
though they do not deal with
Hegelian philosophy. 9 Dewey lists W. T. Harris, editor of the Journal
,
as one of the decisive influences on his philosophical career.*®
The young philosopher received his Ph.D. degree in 1894 and immedi-
ately went West in search of a teaching position. 11 The next ten years
of his life were spent on the faculties of two mid-Western universities,
—
first at the University of Michigan, as instructor and assistant professor
of philosophy (1884-88)
,
then for a year at the University of Minnesota
(1888-89), and finally at the University of Michigan, again, as full
professor (1889-94). 12 During this decade Dewey’s first books appeared,
a psychology text-book (1887), and a study of Leibniz’s New Essays (1888),
together with several short monographs on ethics. These years were marked
by a gradual drift away from Hegelianism and the increasingly perceptible
influence of William James. 13
Op. cit., 19.
9. See Bibliography for his early writings.
10. Op. cit., 16.
11. His dissertation, which was not published, was entitled, "The
Psychology of Kant". M. H. Thomas and H. W. Schneider, 3JD, 3.
12. WWA, X7III, 713.
13. Op. cit., 20-21, 23, 24. Though Dewey left the Hegelian camp alto-
gether and in time became one of the most determined foes of the
Absolute, he confesses that his acquaintance with Hegel left a
permanent deposit in his thinking. Ibid, 21.

In 1894 Dewey was called to the newly- founded University of Chicago
to become the head of the department of philosophy.14 There he began his
pioneer work in the fields of philosophy and education. He established an
experimental school for the purpose of testing educational theories, a
school which soon caught the attention of schoolmasters far and wide and
gained for its founder recognition the world over. The publishing of his
School and Society (1889), which unfolded the thesis that the purpose of
the school is to train society, marked the beginning of a new era in
American education. At the same time Dewey's logical and epistemological
studies won followers for him in the world of philosophy; within a few
years he and his colleagues and disciples were referred to as the ’’Chicago
School.” 15
In 1904 Dewey left the University of Chicago to become professor of
philosophy at Columbia University. While here he wrote the books on
philosophy which have made him famous, — Ethics (1908; in collaboration
with J. H. Tufts), The Influence of Darwin and Other Essays (1910), How
We Think (1910), Democracy and Education (1916), Essays in Experimental
Logic (1916), Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), Human Nature and
Conduct (1922), Experience and Nature (1925), The Public and Its Problems
(1927), and The Quest for Certainty (1929). In the more than twenty-five
years which Dewey spent at Columbia his instrumentalistic pragmatism came
to be the dominant American philosophy.
Since his retirement in 1930 as professor emeritus Dewey has
147 WVA, XVIII, 713.
15. William James in 1903; "Chicago has a School of Thought I It deserves
the title of a new system of philosophy.” CER, 445, 446.
r sv- '.£ r :J ~\Iw ' I^li. 0 c.w i>wd
. ivixdo 1o < < ri &Jc t coswf i
* ....
. ... .
. CO . 'j i.
. :
.. ... : . i; .«
a .soiloeil* lottott&oubo 1 > osoqurq i*di ol ioodoo iBtf^wtelivqx©
•• ai©je, f f -*';:•••• ctcitae*** a/f;f Jii.j e© aC .cicrfw Xoo4da
;
-
*••
-x .’ - .. . . • •• ,n i • ;•• .:v.o9", ' c : : . nr;-
to. * •• oqicrc; teitt eieoxiJ erftf ^fcblotoar rfoirfw
,
( e8£ X >too£ . • c
nl >cT t a lc • edi M>;\/.r.
.. oce /*:©*; . at X' c-doi :
'•
.1:
'.- i Jo i i £ J
.'tdqoo<Uric sisolis. t . . joX ' rv .0tf osr
continued to lecture and write. Five significant books have come from his
pen, — Individualism
,
Old and New (1930)
,
Philosophy and Civilization
(1931) , Art as Experience (1934) , A Common Faith (1934) , and Liberalism
and Social Action (1935).
John Dewey’s life, long and productive, has been rich in honors. He
possesses honorary degrees from universities here and abroad. Profession-
ally he has been accorded the highest honors in the power of his colleagues
to bestow. He is a past president of the American Psychological Associ-
ation (1899-1900), of the American Philosophical Association (1905-6), a
member of the National Academy of Science, and a corresponding member of
L’Institut de France.^ He is holder of the most distinguished lecture-
ships in this country and abroad, — at the Imperial University of Japan
(1920), the first series on the Paul Carus Foundation (1925) (to which
he was chosen by a committee of the Eastern and Western Divisions of the
American Philosophical Association), the Gifford Lectures at the Scottish
Universities (1929) (James and Royce being the only other Americans to be
so honored), the William James Lecture at Harvard (1931), and the Terry
Lectures on Religion at Yale (1934).
Naturally, Dewey has wielded great influence upon the thought and
practice of our time. The professional honors just mentioned which have
come to him testify to his philosophical influence. In education the
experimental methods first enunciated by him at the University of Chicago
have revolutionized the school system of america.* 7 His fame as a
5
16. WWA, XVIII, 713.
17. For the best accounts of Dewey’s influence upon education see the
papers prepared for his seventieth-birthday-celebration by J. H.
Newlon, Art. 1, 691-700 and E. C. Moore, Art. 1, 37-47. For the
best account of his general influence, see Holmes and others, JDMP.
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leader in educational reconstruction has brought him official invitations
from China to lecture to teachers on educational reform (1919-20), from
the Turkish government to report on the reorganization of the national
schools (1924)
,
and from the Russian government to appraise the new
regime (1928).18 He has been an acknowledged leader of social thought
in this country,18 was for some years associated with Jane Addams, 20
and through his disciples has been one of the liberalizing forces in
American life.21 His influence in the arena of practical politics has
been felt in his sponsorship of the People’s Lobby, the League for In-
dependent Political Action, of which he is national chairman, and his
chairmanship of the international commission investigating the Moscow
trials of Leon Trotzky.^^ In the field of religion the humanistic
movement,23 which has shown considerable strength in certain quarters*
18. Cf. Han, MOD, 3
19. Cf. Robinson, ILP, 246.
20. Cf. J. W. Linn, JA, 386, 375.
21. "Croly, Kallen, Lippmann, Robinson, van Loon, LaPollette, Eastman,
Baker, Howe, John Haynes Holmes, Rabbi Wise, Clarence Barrow, —
such, with scores of others, are the men who have colored the
very action of our world with the thought of this man.” Quoted,
Wagner, SR, 729 (source not given).
22.
Cf. N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1937, 1.
3
Cf. "A Humanist Manifesto”, published in May, 1933, setting forth
the tenets of humanist belief. See Potter, HR, 6-15.
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is built on Dewey’s naturalistic philosophy. 24 Professor Wagner is with-
in the truth when he says, '’Although Dewey is still relatively unknown to
most citizens, it is very likely that he has had more to do with molding
their careers than any other living American.”25
We are to investigate, then, in this dissertation the religious
views of the most distinguished American philosopher of our day, — one
who has swung the full orbit of philosophical thinking,26 whose interests
are as wide as experience, and whose influence has been felt, not only
in the classroom, but in the world of practical affairs.
B . THE PROBLEM
The problem of the dissertation is to answer two questions: (1) What
is John Dewey’s interpretation of religion? (2) Is his interpretation
valid? Upon analysis, (1) resolves itself into the following subordinate
24. R. G. Hall: ’’The humanistic drive of the present day goes back to
Dewey more than to any other individual.” Art. 1, 339.
0. A. Petty: Dewey’s Naturalism is ’’the suppressed major premise of
American Humanism.'’ CSG, 10.
E. W. Lyman: ’’Dewey’s naturalism underlies the interpretations of
religion by A. E. Haydon, cf. The Quest of the Ages ; by M. C. Otto,
cf. Things and Ideals ; and by H. N. Wieman.” MTR, 233 note.
D. C. Macintosh: ”0f contemporary American antitheist ical humanism
in general, however, the true father — or should we say the grand-
father? — is John Dewey.” Contemporary Humanism”, HABL, 44.
25. SR, 729.
26. Dewey was reared and educated in ”a convent ionally evangelical
atmosphere of the more ’liberal* sort” (Art. 85, 15), learned his
first philosophy from an intuitionalist
,
became in his graduate days
an Hegelian, developed into a pragmatist with naturalist ic leanings
in the later years, and yet confesses that it is Plato who still
provides his favorite philosophical reading. (Ibid, 21)

problems:
(a) What is Dewey’s position with reference to the historic religious
tradition of the Western world?
(b) What is his theory of the nature of "the religious”?27
(c) What does he conceive to be the true object of faith?
(d) What does he affirm about man, ’’the human abode of the religious
function”?28
(e) How does he interpret the basic problems of religion (i.e., the
phenomena of personal and institutional religion, the problems
of evil, of immortality, and of the goal of human history)?
An analysis of (2) involves the following more specific questions:
(a) Is Dewey’s interpretation of religion internally consistent?
(b) Has it taken into consideration all the facts?
(c) Is it philosophically fruitful (i.e., does it contain insights
or raise problems which contribute to the development of
philosophical thought about religion)?
The purpose of this dissertation is, therefore, both systematic and
critical, — to expound Dewey’s theory of religion and to evaluate it.
C. THE MEANING OP "NATURALISTIC"
The subject for investigation, as already stated, is "The
Naturalistic Interpretation of Religion by John Dewey.” The question
arises at once with regard to the meaning of the term "naturalistic” in
connection with Dewey's interpretation of religion*
27l Cf.
,
CF, 3.
28. Cf.
,
ibid, 59.
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/Dewey often uses the term to characterize his thought. As early as
29
1905 he called himself a "natural realist." In 1907 in a letter to
William James he described his views as naturalistic as contrasted with
30those of humanistic pragmatism:
The antecedents of humanism, via personal idealism, were distinctly
an idealistic metaphysics. % own views are much more naturalistic,
and a reaction against not merely intellectualistic and monistic ideal-
ism but against all idealism, except, of course, in the sense of ethical
ideals.
In his spirited defense of his right to the title of "naturalist" in contror
versy with Santayana, he designated his philosophy "empirical naturalism"
or "naturalistic empiricism."31 Experience and Nature says that his
doctrine, as there set forth, is "either empirical naturalism or natural-
istic empiricism, or, talcing ’experience’ in its usual signification,
ntn
naturalistic humanism.” 7/hat is the meaning of "naturalistic” as
Dewey uses it, particularly in connection with his interpretation of
religion?
In a sense it is the task of the dissertation as a whole to define
the meaning of "naturalistic" as Dewey employs the term with reference to
his theory of religion. At this stage, however, we may say, summarily,
that Dewey’s interpretation of religion is "naturalistic" in three
respects:
1. He rejects supernatural ism. The supernatural and the things
that have grown up about it Dewey characterizes as "encumbrances" in the
IT. ii.rt . 30, 324-7.
30. Letter to William James, November 28, 1907; Perry, TCJ, II, 528.
31. Cf. Art. 76, 57.
32. EAN2
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opening paragraphs of his Common Faith and says that "what is genuinely
religious will undergo an emancipation when it is relieved from them.*' 33
As we shall see in Chapter II of this study, he inveighs against the
evils of supernaturalism in all of his major works of the past fifteen
years.
2. He regards man, individual and social, "the human abode of the
religious function”, as a part of nature. 34
3. He conceives of religion as "naturalistic" in its "foundations
and bearings." 35 True religious faith, he asserts, attaches itself to
the "possibilities of nature." 36God, for him, is not a transcendent being
but the unity, imaginatively grasped, of the ideal possibilities of
existence. 37 Nature is the matrix "within which our ideal aspirations
are born and bred." 3® Not only are the foundations of religion "natural-
istic", but the ultimate bearing of religious faith is upon nature.
Religion eventuates in "an idealism of action" for the re-shaping of
nature, a "reorganization of the existent" so that "approved meanings
are attained." 3%ature "ceases to be something which must be accepted
and submitted to, endured or enjoyed, just as it is. It is now something
to be modified, to be intentionally controlled." 40
33. CF, 2.
34. "It is quite true that in my whole philosophy I regard man as part
of nature." Art. 91, 1552.
35. CF, 57.
36. QFC, 306.
37. CF, 50*
38. CF, 85.
39. QFC, 304, 306.
40. Ibid. 100.
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It is to be noted that Dewey’s philosophy is not naturalistic in the
nineteenth-century sense of the term, — mechanistic materialism. Dewey
regards such materialism as contrary to fact. 4* The Newtonian
philosophy of nature, wherein "dead matter moved under the impulse of in-
sensate forces," he says, is "now discredited", the principle of indeter-
minacy of the newer physics being the final step of its dislodgement . 42
Nature is not a mechanism in the older mathematically-predetermined sense,
but "something problematic, undecided, still going^on and as yet un-
finished and indeterminate." 4^ It is amenable to intelligent human
44
control.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
The purpose of the dissertation, as we have said, is to expound and
evaluate Dewey’s interpretation of religion. The study proper begins with
Chapter II, which seeks to relate Dewey’s point of view to the historic,
Graeco-Christian religious tradition of the Western world that forms the
background of our religious life. He is exceedingly critical of this
tradition, and the chapter mentioned seeks to expound his critique of
the particular object of offense in it, — the belief in the supernatural.
41. "Historically speaking, materialism and mechanistic metaphysics —
as distinct from mechanistic science — designate the doctrine that
matter is the efficient cause of life and mind, and that * cause’
occupies a position superior in reality to that of ’effect.* Both
parts of this statement are contrary to fact." EAN, 262. Matter
is not a metaphysical cause but a character of natural events. Cf.
EAN, 73, 74, 262.
42. ^FC, 110, 98, 204.
43. EAN, 348-9.
44. QFC, 106.
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Having disposed of historic supernaturalism, Dewey essays to give a
’’normative” definition of religion. Chapter III of the dissertation, "A
Common Faith”, sets forth what Dewey believes religion to be. The burden
of the chapter is to expound his theory of ”the religious”, his con-
ception of God, his view of the human abode of religion, and his solution
for the perennial problems of religion.
An analysis of Dewey’s critique of historic religion, as well as
his own interpretation, will reveal, we believe, two presuppositions:
(1) that scientific method is the only certain method of arriving at the
truth; and, hence, the existence of supernatural objects of faith can
never be established; and (2) that man by the use of scientific resources
is capable of indefinite progress; his needs can be satisfied without
reference to more-than-natural powers. Chapter IV of the dissertation
is devoted to the examination of (1), while Chapter V will seek critically
to evaluate (2).
The last brief section contains a summary of the dissertation and
a statement of conclusions. A bibliography of works cited and consulted
completes the study.
E. SURVEY OF THE LITEEATUBE
The literature on the problem of the dissertation is surprisingly
meager. While much has been written on the several phases of Dewey’s
thought, only comparatively few authors have undertaken an exposition
or appraisal of his religious views. In this section we shall mention
the more significant of these.45
45. The authentic bibliography of works by and about Dewey is Thomas
and Schneider, BJB.
" ,acl^ J i tBlb i t T III itfr* ? .aol hi- lc .••jjjj 'sJb „o*t. •
•aol^.l £• f .; ;
.
- l*innt*ife-' . 't to'*
noi oljb et<S !to YI t9^( dO .en <_ etsrt&H-n&dtr&roa os 9© •?-' y
. » .Xers or
•C - la s»w aclJoos ei,.r ul ,m .ol» eool^.1 •'*>".• ei.i ?o Lee ; - irra., : - j
.u,;,
,
••
.
There have been no books written upon Dewey’s interpretation of
religion, although there are several that deal with broader subjects and
treat his views in the course of their argument. Edgar Sheffield
Bright man has given a succinct account of Dewey’s treatment of religious
values, together with a criticism of it, in his Religious Values (1925),
as well as in The Problem of God ( 1930 ).^ Charles Hartshorne has de-
voted a chapter to criticism of Dewey’s naturalistic interpretation of
religion in his Beyond Humanism (1937). William E. Hocking’ s little
book of Thoughts on Death and Life (1937) has some sharp observations on
Dewey’s Common Faith, though only passing reference is paid to it. Orville
A. Petty, in a critique of religious humanism, devotes some caustic pages
to Dewey’s thought as supplying the philosophical foundation for the
doctrines of the school (1936).47 Hugh Vernon White appends a review of
A Common Faith as a sort of after-thought to his Theology for Christian
Missions (1937) . American Philosophies of Religion by H. N. Wieman and
B. E. Meland gives a part of one chapter to Dewey, interpreting him in-
48
correctly, we believe, as a theist (1936). While containing material
relevant to the problem of this study, none of these books can
be called thoroughgoing investigations of Dewey's philosophy of religion
as a whole.
Besides single-page reviews of Dewey books, a few scattering articles
have appeared on his religious theory. The Christian Century has pub-
lished a short symposium on the question, ”Is John Dewey a Theist?”,
46! RV, 140-52; PG, 52-58.
47. CSG, Chapters II, III, et passim.
48. None of these works are cited by Thomas and Schneider, op. cit.
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H. N. Wieman arguing pro and E. E. Aubrey and Dewey himself arguing con .49
J. W. Buckham gives a brief exposition and critique of A Common Faith
in the Journal of Religion .50 An article by R. G. Hall in Open Court
on ’’The Significance of John Dewey for Religious Interpretation” sets
forth the factors in Dewey’s general philosophy which make themselves
manifest in his interpretation of religion.5* Its value is conditioned
by the fact, however, that it was written before Dewey’s most explicit
works on religion appeared. A. E. Haydon, the humanist, gives us a
short, naturalistic interpretation of Dewey’s God.52 H. H. Horne has
written a monograph, brief and not too accurate, on ’’John Dewey’s
Philosophy, Especially The Quest for Certainty , ’’which states the religious
implications of his philosophy . 55 Professor Otto has written a short
appraisal of Dewey's religious views from the standpoint of a humanist. 54
H. P. Van Dusen’s ten-page exposition of "The Faith of John Dewey” in
Religion and Life is excellent, but, of course, too brief. 55 H. N.
Wieman has written several articles on Dewey for the Journal of Religion
and The Christian Century
,
but their interpretation of Dewey’s God is
repudiated by Dewey himself. 55
49. 51(1934), 1550-53.
50. Buckham, Art. 1.
51. Hall, Art. 1.
52. Haydon, Art. 1.
53. Horne, Art. 1.
54. Otto, Art. 2.
55. Van Dusen, Art. 1
56. Cf. Art. 91, 1552-3. For Wieman* s articles on Dewey, see
Bibliography, Section B.
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The citation of these few sources indicates the meager work that has
been done in the field of this dissertation. To our knowledge there has
been nothing written which exceeds twenty-five consecutive pages in length.
Much of that which has been produced is open to question touching its
interpretation of Dewey’s views. This investigation, therefore, deals
with an aspect of Dewey’s thinking which has not yet had adequate treat-
ment by students of the philosophy of religion.^ 7
F. THE SOURCES
We turn from a survey of writings about Dewey to his own works. The
development of his religious views, as garnered from his writings, may
be divided, roughly, into four periods:
I. 1992-90. During these years Dewey’s point of view was theistic.
Since, however, we are interested in his early viewpoint only in a pass-
ing way, it will not be necessary to cite his early writings.
II. 1990-1920. This period of thirty years was, broadly speaking,
a period of indifference on Dewey’s part to religion. His early
57. Two reasons, at least, may be offered for the sparsity of material
on Dewey’s interpretation of religion. In the first place, Dewey’s
interest throughout the years has not been primarily religious but
educational and social. He confesses in his spiritual autobiography,
"Social interests and problems from an early period had to me the
intellectual appeal and provided an intellectual sustenance that
many seem to have found primarily in religious questions ." (Art . 95,
20). Hence,until recently (since 1928) he had written very little
specifically about religion. Secondly, judged by traditional super-
naturalistic standards there is little in Dewey that is religious.
Religion for him is the monopoly of no special institution but the
spiritual import of our common life together; economics, education,
and science being as truly "religious" as corporate worship. (Cf.
Hall, Art. 1, 338.) Hence, because he was not interested in religion
in its traditional meaning and because religion in Dewey’s sense
does not seem religious to many, there was very little primary
material about which a literature could grow.
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friendliness to theism cooled off. His attention was occupied with ex-
perimental ventures in education and with the development of his instru-
mentalistic philosophy. Only incidental writings pertain to religion.
Within this period, however, Dewey produced works which are significant as
laying the ground principles for his later philosophy of religion. Of
these the following are the most noteworthy:
A. In the development of his theory of knowledge:
1. "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?”, one of the
5 8
essays in the volume in honor of William James (1908).
2. How We Think (1910).
3. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays
in Contemporary Thought . (1910).
4. Essays in Experimental Logic (1916).
B. In the development of his notion of human progress:
1. "Progress.” (1916).
2. Democracy and Education . (1916). 60
3. "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy” (1917). ^
III. 1920-1929. During these years the implications of his instru-
mentalistic philosophy worked themselves out in a sharp critique of the
classic religious tradition, set forth especially in his three great
58. Art. 37.
59. Art. 53.
60. Dewey says, "Although a hook called Democracy and Education was for
many years that in which ray philosophy, such as it is, was most
fully expounded, I do not know that philosophic critics, as distinct
from teachers, have ever had recourse to it.” Art. 85, 22-23.
61. Cl, 3-69
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books of the period:
1.
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), which characterizes
classic philosophy as "compensatory’', dialectically formal,
and concerned with a supernatural Reality and calls for
reconstruction in the name of a philosophy that will enlighten
"the moral forces which move mankind" and contribute "to the
aspirations of men to attain to a more ordered and intelligent
happiness
2.
Experience and Nature (1925), which indicts the classic
tradition for its dualisms, which the book seeks to replace
by its concept of continuity; 1’3
3.
The Quest for Certainty (1929), which attacks the specious
claims of the Aristotelian tradition to certainty, pointing
out that the only certainty worthy of the name is that arising
from experimentally-verified control.^4
The subject-matter of Chapter II of the dissertation, "The Attack on the
Supernatural", is drawn mostly from these sources.
IV. 1929 to the present. Having disposed of the classic religious
tradition (though he never really relinquishes the attack)
,
Dewey entered
upon a period of more positive thought concerning religion which finds
most complete expression in A Common Faith (1934), his conception of what
religion ought to be. Besides this book there are several articles that
62. Cf. RPH, 18, 20, 22, 27.
63. Cf. EAN^, III.
64. Cf. QFC
,
Chapters I, IV.

help to define his theory of religion;
1. ”What I Believe” in the Forum (1930)
,
65 which is probably
the best-expressed exposition of Dewey* s philosophy within
brief compass;
2. "A God or The God” in the Christian Century (1933),66
a discussion of the meaning of ”God”;
3. ” Humanist Manifesto” (1933), a statement of the tenets
of religious humanism, of which Dewey is a signer; 67
4 . ”The Liberation of Religion” (1934 ) ,68 an abstract of
A Common Faith ;
5« ”Is John Dewey a The ist?” (1934), 69 which makes more
explicit his conception of God.
These writings form the basis for the discussion in Chapter III of the
dissertation.
G. DEWEY’S EARLY religious views
It is the avowed purpose of this study to treat Dewey’s interpretation
of religion as it appears in the mature years of his development. Before
65. Art. 66.
66. Art. 89.
67. This ’’Manifesto” was prepared under the auspices of the New Humanist
and released to the press, May 1, 1933. The original draft was
written by Professor Roy Wood Sellars and then revised by C. W.
Reese, a. E. Haydon, R. B. Bragg, E. H. Wilson, and Robert Morss
Lovett. It was submitted to Dewey, who signed it, without reservation
or comment, according to a personal letter from E. H. Wilson to the
writer.
68. Art. 93.
69. Art. 91.
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proceeding to the task, however, a word may he in order concerning his
early religious views.
As Dewey tells us, he was reared in " a conventionally evangelical
atmosphere of the more ' liberal * sort. "70 As we may expect, his early
writings show a distinct friendliness to religion of the traditional
kind. Their tone is one not of revolt hut of respect for religion. He
contributed to the Andover Review and Bibliotheca Sacra
,
religious
publications. 71 Such expressions as "the ever-valid religious ideas", 72
"our theology", 7^ "those sublime words of the Apostle's Creed, 'I
believe in the resurrection of the body,"’ 7^ and the statement that the
notion of democracy "in grandeur has but one equal in history, and that
its fellow, namely, that every man is a priest of God"75 reflect an
attitude that is never felt again in Dewey's writings. Anti-religious
philosophies such as materialism, with "its reversed logic, which
attempts to get the higher from the lower, instead of accounting for the
70. Art. 85, 15.
71. See Bibliography.
72. Art. 13, 694.
73. This passage reflects his friendliness to religion: He says, in
reviewing Sterrett's Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion
,
"I cannot but think it a happy omen in the present juncture of our
theology, when the attempt to find God immanent in the world and
in history is becoming so manifest, that Dr. Sterrett should give
us a book whose whole trend is so forcibly and consciously in that
direction." Ibid, 685.
74. A student of Dewey's later naturalism would find it difficult to be-
lieve that he ever wrote these words: "There is the body, the natural
body, first. Spirit indwells within the body, and manifesting itself
realizing its own nature, it makes that body its own organ and
servant. It makes it the spiritual It is by no accident or
meaningless chance that we read in the Apostles' Creed those sublime
words: 'I believe in the Resurrection of the Body.'" Art. 5, 263.
75. ETHD, 14.
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lower on the ground of the higher”, 7& agnosticism, which is but”a transi-
tory resting-place”, 77 and Darwinism, with its anti-theist ical
implications
,
78 receive short shrift from him in these early articles.
He insists that theology is essential to ethics, and whatever discounts
76. Art. 5, 247.
77. ”Agnosticism is by nature a compromise. It is a treaty of partition
which would divide the kingdom of reality into halves, and proclaim
one supernatural and unknowable, the other natural and the realm
of knowledge.” Art. 7, 574.
78.
Dewey says that the argument which seeks to explain purposiveness
in nature by appeal to ’’variations”, ’’survival of the fittest”,
’’selection”, and the like ”is suicidal. It only changes the special
case into a general law. It gets rid of the primitive purposiveness
of, say, a given reflex act, only by importing purposiveness, and thus
intelligence, into the very structure of nature. It simply says that
nature is such that, by the observance of its own law as ascertained
by science, it gives rise to action for and by ends Darwinism,
far from overthrowing this principle, merely establishes it as a
general law of the universe, of the structure of things. Nature
is made theological all the way through.” (Art. 5, 250) This is
essentially the same point that Bowne makes in his argument that the
’’survival of the fittest” is not the problem for naturalism to solve
but "the arrival of the fit.” (See B. P. Bowne, MET, 280.) Dewey
has to say of Spencer: ’’There is indeed an anthropomorphism which
is degrading, but it is anthropomorphism which sets up the feeblest
element of its own thinking, pure being, as Mr. Spencer does, or the
poorest element of its own feeling, a sensation, and reverences that
as its own and the universe’s cause. That is the anthropomorphism
of the enslaved thought which has not yet awakened to the conscious-
ness of its own totality and spiritual freedom.” Art. 6, 169.
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the former destroys the latter. Dewey’s first articles, as we have
seen, are unmistakably friendly to traditional ’’supernaturalistic” (to
use Dewey’s later term of reproach) Christianity.
When we examine Dewey’s conception of the nature of religion more
closely, it appears, from the scant evidence we have, to be closely allied
with morals. True religious feeling arises out of moral experience; the
gulf between the actual and the ideal which occurs in the moral life can
be overcome only through identification of the self in religion with an
ideal which is actual, God. ’’Religious experience is the sphere in which
this identification of one’s self with the completely realized personality,
or God, occurs. The heart of religion, then, is surrender, 81 which,
like ail life, involves faith. 82
79. ”We believe that the cause of theology and morals is one, and that
whatever banishes God from the heart of things, with the same edict
excludes the ideal, the ethical, from the life of man. Whatever
exiles theology makes ethics an expatriate. And we believe these
things not from obstinacy, nor from traditional prejudice, as it
seems to us, nor yet alone from a mere conviction that supernatural
restraint and sanction are needed for the practical moralizing
of humanity; but we are convinced that the physical interpretation
of the universe is one which necessarily shuts out those ideas
and principles which are fundamental to ethics; we are sure that an
interpretation of reality which confines it to the coexistences of
space, the sequences of time, and the reign of mechanical law, is
fatal at once to the categories of morals and to the attitude of the
practical life or morality.” Art. 7, 577.
80. PS
3
,
338.
91. Ibid, 339.
82. ”Since the entire intellectual, aesthetic, and moral life is one of
idealization, it is evident that the f#eling of faith, which religion
insists upon and induces, is the feeling which is implicitly in-
volved in all experience whatever.” (PS3
,
340) Borden Parker Bowne
could have written this sentence!
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Cod is conceived of as "the organic unity of the self and the world,
of the ideal and the real”, — "the true self-related.” 03 He is the
Absolute.04 He is not conceived pantheist ically
,
05 however, but in a
personalistic fashion, — as "the perfect and universal personality."00
Though bewey’s views on religion in this period must be drawn from
fleeting, scattered remarks on the subject, it is clear that Hegel’s
philosophy, in which he had been immersed in the early years, had in-
fluenced to some extent his own thought about religion. 07 (1) As we have
suggested, he identified Cod with the Absolute. (2) He conceived of the
essence of religion the identification of the finite self with the ideal
self. 00 Hegel had insisted before him that true religion is manifested
in the reconciliation of man and Cod through return of the isolated finite
mind into identity with God. 00 (3) Levey * s belief that the philosophy
of religion is the true apologetic for religion is in keeping with Hegel’s
view that philosophy gives us the exact and adequate concepts or notions
83. Op. cit
. ,
244.
94. Cf. Art. 6, 157.
95. Pantheism, particularly of the Spinozistic variety, he holds to be
logically untenable. Art. 2, 257.
96. PS3
,
340.
87. He says of Hegel’s contribution to theology: "Both in this higher
work (of showing the authority of the absolute idea of Religion) and
in the translating of the ever-valid religious ideas out of outworn
and inadequate forms and language into more adequate and convincing
modern forms theology has much to learn from Hegel." Art. 13, 684.
88. Cf., Supra, 21.
Cf. EPW, III Teil, #566.89.
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of reality. 90
il
Prom the early nineties on this friendliness of Dewey for religion
gradually disappears. Dewey never returns to the friendly, theistic
view of religion that he sponsored in the first decade of his professional
life.
The question will be raised as to why Dewey departed from the faith
he held in his younger years, A categorical answer probably cannot be
given, but several explanations of it have merit in them. In the first
place, his professional duties were non-religious in the technical sense
of the term. He was a professor of psychology, philosophy, and education.
He became absorbed in developing and defending new practices and theories
in education. By that law which prescribes that functions not exercised
shall atrophy, his very successes in philosophy and pedagogy militated
against the retention of interest in religion.
Secondly, it is likely that Dewey himself consciously kept aloof from
religion that the objectivity of the philosopher might not be impaired.
91
He says in One place,
I have not been able to attach much importance to religion as a
philosophic problem; for the effect of that attachment seems to be
in the end a subornation of candid philosophic thinking to the alleged
but factitious needs of some special set of convictions.
Further, it is possible that his indifference to religion grew out of
unfortunate experiences with religion or religious people. Dewey’s own
90. Dewey says that he is ”in heartiest sympathy” with the view that ”a
Philosophy of Religion is the only final Apologetic for Christianity.”
(Art. 13, 684, 695) As for Hegel it may be said that the whole course
of his metaphysics ”is, indeed, an argument for the existence of God.”
Calkins, PPP, 392.
91. Art. 85, 20.
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testimony is contradictory at this point. In his intellectual autobiography
,
’’From Absolutism to Experimental ism"
,
he says, 92
I was brought up in a conventionally evangelical atmosphere of the
more ’liberal* sort; and the struggles that later arose between accept-
ance of that faith and the discarding of traditional and institutional
creeds came from personal experiences and not from the effects of
philosophical teaching.
Three years afterward, however, when Professor Macintosh suggested
that unfortunate experiences had perhaps colored his views of religion
he was quiet to deny it, maintaining that his attitude toward religion
was the outcome of his philosophical development .93
I will state that nothing untoward has happened, and that ray present
attitude toward theology, various creeds and various philosophies of
religion developed slowly and pari passu with the general maturing of
ay philosophic ideas.
It seems to us that this is the fundamental reason for Dewey's
apostasy from his early faith. As we shall see in Chapters IV and V, an
instrumentalistic, humanistic philosophy leaves no place for religion in
the traditional sense. Dewey probably did not realize it when his thought
first began to move in these directions. But as he began to draw out the
implications of his philosophy its irreconcilability with historic
religions must have become ever more plain. It seems to us more than
historical coincidence that in the same decade (1890-1900) in which
instrumentalistic trends began to assert themselves sympathy with
traditional theism faded out and that toward the close of Dewey’s career,
92. Loc. cit
.
93. Art. 90, 394
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as he proceeded to tie up the loose ends of his thought
,
he should take
a position diametrically opposed to those beliefs he had once cherished.
We turn now to a consideration of the attack upon historic super-
naturalism which characterizes his later thinking.
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CHAPTER II
THE ATTACK ON THE SUPERNATURAL
We begin the discussion of Dewey’s philosophy of religion by an en-
deavor to relate it to the religious tradition which has prevailed in the
Western world for some two thousand years, — the historic Graeco-
Christian tradition. Before we can understand the significance of his
theory of religion we must establish his position with reference to that
general conception of religion which still occupies the central place in
Occidental thought, and against which he is in revolt. The distinguish-
ing characteristic of this tradition, Lewey affirms, is its faith in ’’the
supernatural.”^ The task of this chapter will be to expound Dewey’s view
concerning ”the supernatural.”
A. THE MEANING OP ”THE SUPERNATURAL”
"The supernatural", against which a great deal of Dewey’s philo-
sophical writing is directed, is defined by him as "that which lies beyond
experience. ”2 Our attention is turned at once to the meaning of "ex-
perience" in his thought.
1. The Meaning of "Experience” in Dewey’s Thought . There are two
general conceptions of "experience” represented in Dewey’s mature
1. Art. 86, 177.
2. Loc. cit. This, to our knowledge, is Dewey’s only definition of "the
supernatural .”
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2thought. In the first place, he conceives of "experience" as "the inter-
action of the organism with its environment." 4 It is
the entire organic agent-patient in all its interaction with the environ-
ment, natural and social ... .Experiencing i_s_ just certain modes of inter-
action, of correlation of natural objects among which the organism
happens, so to say, to be one. It follows with equal force that ex-
perience means primarily not knowledge, but ways of doing and suffer-
ing.
5
Consciousness is only a very small and shifting portion of experience.
In the experience are all the physical features of the environment,
extending out in space. .. .and. .. .time
,
and the habits and interests....
of the organism. ....
According to this definition the "supernatural" would be that which
lies beyond interaction with the organism. A transcendent God would
plainly be supernatural on this view. But this definition is too broad
Jfor Dewey's purposes, because he is an opponent of theism as well as deism.
For, if we assume, as personal idealism does, that nature is throughout
the experience, and in part at least, the activity of the divine Will the
organism is (metaphysically conceived) in constant interaction with God.
I
To be sure, Dewey does not think of God on this wise, but his definition
of "experience”, literally taken, does not exclude such a position. Any
immanental view of God holds to the fact of interaction between the human
person (organism) and God.
(I
(!
!l
3. The writer is indebted here to two Ph.D. dissertations dealing with
Dewey's notion of "experience", — Y. S. Han's "Meaning of Experience
in the Thought of John Dewey” (Boston University, 1929) and W. T.
Feldman' s The Philosophy of John Dewey : A Critical Analysis ( Johns
Hopkins University, 1934).
4. This, we take it, is what Han means when he describes "experience" in
Dewey's thought as "the whole of life process." Op. cit., 148
5. Cl, 36, 37.
6. EEL, 6, 7.
7. See Humanist Manifesto, #6. Potter, HE, 6-15.
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In the second place, Dewey regards ’’experience” in some of his writings
as ’’the hare occurrence of qualitative immediacy,” — a view called
’’immediate empiricism.”®
Immediate empiricism postulates that things — anything, everything,
in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term ’thing’ — are what
they are experienced as.®
I start and am flustered by a noise heard. Empirically, that noise is.
fearsome; it really is, not merely phenomenally or subjectively so.
That is what it is experienced as being. But, when I experience the
noise as a known thing, I find it to be innocent of harm. It is the
tapping of a shade against the window, owing to movements of the wind.
The experience has changed; that is, the thing experienced has changed
— not that an unreality has given place to a reality, not that some
transcendental (unexperienced) Reality has changed, not that truth has
changed, but just and only the concrete reality experienced has
changed.
Empirically, things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled,
disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid,
fearful; are such immediately and in their own right and behalf
These traits stand in themselves on precisely the same level as colors,
sounds, qualities of contact, taste and smell. 11
In itself, the object is just what it is experienced as being, hard,
heavy, sweet, sonorous, agreeable or tedious and so on. But in being
’there’ these traits are effects, not causes. 12
We experience things as they really are apart from knowing, and
knowledge is a mode of experiencing things which facilitates control
of objects for purposes of non-cognitive experience. 13
8. Cf. Feldman, op. cit., 20.
9. ILP, 227.
10.
Ibid, 230.
11. EAR, 96.
12. QFC, 131.
13. Ibid, 98.
9S
\-
.08 \Xe7i 10 \L Lanemonetiq \lnim ton ,«x \ I. Xaai tl ssctcauael
e rti .. .if . -•
,
tju a .* . tf bor-n-j -ceo • . r £i *»r;
d.v ei II .0«uif 1© ;;::c ;i arf o$ #1 ball I . * .: i* s* aaicu
.^nlw edt Jo ztnomovon © J '~n.:wc
,
woimiw erfl Jaxias* obxulfi a lo &ni;<xq*2
race Jon ,x$XI*- oJ ©a*Iq fifcvij, ejsxi - r ua i&iii Jon —
ear: oeoi39ii9qxa ©toion.* odt \Ino hi Jewt j! • -
Qt.be&vuio
t blhn& z t -i,'illosao9 t derred ,n9rix.i' , ilxoniw , : .Jbed-r, . . .h aso ileiit al ban xI*Jaii>9aui dure e*x
,
, ad
,
Aii x 9tf e* Jb93fl' :i8c ;j e Ji i.- i feirfc ei #c «lXr *--U nl
.
^.£
- 0 ;on ,810911© 91£ 3*: : 9S0f!J ’9*1: il*
,gr. . VOitji *:' r: • <?. ••;/ \HA 91 vr r. ' ?.* <:
:
j Ml 90 R--illi>qX.e 6«
Xoilnbo E9 lxioiIipJ8l dpi • r^nlor nr&qxs 1 © ber 1 ai =n\©8l*roxx2<
98 ioa lad! ,xX -Joxilqaii .L-xa . axon a x© i)s*u . X'll cj.e X>f . . .Jiala I
«.II*- x>na elux,# p*fnoo lo • sir XI \ ,Ei.-iufct
^.son .'oo- •« j ac'! ejostdo j
.C
,
.Ji© .qo ,n.e&IeS .10 .8
.?$s .e
. 5S ,MdI .01
.3e . ... :• .XI
.
.K-
,
‘id 1 ...
From this derogation of the things we experience by way of love, desire,
hope, fear, purpose and the traits characteristic of human individuali-
ty, we are saved by the realization of the purposefully instrumental
and abstract character of objects of reflective knowledge. One mode
of experience is as real as any other. 1^
According to this view of ’’experience” the supernatural would be that
which lies beyond immediate awareness. But in this sense everything, other
than the experience itself, would be ’’supernatural”
,
since the causes of
the experience are not contained in it.15 Further, since experience is
non-cognitive and ”one mode of experience is as real as another,”
mystical experiences, to which Dewey denies ontological validity in some
of his writings, would, so far as the experience per se is concerned, have
as much claim to acceptance as any other Strictly speaking, this
view of experience does not rule out God and those objects usually called
go
supernatural, unless one be prepared to^the whole way and rule out every-
thing else, except the fact of awareness which is the experience.
But even if a consistent view of experience were worked out, the fact
that a given object ’’transcends experience” would not connote all that
Dewey means by ”the supernatural.” The contradictory notion of a square
circle, subsisting in some critical realist’s realm of essence, may be
said to transcend experience, and yet it is not against such objects that
Dewey’s polemic is raised. There is about the term "supernatural” a
certain ’’eulogistic” flavor (to use a Dewey expression). It has certain
axiological connotations. It seems to us, therefore, that we shall best
I
147 Op. ci t
. ,
219^
15. See fourth quotation above.
16. See an article by H. N. Wieman which seeks to derive support for
mysticism in Dewey’s doctrine of immediate, non-cognitive experience.
(Art. 1).
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understand Dewey’s meaning of the term if we sketch briefly the broader
features of the classic tradition, the supernatural ism of which is so
repugnant to him.
2. The Classic Tradition . The classic tradition in philosophy is
that which has its source in Greek thought and life, particularly in the
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. This philosophic tradition was met by
another stream of tradition of a religious sort, the Christian, and their
intermingling and mutual influence upon one another provides the matrix
from which all of the religious philosophies of the Western world have come.
When we examine that tradition, with Dewey’s help, there are several
broad features of it which are evident at once. Epistemologically, this
tradition is characterized by an exaltation of the theoretical over the
practical. Greek thought made a distinction between two kinds of knowing,
that which is scientific or theoretical and that which is practical. Re-
viewing the various orders of human knowledge in one place Aristotle re-
marks that the experienced man is wiser than he whose knowledge is
restricted to perceptions and recollections; but the man of theoretic
knowledge is wiser than the merely experienced; the director of an under-
taking involving art of skill than the manual laborer; while the man whose
life is devoted to science (which deals with being) is wiser than he who
seeks knowledge only in view of its application to practical -uses; and
in the sphere of scientific knowledge that is highest which respects the
highest of ultimate reasons and causes of things, — wisdom in the strict
17
and absolute sense of the word. Theology which has to do with the
17. Cf. Met., I, cc. 1, 2.
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ultimate objects of knowledge is higher than those sciences that have to
do with practical affairs, — ethics, economics, and politics. 19 The
objects of science are the objects of reason, — universal and necessary,
while opinion alone is concerned with whatever is subject to variation.1 ^
Experience was deemed by the Greek thinkers as unable to deliver necessary
truths. Its conclusions were particular, not universal. Reason alone
could give cognitive certainty. Reason, as we have suggested, was purely
POtheoretical, and pure contemplation was regarded as the highest virtue.
Epistemologically there was a fundamental dualism between knowing and
doing, theoretical and practical knowledge, in Greek philosophy.
The counterpart of this epistemological dualism was a metaphysical
dualism, corresponding to the two types of knowing, two diverse types or
levels of reality or being. The objects of theoretical knowing were the
ideal essences of individual substances.^1 Pure theoretical knowledge
grasped the forms of things. It was concerned with the static properties
of existents and notwith their changeable occurrence. "The Ideas of Plato
and the Forms of Aristotle," says Dewey, following Bergson,
may be compared in their relation to particular things to the horses
of the Parthenon frieze in relation to the casual movements of horses.
The essential movement which gives and defines the character of the
horse is summed, up in the eternal moment of a static position and form.
To see, -go grasp, that culminating and defining form and by grasping
to possess and enjoy it, is to know.^2
19.
Met. XI, 7; Eth . Eudem . , I, 8.
19. Anal . Poet ., I, 33; II, 19.
20. According to Greek philosophy. Being "can be apprehended through the
medium of the apprehension and demonstrations of thought, or by some
other organ of mind, which does nothing to the real, except just to
know it." QFC, 21.
21. Met . , VII, 4, 1030b. 5.
22. QFC, 91.
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In contradistinction, practical knowledge was concerned with the
changeable, the variable aspects of things, that which is contingent.
Thus, two types of reality were implied in the distinction between the
two types of knowing: Superior reality which is fixed, changeless, to be
apprehended by reason alone, and an inferior order of reality correspond-
ing to practical knowing, — temporal, changeable, alogical, contingent.
To the objects of reason were joined certain axiological predicates. The
Ideas were held to be primary, eternal, and self-sufficient. They were
clothed with perfection. The highest place in the scale of being in
Aristotles’s philosophy was God, who was pure form, ’'eternal, unchangeable
immovable, wholly independent, separated from all else, incorporeal, and
yet at the same time the cause of all generation and change,"2'5 the
perfect Being, uncorrupted by any element of movement (the distinguish-
ing characteristic of the lower realm)
,
— the unmoved mover.24 The
objects, thus, of the highest and most necessary knowledge, true Being,
were endowed in Greek philosophy with "the values which correspond to our
best aspirations, admirations, and approvals."2® These objects of reason
were norms for the world of Becoming. "The ends and laws which should
regulate human affection, desire, and intent" were derived "from the
properties possessed by ultimate Being."2® Thus, in Greek philosophy an
axiological dualism was added to the dualisms of epistemology and meta-
physics.
23. Windelband, HPH, 145.
24. Met
. ,
XII.
25. QFC
,
34.
26. Ibid, 57.
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The Christian religion made its appearance in a world dominated by the
dualistic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. At first it had little to do
with philosophy, for it claimed the definite authority of revelation from
God and appealed primarily to the emotions and consciences of men. But
as soon as it moved out of its narrow Judaistic environment and sought con-
verts in the Graeco-Roman world it had to learn to speak the intellectual
language of its day. The consequence was that Christian apologetics
gradually appropriated the philosophical scaffolding of the age. The
Logos of Greek philosophy was identified with Jesus of Nazareth. The
hierarchy of Forms was molded to fit the needs of the Church. The funda-
mental dualisms running through Greek philosophy were transformed into a
basic religious dualism between natural and supernatural, terrestrial and
celestial, Liesseits and Jenseits
,
the realm of nature and the realm of
27grace. This world was inferior and preparatory to the next or
higher world. By the middle of the thirteenth century Aristotelianism
had been enthroned as the official philosophy of the Church.
The fundamental dualism between the two orders of reality has per-
sisted, Lewey points out, since the period of Aristotelian dominance, even
in those thinkers who rejected scholasticism. Kant held to the basic
distinction between phenomena and noumena. Fichte distinguished sharply
28between moral and existential. Hegel’s system, though "a triumph in
material content of the modern secular and positivistic spirit,” dis-
29
tinguished between the ’'Absolute” and its manifestations. The basic
27. "Religion stated in one language precisely what the great philosophic
tradition stated in another.” QFC
,
293.
28. Ibid, 62.
29.
Ibid, 62, 63.

34
characteristic of the classic tradition as seen in modern as well as ancient
philosophies is dualism. Dewey sums it up thus; 30
All philosophies of the classic type have made a fixed and fundamental!
distinction between two realms of existence. One of these corresponds
to the religious and supernatural world of popular tradition, which in
its metaphysical rendering became the world of highest and ultimate
reality. Since the final source and sanction of all important truths
and rules of conduct in community life had been found in superior and
unquestioned religious beliefs, so the absolute and supreme reality
of philosophy afforded the only sure guaranty of truth about empirical
matters, and the sole rational guide to proper social institutions
and individual behavior. Over against this absolute and noumenal
reality which could be apprehended only by the systematic discipline
of philosophy itself stood the ordinary empirical, relatively real,
phenomenal world of everyday experience. It was with this world that
the practical affairs and utilities of men were connected. It was to
this imperfect and perishing world that matter-of-fact, positivistic
science referred.
The dualism running through the classic tradition may be shown thus;
ORDERS OF BEING
A.
1. Being (Ultimate Reality)
2. Known only theoretically .
(Reason, philosophy,
religious insight)
3. Eternal, unchanging
4. Perfection (Realm of
Value)
5. God, divine beings,
values, immortality
l
w
d
f>
37
*c
d
c
Non-Being (Phenomenal
Reality)
Known practically through
overt doing (Opinion,
natural sciences, arts)
Temporal, changing
Imperfection (Order of
Existence)
Physical Nature
Man was a citizen of
both worlds. (Kant)
30. RPH, 22-23
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3. The Supernatural . Now Dewey means by "the supernatural” that
which is designated above as A. 31 If we were to define it formally we
would say that in his thought "the supernatural" is
that which (1) is regarded as of normative worth and superior reality,
but which (2) lies beyond scientific verification. 32
33
It includes God, objective values, immortality, at least, and other entities.
It may seem from this definition that Dewey's quarrel with the super-
natural is really with a transcendental religious philosophy. It is custom]
ary in liberal circles to distinguish between two views of the supernatural
one of which conceives the supernatural as transcendent and intervening
31. The supernatural is the metaphysical. (CF, 21-22.) It is that which,
in contrast with instruments and acts, is uncontrollable. (QFC, 13).
It is "the home of assured appropriation and profession," as con-
trasted with the natural, the realm of "striving, transiency, and
frustration." (EAN2
,
55). It is "the eternal and infinite" in con-
trast with the "temporal, finite, and human," Ibid. It is the ideal
in contrast with the actual. (CF, 21-22). It includes the unseen
power or powers "controlling human destiny to which obedience,
reverence, and worship are due," (CF, 7) though it is not identical
with God. (CF, 51). Immortality is a part of the supernatural, as
well as the realm of values. (CF, 1; cf. QFC, 305).
32. We have not contrasted the supernatural with the natural, though they
do properly stand in contrast, because Dewey approaches it from the
epistemological side, the contrast between theoretical and practical.
33. The Bible insofar as it is made a standard of conduct, conceived of
as the Word of God, — neither of which can be established scientific-
ally, — is a supernatural book in Dewey's sense of the term. Prayer
regarded as an instrument of divine guidance, its results not being
open to scientific verification, would be supernatural. Etc.
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in nature in lawless fashion, contrary to the teachings of science. This
is the supernatural ism of a deistic " fundamental ismV so-called. According
to the other view, the supernatural is regarded as immanent in the natural
world, as its sustaining ground.
It is a Supernatural not in that it interferes with nature but in that
it includes and transcends nature. The upholders of this view usually
deny miracle, and at any rate, no miracle is necessary to it. The reg-
ularity of the causal law is regarded as being merely the way God acts
It sees God in order rather than in disorder, in the dependable work-
ing of law rather than in incalculable interference with law. Thus
there is no possible quarrel between it and science. 34
It may seem that Dewey* s view of the supernatural is that of the first
type, and his polemic against the supernatural, which we shall develop in
succeeding pages, is not directed against the second. Insofar, however,
as immanental philosophy makes distinctions between different grades or
levels of reality it affirms a belief in the supernatural
,
and almost
ail modern religious philosophies do, with the exception of the natural-
35istic. Further, very few religious philosophies are willing to pin
their sole faith on scientific method and hence are to be classed with
36
traditional supernaturalists in that respect.
The fact is that Dewey does not have high regard for modernism. It
34. Pratt, TEC, 39.
35. Absolutists such as Eoyce ("World of description" vs. "world of
appreciation," SMP, 399-97) and Hocking (whole vs. parts, MGHE, 411),
mystics such as Jones (cf. EF, 7) and Bennett
,
("the unseen order
shining through," DEK, 7), and personalism (metaphysical vs. phenomen-
al reality, Knuds on, POP, 232)
,
— all of which are immanental phil-
osophies, recognize levels or orders of reality.
36. Cf. CF, 32.
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seems to him essentially "transitional, mediating in character,"
Lts psychological value to many persons in easing the strain cannot he
doubted; no one can deny that there is a social value in movements which
modulate from one position to another in a way which avoids the crises
and breakdowns incident to abrupt changes. 3?
But if it follows out the logic of its immanence it will arrive at a
purely naturalistic conception of religion. When God becomes only a
name for the way natural processes behave, the ultimate result will be
nature without the name!3®
The supernatural is the object of relentless attack in all Dewey's
writings. In the present chapter we shall seek to expound and evaluate
his many objections to the supernatural under four headings: (1) genetic,
(2) epistemological, (3) logical, and (4) practical. The first two types
of objections are set forth at greatest length in the Quest for Certainty .
The logical objection is chiefly met in Experience and Nature
,
while the
practical objections to the supernatural are elaborated in A Common Faith .
B. THE GENETIC OBJECTION
’Why do men philosophize? What is the origin of a supernatural istic
philosophy? Men readily persuade themselves that it is a desire for in-
tellectual certainty. They want to know for knowledge's sake. But this,
37. Art. 72; CHE, I, 83. Far from being inferior intellectually, Dewey
affirms that the traditional transcendental religious philosophy has
some intellectual advantages over modernism. QJ?C, 70.
38. Cf., CF, 72-73
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Dewey tells us, is not true. "The ultimate ground of the quest for
39
cognitive certainty is the need for security in the results of action."
The world of experience as we find it is an uncertain world; "the values
40
men prize are at the mercy of acts the results of which are never sure."
Failure, frustration, difficulties, insecurity are constant visitors of
natural man. He does not have the means at hand to make daily life
secure. So "in the absence of actual certainty in the midst of a pre-
carious and hazardous world, men cultivated all sorts of things that would
give them the feeling of certainty," an "emotional substitute" for real
41
certainty. They began to spin out philosophies that would demonstrate
that those things they most prized and were unable to secure were securely
fixed in the very heart of things.
If one looks at the foundations of the philosophies of Plato and
Aristotle as an anthropologist looks at his material, that is, as
cultural subject-matter, it is clear that these philosophies were
^
systematizations in rational form of the content of Greek philosophy.
The exaltation of theoretical knowing above the practical, which we have
noted in the previous section as characteristic of Greek philosophy, was
purely compensatory for the fact that practical doing gave no certainty. 4,
44
Philosophy turns supernatural istic when it "loses its nerve," and
Greek philosophy is the supreme example of it.
39. QFC, 39.
40. Ibid, 33.
41. Ibid, 33-34
42. Ibid, 16.
43. RPH, 117.
44. SAN, 127.
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Such devices as a compensatory philosophy to keep up one’s courage
are no longer necessary, however. Modern science, by experimental methods
of control, can give that practical certainty as a compensation for which
4.K
metaphysical speculation was indulged in.
The origin of supernatural religion is, like the corresponding
philosophy, a product of men’s need of security. "Man who lives in a
world of hazards,’1 run the opening lines of the Quest for Certainty
,
is compelled to seek for security. He has sought to attain it in two
ways. One of them began with an attempt to propitiate the powers which
environ him and determine his destiny. It expressed itself in suppli-
cation, sacrifice, ceremonial rite and magical cult.... If man could
not conquer destiny he could willingly ally himself with it; putting
his will, even in sore affliction, on the side of the powers which
dispense fortune, he could escape defeat ana might triumph in the
midst of destruction.
The other course is to invent arts and by their means turn the powers
of nature to account; man constructs a fortress out of the very condi-
tions and forces which threaten him. He builds shelters, weaves gar-
ments, makes flame his friend instead of his enetpy, and grows into the
complicated arts of associated living. This is the method of changing
the world through action, as the other is the method of changing the
self in emotion and idea. 6
But primitive man was ill-equipped to appropriate the second means of
security. He had none of the elaborate arts of protection we enjoy and
no confidence in his own powers when they were reinforced by appliances
of art. 47 Hence, he turned to the first source of help, giving himself
to all those rites and rituals by which the support of the powers that
made his destiny might be secured. ”In such an atmosphere primitive
45. Art. 86, 177-78.
46. QFC, 2.
47 QFC, 9
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religion was born and fostered. Rather this atmosphere was the religious
disposition.” 48
While modern man has left far behind the trappings of primitive faith,
religion is still largely a compensatory device for human lacks.
When an individual finds a conflict in himself which is offensive
and with which he cannot successfully cope directly, he ’projects* it
into or upon another personality, and then finds rest. Uneasy and
tortured egoism, finding no rest for itself in itself, creates a huge
Ego which. .. .is. .. .huge enough to be our King, Leader, and Helper.
Or, modern man, still feeling himself and his values insecure in an un-
certain world does what Mr. Britling did in Mr. Wells's famous novel, —
"invented a God to keep him company and to give him assurance of the re-
turn of the dawn.” 5® A study of the genesis of supernatural religion, in
short, shows it to be an illusion, a compensatory device, an escape
mechanism. 5*
While the view that religion is an expression of man’s inescapable
desire for security predominates in Dewey’s writings, there is another
view of the origin of religion that he offers also. According to this
second theory religion grew out of the emotional enjoyments attendant
upon mythmaking. Until agriculture and the higher industrial arts were
48. Op. -cit
. ,
10.
49. Art. 58; CHE, I, 82.
50. Ibid, 78.
51. This is the view of the origin of religion made familiar by Freud
and by Feuerbach before him. "Religious ideas,” says Freud, "have
sprung from the same need as all the other achievements of culture:
from the necessity for defending itself against the crushing
supremacy of nature.” (FIL, 36-37.) Dewey's view of the illusory
nature of religion, needless to say, while resembling Freud's in the
main points, does not regard religion as, fundamentally, an ex-
pression of the sex instinct.
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developed by primitive man there were long periods of empty leisure, Dewey
tells us, in which men had nothing to do but to remember and to embellish
the tales of their own exploits, in the hunt or the battleP2 Legends
and myths slowly grew up in response to the irrepressible human tendency
toward story-telling. As culture advanced these stories were consolidated.
Theogonies and cosmogonies were formed, as with the Babylonians, Egyptians,
Hebrews, and Greeks. In time these legends came under the guardianship
of a special body, the priesthood, and out of them both philosophies and
c rz
religions sprang. Primitive religion did not grow out of, nor was it
sustained by any urge of conscience, but out of the enjoyment of myth and
rite.54
These two views of the origin of religion are not easy to reconcile.
The first represents religion as growing out of man’s deepest need, —
the need for life itself, security. According to the second, religion
is an embellishment of life, an emotional enjoyment realized after the
chase was over and the hunt was done. According to the first, religion
is an outgrowth of the impulse to self-preservation; in the second it is
derived from the play-inst inct . Further, the positions of man relative
to the objects of religion are different in the two views. In the first
man is subordinate to the objects of his thought, while in the second
man is the conscious creator of them. In the first, religion arises out
of a pessimistic outlook on things; the second reflects an optimistic
52. RPH, 4.
53. Cf., CF, 59.
>-80

view. These two divergent theories cannot represent two different stages
of Dewey's thought, for the first appears both before and after the
second. 55
Perhaps Feldman in his remark on Dewey's Darwinism in general drops
a hint for the solution of the difficulty. He says that the genetic point
of view is one of limited application with Dewey, used mainly for negative
purposes, "as a weapon against what he considered fruitless metaphysical
and epistemological speculation." 56 It is possible that Dewey is more
interested in discrediting religion than in offering a serious account of
its origin. In fact, Dewey confesses himself that his genetic approach
is made "with malice prepense." "It seems to me," he says, "that this
genetic method of approach is a more effective way of undermining this
type of philosophic theorizing (of the supernaturalist ic sort) than any
attempt at logical refutation could be." 57
Assuming, however, that Dewey's two views of ihe origin of religion
are capable of reconciliation, what is to be said of his attempt to dis-
count supernatural religion by appeal to its unworthy origin in desire
or myth? (1) In the first place, either of these theories of the
origin of religion is, at best, an oversimplification. In view of the
many diverse theories set forth by scholars concerning the origin of
55. The first view appears in RPH ( 1920 ) , EAN (1925). The second pre-
dominates in QFC (1929). In the latter year, however, in FAN2 , the
first view is repeated and again in CF (1934).
56. PJD, 43.
57.
RPH, 24
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religion something more than a summary statement of one’s own theory is
necessary to establish it. 58 (2) Further, Dewey is not thoroughgoing
in his genetic or evolutionary point of view. He assumes that science
and morals have developed; he does not attempt to explain science in
terms of astrology from which it developed nor validate morals by
primitive customs or tabus. But in the case of religion the assumption
is that it is essentially at the same primitive level at which it began,
— a compensatory device. The fact that religion might have developed
along with man's other interests is nowhere recognized. (3) Again, we
must remember that the genesis, either historical or psychological, of
any belief does not determine its validity. The fact that mathematics
began, possibly, by a primitive’s counting of his toes does not in-
validate any of our mathematical theorems. Nor does a primitive beginning
of religion invalidate the beliefs it may hold. It is possible that
religion originated in a primitive desire for security and yet God exists,
nevertheless. (4) Once more, it must not be forgotten that science, upon
58. Malinowski makes religion the outgrowth of primitive scientific
inquiry. (See Adrian, and others, FDHB, 161-62.) Otto finds the
essence of religion in an a priori category, the holy. (ITH, 140).
James thought it grows out of the desire for spiritual redemption.
(VRE, 508). Even Frazer, who taught that religion was the outgrowth
of a magic that would not work, admits that the gods are not solely
a means to man's ends but were enjoyed in many cases for their own
sakes. (MAEK, I, 31). Before insisting on the validity of his
own view, Dewey at least owes these theories of the genesis of religic
serious consideration. But such consideration is nowhere given.
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which Dewey places so much reliance, is a product of desire as truly as
religion.
S
9 Yet, would Dewey dismiss it on that account? (5) Again,
there is a fundamental disharmony between a genetic argument and
pragmatism. For pragmatism makes consequences the test of an idea
or belief, not antecedents. In fact, we shall see in the next section
Dewey’s strictures against supernaturalism for its emphasis on antecedent
realities. On a pragmatic basis religion cannot be denied because of
humble origins. (6) Finally, it seems strange that Dewey should object
to religion as "mythmaking" when, as we shall see in the next chapter,
the object of faith as he conceives it is not a metaphysical reality but
ideals created by the imagination for the purpose of integrating life!
The best to be said for the genetic objection to the supernatural
is that it is superficially plausible.
C. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTION
When we turn to Dewey’s epistemological objection to the supernatural
we enter a province in which he is more at home, for his philosophy is
largely epistemological in character. Very briefly, the objection Dewey
makes to the supernatural from an epistemological basis is this: Super-
naturalism rests on two assumptions that are not valid in the light of
59/ "The distinctively intellectual attitude which marks scientific
inquiry was generated in efforts at controlling persons and things
so that consequences, issues, outcomes would be more stable and
assured.” EAN, 128.
60. Dewey seems to recognize this in his later writing. He says in the
article, "Social as a Category," (Art. 81, 163.) that the proper
method of philosophy is not one which lays the major emphasis upon
"ultimate and unattached simples" but upon "taking things in the
widest and most complex scale of observation open to observation."
Ibid, 162.
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modern scientific techniques.
(1) The first assumption is that knowledge is concerned "with the
disclosure of the characteristics of antecedent existences and essences .”6 ^
It assumes that knowledge has to do with "antecedent reality." By "ante-
cedent” Dewey means simply "prior to and independent of the operations
of knowing."62 An antecedent reality is one regarded as ’given* "prior
to ejperimental verification and redisposition."63 It is held
to he "in sufficient existence before the act of knowing," instead of
being "the outcome of directed experimental operations."64 That is, the
existence of the supernatural is "demonstrated" by reason or established
by contemplation. God, or immortality, are set up first and then "proved.’
Supernatural objects are not consequent to verification but antecedent.
(2) The other assumption of supernatural ism is that cases of
knowledge must correspond with these antecedent objects. 63 "The objects
of knowledge form the standards of measures of the reality of all other
objects of experience." 66 In other words, supernaturalism appeals to a
correspondence criterion of truth. 67
Scientific techniques as they are employed in the physical sciences
61. QFC, 71.
62. Ibid,
,
196
63. Ibid,
,
258
64. Ibid, 171.
65. Ibid,
,
21.
66. Loc. cit
.
67. Cf. ibid, 109-10
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show the false character of these two assumptions. (1) Truth for science
61
does not reside in antecedent reality; for science the true is the verifie<
69
Knowledge is the consequence of experimental operations. "Verification
70
and truth are two names for the same thing." To say that a thing is
true before it is verified is like a by-stander's remark after a person
has been saved from drowning that he was saved all the time, even while
71
in the uncertain process of being rescued. This does not mean that
Dewey is a solipsist. There is existence antecedent to the process of
verification. Things are simply data or problems before verification
is undertaken; they become objects as a result of the process. 72There are
three characteristics of scientific knowing which set it off sharply from
that employed by supernatural istic types Of philosophy: 73
a) The first is the obvious one that all experimentation involves
overt doing, the making of definite changes in the environment or
in our relation to it.
b) The second is that experiment is not a random activity but is
directed by ideas which have to meet the conditions set by the need
of the problem inducing the active inquiry.
c) The third and concluding feature, in which the other two receive
their full measure of meaning, is that the outcome of the directed
activity is the construction of a new empirical situation in which
objects are differently related to one another, and such that the con-
sequences of directed operations form the objects that have the
property of being known .
68. RPH, 160
69. Cf, QFC,
70. IDP, 138
71. Ibid, 143
72. QPC, 137
73. Ibid, 86-7.
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(2) For science, ideas are not that which must correspond to ante-
cedent reality or with themselves. They are hypotheses for verification.
The final value of ideas is not determined "by their internal elaboration
and consistency, but by the consequences they effect in existence as that
74is perceptibly experienced." Scientific men accept "the consequences
of their experimental operations as constituting the known object, rather
than feeling under obligation to ’prove* them by identification with what
l*C
was said to be antecedently known." Conceptions are "instrumentali-
ties which direct operations of experimental observations;" the
76
"knowledge-property resides in conclusions." "The criterion of
knowledge lies in the method used to secure consequences and not in meta-
77physical conceptions of the nature of the real."
The epistemological objection to the supernatural boils down to this:
The premises upon which belief in the existence of the supernatural rests
are not in harmony with those of the sciences. This precipitates a crisis
in religion, because "for the educated man today" the methods of experiment-
al inquiry are "the final arbiter of all questions of fact, existence, and
intellectual assent."^® Because supernaturalism cannot meet the challenge
of scientific method it is on the way out.
74. Op. cit., 165.
75. QFC, 135.
76. Ibid, 192.
77. Ibid, 221.
79. CF, 31.
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This epistemological objection to supernaturalism, — and the ad
hominem gesture about the educated man of today and his beliefs, — rests
on the presupposition that the "educated man" is right when he assumes
(if he does) that science is the final arbiter. This presupposition will
be examined in Chapter IV.
In conclusion, it is to be noted that Dewey's attack upon "antecedent
reality" is in keeping with a tendency we shall see throughout his thought
to depreciate the past.
D. THE LOGICAL OBJECTION
The genetic objection to the supernatural is that religion arises out
of unworthy desires. The epistemological objection was that the premises
of supernaturalism are not in harmopy with the scientific way of knowing.
The logical objection to supernaturalism as a doctrine is that it is (1)
self-refuting and (2) abstract.
(1) Supernaturalism, Dewey tells us, logically destroys itself.
Supposedly it derives its validity from a consideration of experience. But
once it has been established, it depreciates, assigns an inferior status,
to the very experience upon which it is based. That is particularly the
case with Absolutism. 79
The contents as well as the form of ultimate Absolute Experience are
derived from and based upon the features of actual experience, the very
experience which is then relegated to unreality by the supreme reality
derived from its unreality If we start from the standpoint of the
Absolute Experience thus reached, the contradiction is repeated from
its side. Although absolute, eternal, all-coraprehensive
,
and per-
vasively integrated into a whole so logically perfect that no separate
79. EAN2 , 61.
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patterns, to say nothing of seams and holes, can exist in it, it pro-
ceeds to play a tragic joke upon itself — for there is nothing else
to he fooled — by appearing in a queer combination of rags and glitter-
ing things, mental as well as physical, of ordinary experience.
The same sort of inconsistency is apparent in the exaltation of
theoretical knowing over doing in the classic tradition. After elevating
knowledge of immutable objects and degrading practical affairs to the realnd
of inferior reality, "the chief task of knowledge seems to be to demon-
strate the absolutely assured and permanent reality of the values with
which practical activity is concerned. The supernatural, in short, is
established by an inconsistent procedure; it either appeals to experience
for its establishment and then demeans experience or demeans empirical
modes of knowing only to secure by theoretical procedure those ends toward
which empirical methods are directed.
(2) Not only is the doctrine of the supernatural inconsistent, but
it is guilty of abstraction. It commits the fallacy of "selective
emphasis” or hypostatization. We find ourselves in a world that is
"uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable, hazardous.” 82 There are, how-
ever, stable elements in the midst of the unstable, which is the occasion
of philosophizing. The fallacy of classic thought has been that though the
world contains both stable and unstable elements, and one is quite as much
a part of existence as the other, traditional philosophy and religion have
"relegated the uncertain and unfinished to an invidious state of unreal
being, while they have systematically exalted the assured and complete to
80. QFC, 35.
81. EAN2 , 29.
82.
Ibid, 42.
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the rank of true Being*" They have been guilty of the "erection of
84
objects of selective preference into exclusive realities." Men prefer
certainty to uncertainty; therefore, those objects that are certainly
pc
known (i.e. theoretically known) are assigned primary reality. ° They
prefer the simple to the complex; therefore, "elements" have greater
reality conferred upon them.88 They prefer the permanent to the chang-
ing; therefore, whatever is "eternal" is elevated to the rank of primary
reality.87 What are "these Forms and Essences," Dewey asks, 89
which so profoundly influenced for centuries the course of science and
theology, save the objects of ordinary experience with their blemishes
removed, their imperfections eliminated, their lacks rounded out, their
suggestions and hints fulfilled? What are they in short but the objects
of familiar life divinized, because re-shaped by the idealizing
imagination to meet the demands of desire in just those respects in
which actual experience is disappointing?
"The values prized in those religions that have ideal elements are
idealizations of things characteristic of natural association, which have
been projected into a supernatural realm for safe-keeping and sanction." 89
God, like mathematical subsistences, esthetic essences, or the purely
physical order of nature, is an illustration of the fallacy of "selective
emphasis", which converts "eventual functions" into "antecedent
83.
_,_2
EAN
,
52.
CD Ibid, 26.
85. Ibid, 25-6.
CD Ibid, 26-7.
CD Ibid, 27.
88. RPH, 105-6.
89. CF, 73.
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realities." They are abstractions.
This objection to the supernatural has the greatest merit of any
Dewey brings against the supernatural. It is a form of the ancient
problem of the one and the many, the permanent and the changing. To
assert the superior reality of either the one or the many, or the perma-
nent or the changing, is to do violence to the seamless fabric of ex-
istence. Dewey’s objection is certainly valid against an impersonal
idealism holding to the metaphysical objectivity of values (though it
is likewise valid against his own temporalism when it asserts that
change is everything). Some account of reality must be given that
will include both the one and the many, both permanence and change. Dewey
believes that his conception of nature as inclusive of ideal and real,
universal s and particulars, is such an entity. But all he has done is to
describe nature. He does not attempt to explain it. A possible explanatio
of nature would be a God who is the ground of nature and a concrete uni-
versal, a mind that maintains its identity while a participant in change.
i
p
90. EAN , 29. Dewey's objection to supernatural ism here is essentially
the same one that Bowne used to employ with such effect against
naturalism. Bowne called it ’’the fallacy of the universal;” — "It
consists in mistaking class terms for things, and in identifying the
processes of our classifying thought with the processes of reality."
(TTK, 244) He used it against such abstractions as "matter" and
"force", "law", and "nature." (Cf. ibid, 245; MET, 248ff
. ,
267.)
Dewey also denominates "matter", "law", and "physical nature" as
abstractions (Cf. EAN2
, 74, 29; RPH, 164), but applies the same to
God. He is the hypostatization of the ideal qualities of existence.
Bowne would be driven by his own logic to the same position had he
not held to metaphysical causality as the criterion of reality.
Dewey's concept of causality is positivistic.
91. Cf, EAN, 71.
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logical objection does not hold against such a view.
D. THE PRACTICAL OBJECTION
It is no longer enough for a principle to be elevated, noble, uni-
versal and hallowed by time. It must present its birth certificate,
it must show under just what conditions of human experience it was
generated, and it must justify itself by its works, present and
potential.9^
We have already given some account of Dewey’s attempt to discredit
the genesis of supernaturalism. In this section we shall set forth
Dewey’s views of the supernatural’s attempts to justify itself by its
works. Many are the reproaches brought by Dewey in his writings against
the supernatural for its practical failures. We shall gather together the
gist of his arguments against the supernatural in four propositions.
1. Subversive influence upon science . The first reproach of a
practical sort to be levelled against the supernatural is: belief in it
has retarded the growth and application of science to the needs of life.
The obstructive role played by traditional supernaturalism is familiar
to every student of the history of science. Not only did the intolerance
of the Church impede the growth of science, but the very concepts of
medieval supernaturalism, such as "final causes", for example, caused
science to stagnate. 93 Not until men gave up the investigation of the
antecedently real and began to experiment were the great achievements of
science possible. 94
Religion stands today as an essentially conservative force in the
9Z. RPH, 48.
93. QFC, 102.
94. HNC
,
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path of science, an obstacle in the way of the application of intelligent
(i.e. scientific method) to social relations. 95 Supernatural ism is the
ally of vested interests who do not want the spotlight of critical in-
telligence turned upon them or their works.96 It "stands in the way of
an effective realization of the sweep and depth of the implications of
natural human relations.*®7 It is a harrier to "using the means that
are in our power to make radical changes in those relations." 98 It is
impossible to estimate, Dewey believes, the amelioration that would re-
sult if science and scientific method were given unrestricted opportunity
for development.99
2. The practical futility of supernaturalism . In the second place
the sxipernatural offers us no real solution for the specific problems
that trouble us, and hence is a misapplication of human energy. After all.
belief in the supernatural "does not change the existential situation in
the least." 100 To classify the world into eternal and temporal, super-
natural and natural
,
permanent and impermanent
,
does not make the world
a whit less hazardous, for "trouble, struggle, conflict, and error still
empirically exist." 101 Not only do these troublesome facts exist, but
supernaturalism can give no hint as to how our specific problems are to
be solved. Theology can supply us with no solution for diphtheria, in-
sanity, governmental inefficiency, or poverty. Dewey does not believe
95. Cf, IDP, 2.
96. CF, 78.
97. CF, 80.
98. Loc. cit.
99. QFC
,
305.
100. QFC, 35.
101. SAN2 , 54.
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that "early Christianity has within itself even the germs of a ready-made
solution for present problems . "102 y/e get n0 enlightenment at all from
a contemplation of the supernatural or by reference to it; science offers
the only way out of the problems that besiege us.l°3
Hence, devotion to the supernatural represents a waste of energies that
could be better used. 104r "Mankind has hardly inquired what would happen
if the possibilities of experience were seriously explored and exploited."^5
3* Supernaturalism inimical to human endeavor * But not only does
the supernatural offer us no solution for our practical problems, but it
is really an enemy to their solution, because it dulls the edge of human
endeavor.
Men have never fully used the powers they possess to advance the good
in life, because they have waited upon some power external to themselves
and to nature to do the work they are responsible for doing. Depend-
ence upon an external power is the counterpart of surrender of human
endeavor. 106
The effect of traditional theology has been "to make the mind sub-
missive and acquiescent ;" 10? it leads to "intellectual somnambulism." 10®
The business of "finding a wholesale transcendent remedy" for our ills,
prevents men from looking facts in the face and going out to change the
world. 109 Furthermore, the distinction between the ultimate and the
102. Art. 86, 180.
103. RPH, 112-13; QFC
104. QFC, 277.
105. Art. 86, 177.
106. CF, 46.
107. RPH, 50.
108. Ibid
,
140.
109. IDP, 16.
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phenomenal has tended to depreciate the realm of existence and natural
values. Ideals are thought to he but objects of meditation locked up
safely in heaven; the world is turned over to the forces of evil. "While
saints are engaged in introspection burly sinners run the world." 110
The hope of courage and an active re-shaping of the world in the interests
of human betterment lies in a return to an active conception of knowledge
and the belief that the environment is something to be changed. 111
4. The supernatural an encumbrance to religion . Finally, the super-
natural is inimical to religion itself. To begin with, the supernatural
is not essential to religion. "Religious qualities and values if they
are real at all are not bound up with any single item of intellectual
112
assent, not even of that of the existence of the God of theism." The
feeling of dependence which Schleiermacher celebrated as the essence of
H«
religion can be a feeling of dependence on nature instead of on God. ^
Faith may be had in intelligence itself, without reference to supernatural
powers. 114
Not only is the supernatural not essential to religion but it is an
encumbrance to it. The present depression in religion, as we have seen,
is due to the conflict between the notion of the supernatural and the
methods and teachings of science, which have led to the widespread dis-
crediting of those forms of faith holding to the supernatural. 115 The
110. RPH, 196.
111. Ibid, 115-16.
112. CF, 32.
113. CF, 25-6; QFC, 307.
114. CF, 26.
. Ibid, 9.115
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esoteric character ascribed to experiences of the supernatural has dis-
couraged those who seek a genuine experience of religion. 116 Traditional
religion’s division between sinners and saved has erected a barrier to
117true human brotherhood. Besides, supernatural religion has fostered
in many cases fanaticism and false pride. 118 All in all, the super-
natural has been a blight upon the religious spirit, and its tie with
religion and religious values must be dissolved. 119
5. Criticism . With respect to this indictment of the supernatural
from the standpoint of its works a number of things may be said.
The first objection, — that belief in the supernatural is and has
been an obstacle to the development of science, — is unquestionably true.
Dewey’s argument assumes, however, that science should be allowed free
play for its development, the implication being that science is the only-
means and criterion of progress. This assumption will be examined in
Chapter V of the dissertation.
It is to be noted, however, that science owes something to historic
naturalism. Professor Whitehead has pointed out that modern science got
its start from the notion of the rationality of nature, which was a teach-
ing of medieval theology. 120 Professor Hocking has shown, further, that
Christianity was not entirely an enemy of the rise of modern science, for
116. Op. cit., 14-15.
117. CF, 83-4.
118. HNC, 227-28; QFC, 308.
119. CF, 128.
120 . SMI/, 19
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the spirit of scientific detachment had been instilled unwittingly through
the cultivation of religious detachment. ^l
The second proposition stated above, — that the supernatural has
nothing to offer for our specific ills, — rests upon the assumption that
the worth of anything is to be gauged by the immediate contribution it
makes to solving the problems at hand. It assumes, further, that the
only needs men have are those amenable to solution by experimental method.
This assumption will be examined in the last chapter of the dissertation.
After all, most of the higher interests of mankind are subject to
the same objection Dewey has raised against the supernatural . How does
friendship solve our biological needs? Y/hat solution does a Beethoven
symphony offer for the inadequacies of our economic order? How does the
reading of Shakespeare contribute to the solution of a problem of sanita-
tion? Yet, we shall scarcely give up friendships, or Beethoven, or
Shakespeare on that account. So long as men feel that these things, though!
having no immediate cash value, give more to the enrichment of life than
they take away, they will be cherished and retained. The specific tasks
of the hour are not the sole criterion for evaluating art, human association;
or religion.
Dewey says, in the third place, that "dependence upon an external
power is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor." "Men have never
fully used the powers they possess to advance the good in life, because
they have waited upon some power external to themselves and to nature to
do the work they are responsible for doing." History, he avers, is
121. TDL, 181.
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testimony to this fact.* 22
Without doubt there have been adherents of the supernatural who have
passively waited for God to do for them what they could have done for
themselves. But when Dewey makes the broad statement that dependence
upon external powers is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor
one can only marvel. If the statement is true then either the Puritan
fathers did not believe in external powers or else they did not carve
out a civilization in the New England wilderness. If it is true then
either Paul, Augustine, Luther, the Franciscans and Jesuits, Wesley, and
Shaftesbury were unbelievers, or else they did nothing. As one con-
templates Christian history one thinks of the movements that have had
their inspiration in the Church, ~ toward education, care of the poor,
the building of hospitals, abolition of the slave-trade, education for
temperance, prison reform, — and the known social consequences of the
Franciscan movement, the Y/esleyan Revival, and the Oxford Movement; and
one is at a loss to explain such a palpably erroneous judgment as that
recorded above. The most decisive refutation of Dewey’s position is his
own words. A few pages after the citation offered above Dewey is dis-
cussing another subject, the power of ideal ends in determining human
conduct and enhancing social fruit fillness . As illustrations of the
way ideals can determine conduct he mentions four persons, — Florence
Nightingale, Howard, Wilberfarrce
,
and Peabody.* 2® And all four of
122. CF, 46.
123. Cf., CF, 49
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these whom he selects as models of social fruitfulness are believers in a
real God! 124 In the light of these facts Professor VanDusen’s judgment
is not too strong when he says that Dewey’s statement is "so perverse a
distortion of the truth as to cast question upon the reliability of its
author.”^- 25 It is an illustration of the same flagrant disregard of
the history of religion which we have noted before.
Finally, Dewey says that the supernatural is an encumbrance to
religion. The assumption is, however, that the supernatural can be
124. Florence Nightingale; — Sir Edward Cook, her biographer, cites the
following passage from her diary in the year 1850: "I am thirty, the
age at which Christ began his mission. Now, no more childish things
no more vain things, no more love, no more marriage. Now, Lord, let
me think only of thy will.” Cf
. ,
Martin, CSR, 121.
John Howard; — In a memorandum, containing an account of 42,033
miles travelled in behalf of prison reform we read these concluding
words: "To God alone be all praise! I do not regret the loss of
many conveniences of life, but bless God who inclined my mind to
such a scheme.” J. Howard, SP, XI.
William Wilberforce; — See his correspondence edited by his sons.
( CV/W ) Hardly a letter fails to express his fervent sense of
gratitude and dependence on God. For particular letters, see ibid,
I, 114, 172; II, 325.
George Peabody (presumably it is the Brit ish-American philanthropist
who is meant); — ”It has been my constant prayer to God for upwards
of twenty years, that I might be enabled to accumulate a large stun
of money to bestow in charity on the poor.” Quoted, Hanaford, LGP,
287.
125. VanBusen, Art. 1, 129-30. Even Leuba, who shares with Dewey the
belief that metaphysical religion is illusion, admits that the
nystics, supposedly the most God-centered of men, have been servants
of the common good. "Whatever the mystics may say that seems to
subordinate unselfish activity to the passing enjoyment of God is
belied by the general trend of their writings, and still more con-
vincingly by their lives; all of them, so soon as unity was es-
tablished in their consciousness, have spent themselves without
stint in the service of their fellowmen.” PRM, 128.
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removed from religion and it still be religion. Historically, the super-
natural has been an integral part of religion, as Dewey acknowledges him-
self. But with his customary disdain for historical facts, he denies
that religion should be defined in historical terms. Nothing can be done
about it except to note the departure from the historical usage. To say
that traditional supernaturalism has been an encumbrance is to say that
traditional religion has been an encumbrance, for they are part and parcel
of each other.
It is to be noted, in conclusion, that the practical objection as a
whole rests upon the pragmatic criterion of truth, an assumption that will
be subjected to later scrutiny.
F . DEWEY AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
The concluding portion of this chapter will be devoted to a brief
discussion in the light of Dewey’s thought of the arguments which have
been advanced for the existence of a supernatural God. Traditionally
there were three "proofs” of the divine existence, which were recognized
by Kant, — the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological
(physico-theological)
.
126 The latter supplanted them by a fourth, which,
with its developments by theology and philosophy, has been called the
moral argument. To these arguments there is that of certain "religion-
ists", who "rely upon a certain kind of experience to prove the
existence of the object of religion, especially the supreme object, God."12
126. KRV
,
A 591-2.
127. CF, 11
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This may be called the argument from religious experience. Having set
forth Dewey’s objections to belief in the supernatural, in the succeeding
|!
pages we shall indicate Dewey* s attitude to those arguments offered in
favor of supernaturalism by its proponents. While we do not have
references in every case to specific arguments, his position with regard
to them is clear.
1. The Ontological Argument . This is the famous argument of Anselm to
the effect that the very concept of God implies his existence. Kant
states it in the form it was held by its author: 128
dass es doch einen und zwar nur diesen einen Begriff gebe, da das
Nichtsein Oder das Aufheben seines Gegenstandes in sich selbst wider-
sprechend sei und dieses ist der Begriff der allerrealsten Wesens. Es
hat, sagt ihr, all Realitat, und ihr seid berechtigt, ein solches
Wesen als moglich ansunehmen Nun ist unter aller Realitat auch
das Dasein mit begriffen: also liegt das Dasein in dem Begriffe von
einem moglichen. Wird dieses Ding nun aufgehoben, so wird die innere
Moglichkeit des Dinges aufgehoben, welches widersprechend ist.
Dewey’s objection to this argument is essentially the same as Kant’s,
namely, that existence cannot be deduced from a concept: 129
No amount of purely deductive manipulation of abstractions brings
a resulting conclusion any nearer a concrete fact than were the two
original premises. Deduction introduces in regular sequence new ideas,
and thus complicates the universal content. But to suppose that by
complicating the content of a universal we get nearer the individual
of experience is the fallacy at once of medieval realism and of the
ontological argument for the existence of God.
2. The Cosmological Argument
.
The second of the traditional arguments
Kant phrased as follows: 130
Wenn etwas exist iert, so muss auch ein schlechterdings notwendiges
128. KEY, A 596-7.
129. LCS, 119.
130. Kant, op. cit.. A, 604, B, 632.
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Wesen existieren (weil^) alles Zufallige seine Ursache habe,
die, wenn sie wiederum zufallig ist, ebensowohl eine Ursache haben muss,
bis die Reihe der einander untergeordneten Ursachen bei einer schlecht-
hin notwendigen Ursache endigen muss, ohne welche sie keine Voll-
standigkeit haben wurde Nun exist iere zum mindesten ich selbst: alsc
exist iert ein absolut notwendiges Wesen.
There are four points, according to Professor Sorley, at which the
cosmological argument is open to attack and defense: 131 (1) the validity
of the causal concept in general; (2) the validity of applying it to the
world as a whole; (3) the validity of calling a halt in the regress of
causes, and saying that the First Cause had been reached; (4) and the
validity of the identification of this First Cause with God. Kant defends
the first with his teaching that every event must have a cause. 13^ He
attacks the argument on the basis of (3) and (4). Cause and effect
stand in necessary relationship to each other; a cause stands in necess-
ary relationship not only to its effect but to the cause of which it is
an effect. 133 Hence, to postulate a beginning in the causal series would I
destroy the notion of causality. 134 Further, at most the argument es-
tablishes a first cause and does not teach Mwas namlich ein absolut
notwendiges Wesen uberhaupt fur Eigenschaften haben mlisse."133
Dewey’s attack on this argument, though the argument is not mentioned
specifically anywhere, is along the first line indicated above. He
opposes the causal concept in general. Mechanism, like teleology, in
nature implies ”a breach in the continuity of historic process; the gulf
131. WIG, 314.
132. Cf, op. cit.. A, 196, B, 241, 234.
133. Op. cit. A, 621; B, 649.
134. Ibid, A
, 445; B, 473.
135. Kant, op. cit., A 606-7.
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created has then to be bridged by an emission or transfer of force.” 136
Causality presupposes that causes are ”somehow superior in rank and
excellence” to effects. 137 as a matter of fact they are members merely
of a common series; one cannot be derived from the other.
Both the earlier and the later are simply limits which define the
process in question. They are framework which gives it outline; they
are the terms which characterize the problem to be attacked. 138
To select one event from a process and designate it as cause and another
as effect is to abstract, to ”isolate an event from the history in which
it belongs and in which it has its character. ”139 Dewey takes the
empirical view of causality and calls it ”another name for the sequential
order itself.” 140 Hence, from Dewey’s point of view the cosmological
argument is defective because it assumes metaphysical causality, a con-
cept that is not empirically verifiable.
3. The Teleological Argument. The third of the historic arguments runs,
136. £4N, 273.
137. Art. 24, 116.
138. Ibid, 118-19.
139. EAN, 100.
140. Loc. cit. Though Dewey renounces efficient causality, he does seek
to explain the origin of notions of causality, in short, the cause
of causal theories’. (Cf.
,
EAN*, 34-5, 58 ff
. ) Further, he says,
in another place that ”a ’cause* is not merely an antecedent; it
is that antecedent which if manipulated regulates the occurrence of
the consequent.” (EAN, 109; the italics are the writer’s) This is
illustrative of the difficulties in which philosophers fall who try
to eliminate the notion of efficient causality.
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according to Kant, as follows; 141
1. In der Welt finden sich allerwarts deutliche Zeichen einer
Anordnung nach bestimmter Absicht, mit grosser Wei she it ausgefuhrt, und
in einem Ganzen von unbeschreiblicher Mannigfaltigkeit des Inhaltes
sowohl, als auch unbegrenzter Grosse des Umfangs. 2. Den Dingen der
Welt ist diese zweckmassige Anordnung ganz fremd und h&ngt ihnen nur
zuf&llig an, d. i. die Eatur verschiedener Dinge konnte von selbst, dure 1
so vielerlei sich vereinigende Mitt el, zu bestimmten Snd&bsichten nicht
zusammenstimmen, waren sie nicht durch ein anordnendes vernVinftiges
Prinzip, nach zugrunde liegenden Ideen, dazu ganz eigentlich gew&hlt
und angelegt worden. 3, Es existiert also eine erhabene und weise
Ursache (oder mehrere)
,
die nicht bloss als blindwirkende allvermogende
Natur durch Fruchtbarkeit
,
sondern als Intelligenz durch Freiheit die
Ursache der Welt sein muss.
Dewey has a full quiver of arguments against teleology which may be
summarily stated, since we have met some of them before. (1) Dewey says
that there is no particular mystery about the alleged "teleological"
character of the world; the fact of adaptation is no more difficult to
explain than the mystery of existence itself. 142
A mystery has not seldom been made of the fact that objective nature
lends itself to man’s sense of fitness, order and beauty; or, in an-
other region of discourse, that objective nature submits to mental
operations sufficiently to be known But the wonder and mystery
do not seem to be other than the wonder and mystery that there should
be such a thing as nature, as existential events, at all, and that in
being they should be what they are. The wonder should be transferred
to the whole course of things.
This is true, of course, but the mystery of existence as a whole is more
luminous on some hypotheses than others. 143 (2) Dewey affirms that the
141. Kant, op. cit., A 625.
142. EAN, 276-7.
143. Tennant acknowledges the truth of the point which is made by Dewey
here. But he points out that thought has the task of explaining
why "the world is more or less intelligible", why "it happens to
be more or less a cosmos, when conceivably, it might have been a
self- subs i stent and determinate ’chaos’ in which similar events neve:
occurred, none recurred, universals had no place, relations no fixit;
things no nexus of determination, and ’real* categories no foot-
hold." PT, II, 82.
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fact that certain events are termini does not make them "ends" of natural
processes, any more than the fact that because a musical phrase has a
certain close, the earlier portions, therefore, have existed for the sake
of the close. (3) Teleology is arbitrary, selective. It chooses to
eulogize the good and explain away the bad, whereas nature is both good
and bad.^45 (4) The notion of teleology is hypostatization of esthetical
objects into realities.^8 (5) Natural teleology is not in accord with
the deliverances nor the methods of science. For the reasons mentioned
above Dewey would reject the teleological argument.
4. The Moral Argument. Kant renounced the rational arguments for the
existence of God but supplanted them with the argument that the divine
existence is a postulate of the moral consciousness. Stated briefly, Kant
argued that the highest good is possible only if happiness follows upon
moral virtue. But no finite being can order events so as to secure happi-
ness. Therefore, God must exist as a guarantee of the coexistence of
virtue and happiness.^8
Dewey makes no mention of Kant*s argument as such, but the latter*
s
fundamental assumption that the moral life requires the existence of God
for its grounding is attacked more than once. Morality, Dewey argues,
does not require a supernatural guarantee of its validity; the authority
of ideals lies in their own intrinsic nature.
144. EAN, 99.
145. Ibid* 103, 112; CF, 55-6. See Logical Objection above.
146. Ibid, 88, 90.
147. Ibid, 103, 131. This is the Practical Objection above.
148. Kant, KRV
,
II, 2.
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All endeavor for the better is moved by faith in what is possible,
not by adherence to the actual. Nor does this faith depend for its
moving power upon intellectual assurance or belief that the things
worked for must surely prevail and come into embodied existence. For
the authority of the object to determine our attitude and conduct, the
right that is given it to claim our allegiance and devotion is based
on the intrinsic nature of the ideal.
Indeed, Dewey insists that not only is a supernatural guarantee not
necessary for morality, but to attempt to support morality with meta-
physical guarantees of ultimate success of the good marks a lack of moral
faith.150
The argument for the existence of God from the objectivity of moral
values (the later form of the moral argument) is open, of course, to the
strictures noted in his logical objection to the supernatural. Values
objectified are hypostatisat ions . Further, to argue for God from the
alleged objectivity of moral values is to fall into contradiction.
It is a contradiction* to make the moral ideal absolute and then
insist upon the necessity of some existent Being in order to ensure
its triumph. _ljf the ideal be absolute, then it takes care of itself,
existential triumph or not. 1
On the whole, Dewey* s demurrer against the moral argument is valid.
Morality does not require supernatural guarantees. Yet, one wonders why
metaphysical support for values is rejected. It seems strange, too, that
one who is interested in consequences as Dewey is should not ponder the
consequences to moral endeavor if the doctrine becomes universal that the
universe will ultimately erase the results of all our moral strivings.
5. The Argument from Religious Experience . In recent times religious
thinkers have seen the inadequacy of the traditional arguments for the
149 .
150 .
151
CF, 23.
Ibid, 21-22.
Art. 90, 395
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for frfre divine existence, and, influenced by the empirical trend of modern
thought, have sought an empirical basis for the older proofs. Often they
have fastened upon religious experience and have argued that the existence
of God is immediately given in religious experience. We are said to
know God through our religious experience in the same direct way that we
know the physical world through the senses.
This sort of argument comes in for rigorous scrutiny by Dewey. He
finds several faults with it. (1) For one thing, he distinguishes between
the experience itself and its interpretation and holds that the super-
natural interpretation of religious experience is not inherent in it
but is brought to it by the experient’s doctrine or previous experience.
The experience is a fact to be inquired into. The theory, like any
theory, is an interpretation of the fact. The idea that by its very
nature the experience is a veridical realization of the direct presence
of God does not rest so much upon examination of the facts as it does
upon importing into their interpretation a conception that is formed
outside them. 52
As with every empirical phenomenon, the occurrence of the state. ...is
simply an occasion for inquiry into its mode of causation. There is
no more reason for converting the experience itself into an immediate
knowledge of its cause than in the case of an experience of lightning
or any other natural occurrence. 153
The particular interpretation given to this complex of conditions is
not inherent in the experience itself. It is derived from the culture
with which a particular person has been imbued. A fatalist will give
one name to it; a Christian Scientist another, and the one who rejects
all supernatural being still another. The determining factor in the
interpretation of the experience is the particular doctrinal apparatus
into which a person has been inducted. 154
152. CF, 35.
153.
154 .
CF, 37-8
CF, 13.
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This objection to the argument from religious experience is valid. ,rWhat
we call religious experience has no necessary ontological significance.
It may be valid, but it may also be invalid.**155 (2) Dewey contends
that religious experience, far from requiring belief in a supernatural
God, can be had without belief in God. Men with all sorts of views of
God, and those who reject belief in the supernatural have had religious
experiences. 155 There is no a priori bond between the experience of
religion and a supernatural object of reference. (3) Dewey urges,
further, that any experience, the religious not excepted, is a complex
1 R7
thing, and may have many causes. To ascribe it to God is an over-
simplification. (4) Religious experience has the disadvantage of being
private and limited; unlike science it is not open and public. 158 There
is much greater play of subjectivity possible in experience of the
religious sort. Finally, (5) the argument from religious experience is
circular.
When the experience in question does not yield consciousness of the
presence of God, in the sense that is alleged to exist, the retort is
always at hand that it is not a genuine religious experience. For by
definition only that experience is religious which arrives at this
particular result. 15^
155. Knudson, VRE, 71.
156. CF, 12.
157. CF, 14.
158. CF, 39.
159 Ibid, 40
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Thus, Dewey rejects the arguments most frequently offered in speculative
circles for belief in the divine existence. His strictures upon these argu-
ments are not essentially different from those which theists themselves pass
upon them. Very few modern students of religion will admit the logical
cogency of the so-called proofs for the divine existence. But most of
them believe that they create a presumption in favor of the existence of
a divine being and, on this basis, launch their faith. Dewey, on the other
hand, chained to nature by the method of experiment, which he regards as
sovereign, refuses either to speculate or to proceed in faith. His final
word on the question is that the existence of a supernatural God is
logically possible, but if the future of religion is bound up with the
discovery of valid proofs of it, the future of religion is not bright .160
G. SUMMARY
In this chapter we have expounded Dewey’s naturalistic critique of
the notion that occupies the central place in historic religious philosophy
— the supernatural. Ir7e have seen that he condemns belief in it on four
general counts: (1) Genet ical ly , religion arises out of desire or myth,
a fact which discredits its claim to objective validity. (2) Epis-
temologically
,
the supernatural rests on premises belonging to the pre-
scientific era. (3) Logically , it is self-refuting and guilty of
bypostatizing eventual functions of experience into antecedent realities
.
(4) Practically , belief in the supernatural is inimical to the develop-
ment of science, human amelioration, the exercise of human endeavor, and
160. Art. 90, 395.
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the practice of religion undefiled.
Upon examination we have found that the first objection is irrelevant
even on a pragmatic basis; antecedents are not the criteria of truth. The
second objection presupposes the exclusive validity of scientific method.
The third has the greatest cogency, being decisive against impersonal
idealism. The fourth is vitiated by unguarded generalizations and rests
on the general pragnatic criterion of truth.
Dewey rejects the usual arguments for God upon essentially the
same grounds as other critics.
Three things, in conclusion, are worthy of note: (1) Dewey’s attack
on supem8turalism has cogency only if his assumption concerning the
exclusive validity of experimental method is tenable. This assumption
will be investigated in Chapter IV. (2) Dewey manifests a strange, al-
most wilful, disregard of the facts of historic religion. (3) The
underlying difference between Dewey and the supernatural religion he
opposes is the difference between an existential and functional approach
to reality. For supernatural religion the decisive issue is whether cer-
tain objects exist; for Dewey the question is, Vfhat practical difference,
if any, do they make?
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CHAPTER III
a COMMDN FAITH
In the preceding chapter Dewey's critique of historical religion has
been set forth. In the chapter which follows the endeavor will be to
expound his own interpretation of religion. V/e proceed, thus, from a
discussion of what religion is to what, in Uewey’s judgment, it ought to
be, moving from the negative to the positive, from the critically des-
criptive to the normative. Dewey believes that the essential point to
grasp in formulating a common faith to which all truly religious men may
adhere is the fact that religion is naturalistic in its ’’foundations and
bearings.” ^ The general plan of this chapter will be to set forth
briefly the naturalistic foundations of religion, — nature, man, and
value, — then to consider faith itself in its relations, together with
its object, and finally to indicate the bearings of Dewey's view upon the
perennial problems of religion. That the theory may be seen in its clear-
est outlines the chapter closes with a brief comparison of it with per-
sonalism.
a. Nature
Although the foundations of religion are held to be "naturalistic”,
Dewey does not give us a formal definition of ’’nature”. But what he
means by the concept in general is apparent. Nature, for Dewey, is a
1. CF, 57.
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totality which includes, — (1) the physical, (2) the psycho-physical,
and (3) the mental.2 It is not to be identified with physical nature, —
the sum of things and events in space and time and subject to a single
system of causal laws. It includes physical nature, and also man,3
mathematical and logical objects, and values.^ In general, its bound-
aries may be said to be co-terminous with that which can be experimentally
verified.5
Three statements may be made about nature as Dewey conceives it:
1. Nature is a temporal process. It is ”a history which is a succession
of histories.”5 "Every existence is an event.” 7 The world is in
O
process of transformation. The permanent is merely those things which
Q
undergo change more slowly than others.
2.
Nature is continuous . Dewey is never clear or consistent in
his view of continuity, although he regards it as axiomatic. Sometimes
the term is used in the broad sense of ’’relational.” He says, for example,
in speaking of ’’the occurrence of problematic and unsettled situations”
that they are due ”to the characteristic union of the discrete or individ-
ual and the continuous or relational . In this sense continuity means
2. EAN, 261.
3. Cf.
,
Art. 91, 1552.
4. QFC, 195.
5. Cf.
,
ibid, 197.
6. EAN, 100. "’The natural’” , says Han, ”is whatever occurs." M)E, 63.
7. EAN, 71.
8. Art. 37, 56-7.
9. EAN, 71.
10. QFC. 234.
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interaction, — as, for example, when processes of nature interact or i-
deals regulate conduct.11 Dewey always means this, at least, when he
refers to nature as continuous, — it is related, interactional. But
sometimes the term is used to suggest qualitative identity. He says,
for instance, that
the intelligent activity of man is not something brought to bear upon
nature from without; it is nature realizing its own potentialities in
behalf of a fuller and richer issue of events.12
That is, man is not related to nature; he is a part of nature, identical
with it. Or again, he says,
A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as itself
a natural event occurring within nature because of traits of the
latter. 13
The "is" of this quotation, we take it, means to affirm identity. While
the former meaning of ’’continuity" is the one more frequently expressed,
the latter is employed, too, particularly as the major premise of criticisris
against the foes of naturalism. 14
The implication of the fact of "continuity” is that nature is a
system. 13
3. Nature contains real novelties. Nature is indeterminate; if it
11. Art. 86, 176.
12. QFC
,
214-15.
13. SAN, 68.
14. For an excellent discussion of this use of "continuity" in Dewey’s
writing, together with its difficulties, see Feldman, op. eit., 86-90
15. "Everything that exists in as far as it is known and knowable is in
interaction with other things. It is associated, as well as solitary
single." EAN, 12.
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were not so, perception, knowledge, and experiment would be impossible. 16
There are emergent s in nature, as we have suggested, — three levels:
(1) physical, (2) life, and (3) association, communication, participation,
— mind; mind is a real novelty. 17 It is a functional character of
natural events at the state of widest and most complex interact ion. 18
Each level has its own characteristics and categories, although each stands
in relation to and in dependence on the others. 19
Two observations may be made about this view of nature. First, it
represents an attempt on Dewey’s part to conceive of existence as a whole.
As we shall unfold Dewey’s religious philosophy we shall notice this moment,
reminiscent of Hegel and Dewey’s renounced idealism, again and again.
Secondly, this broad view of nature is only a description; it is not a
philosophical explanation. Physical things, man, values and all are
described in their interaction; an explanation of why they are systematic-
ally related is not forthcoming. Pratt’s strictures against the emergent
evolutionists are applicable to Dewey: 20
What they present us with is merely a theoretical history, a
chronological list of the order in which things have appeared. Their
history and their list are probably correct, but if they stop with
them they have thrown no light on the extraordinary things that they
have described.
16. Cf.
,
EAN, 349-9, 75.
17. EAN, 272-3; Cl, 66.
18. EAN, 75, vi.
19. Ibid, 272-3.
20.
PR, 363
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B. MAN
When we approach Dewey’s view of man we come to grips with his
naturalism still better. There are three questions religion is interested
in asking about man: (1) Does he possess a soul or self? That religion
has been interested in the question needs no proof. (2) What is the
relation of the soul or self to the body? Immortality is bound up with
this query. (3) Is the individual of supreme worth? Christianity has
always affirmed the intrinsic worth of the human soul. We organize
Dewey’s thought about men in relation to these questions.
1. Does Dewey affirm the existence of a. soul or self? If by ’’soul”
the soul of traditional Christianity is meant, — the mental principle
conceived as a substance separate from the body, and having personal in-
dividuality and identity, though the source of mental phenomena, — Dewey
denies the existence of a "soul”. He is explicit about the matter. Such
a soul is an hypostatization.^l When such a soul is offered as strict
science it is nothing more than a "superstitious encumbrance.
Does he believe, however, in a self conceived not as a transcendental
substance but as a conscious, immanent, nonspatial unity? Two views are
present in his writings.
First, there are many behavioristic statements, of which the follow-
ing are samples:
21. Art. 33, 40.
22. EAN, 294
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Instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of thinking and knowing.
It means that knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis
is ultimately physical and active; and meanings in their logical
quality are standpoints, attitudes, and methods of behaving toward
facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification.
Put in another way it holds that thinking does not mean any transcendent
states or acts suddenly introduced into a previously natural scene, but
that the operations of knowing are (or artfully derived from) natural
responses of the organism. 23
Knowledge which is not projected against the black unknown lives in the
muscles, not in consciousness .24
The ’seat* or locus of mind — its static phase — is the qualities
of organic action, as far as these qualities have been conditioned by
language and its consequences. 25
Meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a property
of behavior, and secondarily a property of objects. 26
Thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into
it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but be-
cause of what physical acts and appliances do; the distinctive purpose
for which they are employed. 27
It would be difficult to find a more outspoken formulation of behaviorism
than these passages represent. We should be forced to classify Dewey with
the Watsonians were it not for some other considerations which receive
probably greater emphasis in his thought.
For one thing, Dewey explicitly rejects behaviorism of the extreme
type. He says that that description is inadequate which "reduces speech
to vocalization or making of sounds and thinking to a silent exercise of
23. EEL, 331-2.
24. HNC
,
177.
25. EAN, 291-2.
26. EAN, 179-80
27. EEL, 14.
if'*
.! • > . 1 j ij ;
.
t - .
'•
'
. V •. *
J
'j,
.
c *0.-;.!
oivsic /• cJiti i - ©i<te : i
jco ' es-ant
>1? a
Vil a i -- pish. • — •»' > id .. •?«£-*»
:
f
.
:
.
•
; . -:.y ..
s^jL'^i^en
:
onl * 6.
.
:
.
...... c
-
/veitoljjtr Pft !
• K •. • zl •; ^loVo-iq
iciVi • ; o© . ;® xs* -
:
.
“31 01 .
. tii j
-
** : . :',:n . . n. . ' .oc „
.
.•'••j
.
*
. .
77
the organs of vocalization and other structures .”28 He regards it as
a grossly overs implified ’’subcutaneous" theory of the mental processes. 29
In addition to the explicit rejection of Watsonian behaviorism there
are other considerations pointing quite as definitely away from it: (1)
Dewey affirms the existence of consciousness, response to meaning. He
defines intellect as "possession of and response to meanings", 38 "mental"
as "aware of meanings", 3^ and "thinking" as "response to the doubtful
as such."32 In this capacity to respond to meanings Dewey says that
human beings function at a level above the psychophysical. 33 By no
stretch of the imagination could the following passage on the "moral
self" be interpreted behavioristically: 34
The self should be wise or prudent, looking to an inclusive satis-
faction and hence subordinating the satisfaction of an immediately
urgent single appetite; it should be faithful in acknowledgment of the
claims involved in its relations with others; it should be solicitous,
thoughtful
,
in the award of praise and blame, use of approbation and
disapprobation, and, finally, should be conscientious and have the
active will to discover new values and to revise former notions.
(2) Dewey affirms that men are not only conscious but "conscious of corr-
sciousness." 35 (3) Further, he speaks of the "integration of the
28. From "Body and Mind", an address delivered before the New York
Academy of Medicine and reported in Ratner, POJD. This quotation
is found on page 102.
29. Art. 50, 509-11.
30. EAN, 272.
31. SAN, 259.
32. QFC, 224.
33. SAN, 177, 178.
34. ETH, 315. The italics are Dewey’s.
35. Art. 37, 72, 73; Ratner, POJD, 85.
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self”; indeed, he makes it the mark of genuine religious experience.36
(4) Finally, as Love joy puts it, one of the ”deepest-lying premises” of
Dewey’s philosophy is the notion that man is an ’’agent” and a ”reflective
agent, in a physical and social environment.”37 One of the never-ceasing
refrains of Dewey’s works is the teaching that a pragmatic intelligence
is ’’creative intelligence.”38
The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind
is to project new and more complex ends — to free esperience from
routine and caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes
already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the
existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate
and liberalize action is the pragmatic lesson. 39
These considerations since they represent the general trend of Dewey’s
thought, seem decisive against behaviorism. Morris’s judgment is probably
correct when he suggests that Dewey’s thought is ’’behavioristic in the
larger non-Watsonian sense of stressing the central importance of behavior
for philosophy.”^ Does Dewey hold, then, to the reality of a conscious
self? Y/e defer our answer until after investigation of the next question.
2. Y/hat is the relation of ’’mind” to body? It is not a dualistic
one. Dewey explicitly rejects psychophysical dualism,^! and the
36. CF, 17.
37. Love joy. Art. 1, 177.
38. Cl, 64.
39. Ibid, 63.
40. STM, 320.
41. EAN2
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double-aspect theory
,
4^ as well as epiphenomenalism.45 All attempts
to assign mind and body to different existential realms is repudiated.44
What is the relationship? Dewey contends that mind and body are
different characters of natural events.45 They represent different
levels "of increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among
natural events."45 The approach to the body-mind problem must be
genetic. It cannot be settled by taking a cross-section of the body-
mind unity; rather this unity must be treated as a process of growth,
one thing in a child, another in a youth, another in maturity. 47 There
are several stages in the development of the body-mind unity; (1) There
is that of the psycho-physical organism, which represents simply the
organization of energies upon the lines of need-demand-satisfaction. 45
(2) Above it is the level of sensitivity , discriminatory response, —
the animal level as compared with the plant level of the first.45 (3)
Next is the level of feeling
,
marked by response to distant stimuli
(distant in space and time), — a characteristic of the higher animals. 50
(4) Finally, at the peak of development is mind, whose distinguishing
characteristics are communication, language, response to meanings. 51
42. SAN, 74.
43. Ibid, 315.
44. Ibid, 294.
45. Ibid, 74.
46. Ibid, 261.
47. Cf., ibid, 275.
48. SAN, 253-4.
49. Ibid, 256.
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Consciousness is present at all these levels; but at the level of psycho-
physical organisms it is only "the totality of actualized immediate
qualitative differences", while at the level of mind it is the totality of
"actualized apprehensions of meanings.
"
5^ Consciousness is those
meanings of which one is aware at the moment, while mind is "the whole
system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life."53
Thus mind, or soul (as Dewey sometimes employs the term, though apprehen-
sive of the misunderstandings it may evoke) represents an achievement of
the psycho-physical organism. Not everyone possesses a soul or mind. 54
The relationship, thus, of consciousness to physiological organism is
relative to the stage of development of consciousness. Mind represents
the highest level of action of natural events of which the organism
occupies a lower.
Though mind and body represent different levels of interaction, mind
is bound to body, having an essential connection with it.
Every 'mind* that we are empirically acquainted with is found in
connection with some organized body. Every such body exists in a
natural medium to which it sustains some adaptive connection; plants to
air, water, sun, and animals to these things and also to plants. With-
out such connections, animals die; the 'purest* mind would not continue
without them
The only excuse for reciting such commonplaces is that traditional
theories have separated life from nature, mind from organic life, and
thereby created nysteries. 55
52. EAN, 303.
53. Loc. cit.
54. "To say emphatically of a particular person that he has soul or a
great soul is not to utter a platitude, applicable equally to all
human beings. It egresses the conviction that the man or woman in
question has in marked degree qualities of sensitive, rich and co-
ordinated participation in all the situations of life." Ibid, 294.
55. EAN, 277, 278.
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Does Dewey hold to a conscious self? While explicitly rejecting the
substantial or transcendental view of soul, he does affirm the existence
of a conscious self, the quotations which point otherwise notwithstanding.
It will he noted in reading Dewey that the greatest doubt is thrown upon
the existence of a conscious self in Experience and Nature . In that book
Dewey is attempting to establish continuity in nature, and the method, as
we have seen and shall see again and again, is verbal. By expressing him-
self in behavioristic terms he gives the effect of bridging the body-mind
dualism. To call ”mind” "a genuine character of natural events when these
attain the stage of widest and most complex interaction with one another”
not only sounds behavioristic but seems to bring together two entities, —
mind ana nature, — that have often stood in opposition.^ But when we
discover that some of the distinguishing marks of this "character of
natural events” are consciousness ,^ 7 unity, awareness and manipulation
of meanings,^ space and time transcendence,^® and striving for known
ends,^ the behavioristic ring of the definition is not so fearsome; it
is another way of saying that man, while closely related to the psycho-
physical, is nevertheless a conscious, thinking, feeling, willing being.
It is to be noted that Dewey’s ethical and religious writings do not
56. EAN*
,
vi
57. EAN, 298
00in Cf., ETH
59. EAN, 298
336;
308.
CF, 33.
60. Ibid, 256-7.
61. ETH, 317.
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hesitate to employ the term "self."62
3. Is the individual of supreme worth? To this question in its tradition-
al form, like the others, Dewey would return a negative. The individual
of traditional religion with
A never-dying soul to save
And fit it for the sky
is not the possessor of infinite worth.63 Neither is the individual of
the good old days of "rugged individualism" nor the individual in his
solitariness of supreme worth. 64 Yet, while Dewey is chary about ascrib-
ing superior worth to the individual, because of the overtones of super-
naturalism suggested by such expressions as the "infinite worth of the
human soul", he accepts the practical meaning of this teaching. He
acknowledges that the historic teaching of the infinite worth of the human
soul, though not demonstrated by traditional religion, has had a salutary
effect upon secular relationships. 65 He confesses that democracy, of which
he has been a life-long exponent, assumes the worth of the individual.
Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is
found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions
and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the
all-around growth of every member of society. 66
62. Cf.
,
ETH, 315 ff
. ; CP, 33ff.
63. Cf., ION, 74-75.
64. Cf.
,
ibid, 74-82.
65. RPH, 47.
66. Ibid, 186.
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He looks forward to a time and a society when individuals may mutually
enjoy the good things of life.^ He says that "individuals will always
he the center and the consummation of experience;"68 there cannot he
"a society really worth serving unless it is constituted of individuals
of significant qualities."6 ^ He affirms the true purpose of "govern-
ment, business, art, religion, all social institutions" to he "to set
free and to develop the capacities of human individuals without respect
70
to race, sex, class or economic status." Surely traditional religion
never gave greater practical content to its doctrine of the worth of the
individual soul than this.
A word of criticism must he raised hereegainst Dewey’s conception of
nature and man, which we have set forth in the two preceding sections.
Nature, as he conceives it, is a continuous system, inclusive of both
mind and physical organism. Hence, there is no real problem of the
relationship of body and mind; the problem is created by a tearing in
71
twain of an original unity and an attempt to relate the parts again.
Does, however, the teaching that a dualist ic relationship exists be-
tween mind and body destroy "continuity", as Dewey believes? If by "con-
72
tinuity" is meant identity (the second meaning mentioned above), a
dualism of mind and body is not reconcilable with continuity. But a
67. ION, 154.
68. Art. 86, 181.
69. DEE, 142.
70. RPH, 186.
71. Cf., EAN, vii
,
viii.
72. Supra, 75.
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qualitative identity of mind and body makes all of Dewey's talk of
"emergence" and "levels" meaningless. Plainly it would seem that Dewey
does not mean they are identical but continuous in the other sense men-
tioned above, — "related." 73
But how, we ask, does "dualism" destroy continuity in the sense of
relatedness? There is a continuity existing, for example, between father
and son. They represent in a sense different stages of development in a
family, different levels. Yet, that does not mean that father and son
are not distinct nor that their relationships are not a problem which the
simple affirmation of continuity does not solve.
Dewey has "solved" one of the knottiest problems of philosophy by a
verbal expedient. He has stretched the concept of "nature" until it covern
both mental and psycho-physical and then assumed that because both fall
within the category of "nature" there is no basic problem of their rela-
tionship.
There are four fundamental differences between mental events and bodi-
ly events: 74 (1) Mental events observe themselves; bodily events do not.
(2) Bodily events are in space; mental events are not. (3) Bodily events
are in the present only; mental events are extended in time to the past
and future. (4) Bodily events are facts; mental events are facts with
meanings . Ho more elementary differences can be conceived in all existence
than these. To enclose them both with the concept "nature" does nothing
at all to their differences. Dewey is guilty here of the same fallacy
73. He acknowledges they are "different" levels of emergence. EAN, 272.
74. Cf. Hocking, TOP, 98-100 for an illuminating discussion of these
point 8.
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with which he charged supernaturalism in the previous chapter. Super-
naturalists, he claims, hypostatized certain aspects of experience, —
permanence, for example, — into realities, allowing the hazardous elements
of experience to sink into phenomenal reality or non-Being. But classifi-
75
cation, he reminds us, does nothing to existence* We agree, — not
even to the fundamental differences existent between mind and body!
C. VALUE
Before embarking upon a discussion of Dewey’s concept of religion
proper we sketch briefly his naturalistic theory of value which lies at
the basis of it.
1. Psychology of value . Values arise in experience. Two inter-
pretations of the psychology of valuation are offered us by Dewey. In
his Ethics he makes value equivalent psychologically to the realization
76
of desire. While thought plays a part in the determination of value,
77
"it is impotent unless it arouses desire.” In his Quest for Certainty
with
he identifies value^ liking or enjoyment. ”To be enjoyed and to be a
78
value are two names for one and the same fact.” There is, however,
no fundamental significance for the philosophy of religion of these two
psychological theories.
2. Criterion of value . The true worth of the goods presented by
79
experience is not immediately given. Both likings and desires con-
flict, which make discrimination between them necessary; there is a basic
75. QFC, 35.
76. Cf. ETH, 228
77. ETH, 201.
78. QFC, 258.
79. ETH, 318-19.
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86
distinction dfstyrrcfri’pn. between desired and desirable. 8^ The criterion
of discrimination between competing desires or likings is their relation-
ships to a whole . The office of reflection in value-experience is "the
formulation of a judgment of value in which particular satisfactions are
placed as integral parts of conduct as a consistent harmonious whole."8 *
"The criterion is the whole situation in which the desire takes effect." 82
This does not mean, of course, that the true worth of competing desires
is decided without appeal to consequences. "The moral quality of aqy
impulse or active tendency can be told only by observing the sort of con-
sequences to which it leads in actual practice." 83 Thought
,
coherence,
is the criterion by which consequences are to be judged.
3. The organization of values . When we reach the matter of organ-
izing values two characteristic doctrines of Dewey come forward. First of
all, he insists that values cannot be arranged in a hierarchy of any sort.
We cannot draw up a catalogue and say that such and such goods are
intrinsically and always ideal, and such and such other ones inherently
base because material. There are circumstances under which enjoyment
of a value called spiritual because it is associated with religion is
mere indulgence; when its good, in other words, becomes one of mere
sensuous emotion. There are occasions when attention to the material
environment constitutes the ideal good because that is the act which
thoroughgoing inquiry would approve ..The business of reflection
in determining the true good cannot be done once for all, as, for
instance, making out a table of values arranged in a hierarchical
order of higher and lower. It needs to be done, and done over and over
and over again, in terms of the conditions of concrete situations as
they arise. 84
80. QFC, 260, 261.
81. ETH, 228.
82. Ibid, 385.
83. Ibid, 250-51.
84. Ibid, 230
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In the second place, Dewey maintains that no distinction must he made
between instrumental and intrinsic goods. Several considerations inspire
him to reject this usual ethical distinction:
(1) "Means-consequences” is "a single undivided situation."85 Means
Q /•
and consequences bear an organic relation to each other. (2) So-
R7
called ends or intrinsic values are not termini but turning-points. 0
Every value is both a means and an end.
All experienced objects have a double status. They are individual-
ized, consummatory, whether in the way of enjoyment or of suffering.
They are also involved in a continuity of interactions and changes,
and hence are causes and potential means of later experience. 88
(3) Value- judgments are essentially judgments about the conditions and
result of value. 88 (4) Finally, the practical results of divorce of
means and ends has been the brutalizing of our economic and social life,
because ideals are held to occupy a different status from the world of
90
means and not associated with them.
4. The relation of value and existence . "Ideals," a term which
9
Dewey uses interchangeably with values, are continuous with natural events.
By that he means that ideals represent the "possibilities" of natural
events
.
85. SAN, 397.
86. Cf. Ibid, 367-68.
00 HNC
,
223.
CD CD QFC, 236.
89. Ibid, 265.
90. Cf. RPH, 171-72.
QFC, 280-81.
91. EEL, 336—7.
92. Loc. cit.
This is a theme Dewey often dwells upon. See also
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The relation between objects as known and objects with respect to
value is that between the actual and the possible. ’The actual’ consists
of given conditions; ’the possible' denotes ends or consequences not
now existing but which the actual may through its use bring into exist-
ence. The possible in respect to any given actual situation is thus
an ideal for that situation; from the standpoint of operational defini-
tion — of thinking in terms of action — the ideal and the possible
are equivalent ideas If we agree to leave out the eulogistic savor
of ’ideal’ and define it in contrast with the actual, the possibility
denoted by an idea is the ideal phase of the existent.^
The ’’ought” is merely ”the ’is* of action.” 94 Consciousness of duty is
no more than ’’consciousness of something to be done.”^ ’’The difference
between saying ’This act is the one to be done, this act will meet the
situation,' and saying, ’The act ought to be done,' is merely verbal.” 96
5* Are values objective? 97 Finally, we come to the question as to
the objectivity of value, which is often cited as the test case for deter-
mining metaphysical position. Dewey is opposed to the objectivity of
values in the sense of their being already actual in a realm of Being.
His whole polemic against the supernatural set forth in the previous chapte
is directed against such a conception. Further, if it be true, as Barrett
(following Urban) declares, that the decisive question is whether we find
value in the world or we ourselves create all there is, Dewey must be
counted among the subjectivists. "Nature,” he says, "has intelligible
93. QFC, 299-300.
94. Ratner, POJD, 374.
95. Loc. cit.
96. Ibid, 375.
. Dewey objects to this phrasing of the question, for it is reminiscent
of an introspective psychology which "accepts a realm of purely
private states of consciousness" in contrast with an objective order.
EEL, 345.
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order as its possession in the degree in which we by our own overt opera-
tions realize potentialities contained in it. "9®
But there are several respects in which Dewey may be said to hold to
a sort of objectivity of value. (1) Values are more than mere personal
likings; if they are not to be simply arbitrary, undiscus sable preferences
they must possess the objectivity of cognitive beliefs.®® If a pragma-
tist can consistently hold to logical objectivity, values may be said to
be logically objective for Dewey. (2) Further, they are socially
objective. The projection and realization of ideals is a process extend-
ing through generations of continuous effort.^* (3) Also, they are
objective in the sense of having a determinative influence upon human
conduct.
(
4 ) Finally, they are objective in the sense that they
are natural. They are rooted in natural conditions: "they are made out
of the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience.
Men's labours in behalf of the ideal are "the doing of the universe", be-
cause man is a part of it.*^ 3
There are many criticisms which a theory of values such as that out-
lined call forth. At this point, however, we shall make but two
observations.
98. QFC, 215.
99. EAN, 424.
100. "The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. They
exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human
community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of con-
serving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values
we have received that those who come after us may receive it more
solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared
than we have received it." CF, 87.
101. CF, 48.
102. Ibid, 49.
103. EAN, 420.
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(I) We see here again the same fallacy noted in Dewey’s discussion
of man and nature, — the merely verbal unifying of real and ideal by the
concept of " continuity”. Values may be included under the concept
"nature”
,
but that fact does not bridge the fundamental differences be-
tween existence and value:
(1) as mental events (and Dewey admits they are projections of the
104imagination) there are the same differences between them and physical
existents as we have noted previously. 105
(2) Further, ideals involve an element of compulsion, necessity,
obligation which other existents do not. Dewey says that an ideal is
"a possibility of existence." 106 In that way he binds value and exist-
ence together. But that is not what we mean by an ideal. A genuine
ideal is not only a possibility of existence but one which we acknowledge
that we ought to realize. To say "wealth is a possibility of existence"
is not the same as to say "I ought to seek wealth." Possibilities may
be either good or bad. War and peace, for example, are both possibili-
ties of existence. Kant pointed out long ago the distinction between
existence and obligation.
Das Sollen druckt eine Art von Eotwendigkeit und Verknupfung mit Grunden
aus, die in der ganzen Natur sonst nich vorkommt Es ist unmoglich,
dass etwas darin anders sein soil, als es in alien diesen Zeitverhalt-
nissen in der Tat ist, ja das Sollen, wenn man bloss den Lauf der Natur
vor Augen hat, hat ganz und gar keine Bedeutnng. YtTir konnen gar nicht
fragen: was in der Natur geschehen soli, ebensowenig, als: was fur
Eigenschaften ein Zirkel haben soli 107
104. CF, 43.
105. Supra, 94.
106. Cf. EEL, 336-37.
107 KRV, A, 547; B, 575
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(3) Still further, what "ought to be" stands frequently in oppositioi
to what is*
To call both existents and values, then, "natural events" is only
to classify and not to solve the problem of their status in the world.
It is a verbal solution for the basic dichotomy existing between them. 109
It no more mediates their intrinsic differences than the classification
of Japanese and Chinese as "Mongolians" settles their difficulties.
(II) We see in Dewey’s discussion of values his basic assumption
that nature is a whole, which includes man and his values. Since it is
a whole and not anaggregate, it may be characterized as a whole. Man is,
of course, characterized by this natural whole of which he is a part;
but man to some extent characterizes it! "If man is natural," as
109Hartshorne puts it, then "nature is manlike." The final implications
of interpreting nature in terms of man is that conception of the world
to which theism ultimately refers. 1 *0 The doctrine that nature is a
whole, inclusive of man and his ideals, is two-edged; its implications are
quite as properly idealistic as naturalistic.
108. It is for this reason that Santayana calls Dewey’s naturalism "half-
hearted." For Dewey brings ends, aims, and values which men
cherish into nature, imparting to it a teleological and anthropolog-
ical character quite inconsistent with nature as usually conceived.
Santayana holds that Dewey is incurably ethical, and his naturalism
is really a thin veneer. He is unwilling to go the whole way and
carry through the assumption of naturalism to materialistic con-
clusions. Cf. Santayana, Art. 1.
109. BH, 40.
110. Hartshorne contends that the ultimate implication of Dewey’s view
is panpsychism. Ibid, 40-41, 45.
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D. "THE RELIGIOUS”
1. Religion versus "the religious. ” Dewey begins his exposition of
his own views with the pronouncement that "there is a difference between
religion, & religion, and the religious.”111 Concretely, there is no
such thing as religion in the singular.
There is only a multitude of religions. ’Religion* is a strictly
collective term and the collection it stands for is not even of the
kind illustrated in textbooks of logic. It has not the unity of a
regiment or assembly but that of any miscellaneous aggregate. 1 *-2
All peoples have had _a religion, but ’’the differences among them are so
great and so shocking that aqy common element that can be extracted is
meaningless.”113 A survey of historical religions reveals a multitude
of different gods, from the Kami of primitive Shintoism, or the fetish
of the Africans, to the gods and semi-divine heroes of the Greek and Roman
Pantheons, or the personal and loving Providence of Christianity. 114
’’There is no greater similarity in the ways in which obedience and rever-
ence have been expressed." 113 There is, further, "no discernible unity
in the moral motivations appealed to and utilized” in historical religions.
Hence, Dewey comes to the conclusion that the search for a universal element
111. CP, 3.
112. Ibid, 7-1
113. Ibid, 8.
114. CP, 4.
115. Loc. cit
116. Ibid, 5.
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religion, in the mass of divergent religions is profitless.
\7hat boots it to accept, in defense of the universality of religion,
a definition that applies equally to the most savage and degraded belief!)
and practices that have related to unseen powers and to noble ideals of
religion having the greatest share of moral content?117
Since a universal element of any significance is missing, — religion,
— and religion always means "a special body of beliefs and practices
having some kind of institutional organization, loose or tight, w11®
Dewey proposes to deal with what he designates ’’the religious”, — ”atti-
tudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or
ideal. n11 ^
2. Analysis of ’’the religious”. Dewey gives us two specific state-
ments of ’’the religious”:
(1) A sense of the possibilities of existence and .... devotion to the
cause of these possibilities, as distinct from acceptance of what is
given at the time. 12®
(2) The unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal
ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will
responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices. 121
An analysis of these two expressions of ”the religious” reveals the
following constituent elements:
117. CF, 7.
118. Ibid, 9.
119. Ibid, 10.
120. QFC, 303.
121 CF, 33
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(1)
A inerts chau, — apprehension of value, "a sense of the possibili-
ties of existence”, imaginative projection of the ideal. This valuation-
al sense is directed toward (1) whatever is truly significant
,
whether it
be certain ideal possibilities or that upon which they depend, and (2) it
apprehends what is significant in its wholeness . The object of faith is
variously defined as ”the active relation between real and actual” (which
Dewey describes as "coherent”),122 ”the unity of all ideal ends arousing
1 P3 1 P4
us to desire and actions,” the universe as a whole. c But what-
ever the objects of valuation may be, they are not apprehended religiously
in their solitariness but in their unity or wholeness.
(2) Devotion to whatever is perceived to be truly significant, —
"devotion to the cause of these possibilities,” "allegiance to inclusive
ideal ends."
(3) The result of devotion to ideal ends is unification of the self .
Dewey says that whenever this is effected "there is a definitely religious
attitude."125
If we seek an illustration of the sort of naturalistic religion Dewey
is expounding, communism comes to mind. It rejects the supernatural, as
Dewey does, and involves a passionate allegiance to certain ideal ends
which it holds to be possibilities of natural events. While Dewey is
126
critical of communism he admits that it is truly "religious.”
122. CF, 51.
123. Ibid, 42.
124. Ibid, 18, 19.
125. Ibid, 17.
126. Cf. Art. 83; CHE, I, 426; art. 87, 31-32.
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3* Comparison with the historic notion of "the religious A com-
parison of Dewey's theory of "the religious" with that of historical
religions suggests that elements (2) and (3) above are common. Devotion
to the objects of faith and integration of self through such allegiance are
127frequent phenomena of historical religions, as Dewey would acknowledge.
There are three respects, however, in which Dewey's view of "the
religious" differs sharply from historical conceptions of the same. In the
first place, historically the religious attitude has been inseparably bound
to supernatural objects. The truly significant or worthful to which the
religious attitude is directed in Dewey’s theory is, of course, natural.
Secondly, historical religions have regarded "the religious" as having a
ICO
peculiar quality of its own, "something sui generis For Dewey
the religious attitude may be associated with all sorts of experiences and
activities Thirdly, historical religions, Dewey believes, have
found their "consummat ion in the act of worship; "dependence upon an exter-
1 30
nal power is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor." "The
religious" in Dewey's sense, is not quietistic, but, because it is directed
131toward natural ends, eventuates in "an idealism of action."
4. "The religious" and science . Historic religions have been bound
to specific intellectual beliefs. But these supernatural beliefs of relig-
ion have been discredited in the modern world by the impact of the new
127. Cf. CP, 4, 17.
128. Ibid, 13-14.
129. Ibid, 14.
130. Ibid, 146.
131. QpC, 304.
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astronomer, geology, biology, anthropology, psychology, and literary criti-
cism.^2 Supernaturalistic faiths have been hard pressed by theapproach
of science. They have resorted to a number of different expedients
.
Attempts have been made to partition the territory between science and
religion. But this method is open to the objection that ” a positive
conclusion is drawn from a negative fact.” 133 That is, ’’existing ignor-
ance or backwardness is employed to assert the existence of a division
in the nature of the subject-matter dealt with.” 134 But ’’the argument
that because some province or aspect of experience has not been ’invaded’
by scientific methods, it is not subject to them, is as old as it is
dangerous.” 135 Another device has been to save religion by holding
its beliefs to be symbolic. While this view may be an advance upon those
that hold to literal objective validity, such an attempt is riddled with
ambiguities concerning the status of that symbolized. 136
Because of the inability of supernatural religions to accommodate theii
doctrines to the methods and results of science a crisis exists in religion
today. This crisis can be resolved by a conception of faith such as Dewey
heralds. It is in harmopy with the spirit and methods of science, and
cannot be discredited but only furthered by any advances science will make.
132. CF, 31.
133. Ibid, 34.
134. Loc. cit.
135. Ibid, 35.
136. Ibid, 40-41.
137. Ibid, 33,
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Were we to admit that there is but one method for ascertaining fact
and truth — that conveyed by the word 'scientific* in its most general
and generous sense — no discovery in any branch of knowledge and in-
quiry could then disturb the faith that is religious.
What is the relation, then, of science to ’’the religious,” as Dewey
views it? First of all, as we have just suggested, ’’the religious” is,
in spirit, in harmony with science. The ever-seeking, progressive, truth*
loving attitude which characterizes science is its own. Secondly, science
would uncover the possibilities of which, after criticism, are to become
138
the ends of religious devotion. Finally, the methods of scientific
intelligence would be employed for the realization of those ends to which
139
’’the religious” gives its allegiance.
5. ”The religious” and philosophy . Philosophy, as Dewey conceives
it, has a two-fold function with reference to experience. First, and
negatively, it is critical. Its duty is to act as ”liason officer be-
tween the conclusions of science and the modes of social and personal
action through which attainable possibilities are projected and striven
for.”^4^ It criticizes the values (possibilities) which the sciences
bring to light with an eye to rendering them ”more coherent, more secure,
141
and more significant*” Further, it is critical in that it seeks
to remove those obstacles which stand in the way of the realization of
142
true values.
Secondly, it has the positive function of projecting ideals, —
138. QFC, 304.
139. Cf. CF, 81.
140. QFC, 311.
141. EAN, 408.
142. QFC, 313.
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possibilities of experience, — that are truly worthy of personal and socia,L
action. Further, it would project methods for their realization, 143
0?he positive function of philosophy is]] the creative work of the
imagination in pointing to the new possibilities which knowledge of the
actual discloses and in projecting methods for their realization in the
homely everyday experience of mankind.
The relation of philosophy to "the religious" is fairly clear.
Philosophy, after criticism of the results of the sciences, would present
religious men with those ideal ends which should be the ends of faith.
Philosophy would supply "the religious" with its objects. At the same
time, it would critically revise from time to time those objects as well
as seek to destroy all spurious forms and conceptions of religion.
6. "The religious" and the moral . Bewey offers two respects in
which "the religious" differs from the moral. First,
The religious attitude signifies something that is bound through
imagination to a general attitude. This comprehensive attitude, more-
over, is much broader than anything indicated by ’moral* in its usual
sense. The quality of attitude is displayed in art, science, and
good citizenship. 144
If "morals in the usual sense" means merely honesty, temperance, benevol-
ence, chastity, and the like, of course, "the religious" represents some-
thing more comprehensive. But Bewey himself does not conceive of morals
in such a fashion. "Moral science," he says, "is not something with a
separate province. It is physical, biological, and historic knowledge
placed in a human context where it will illuminate and guide the activities
of men."145 Morals includes love of knowledge, belief, and art. 145
143. QFC, 312.
144. CF, 23.
145. HNC, 296.
146. Cf. EAN, 52, 272; cf. Crissman, Art. 1, 598.

"Potentially
,
conduct is one hundred per cent of our acts."147 Whenever
choice enters, "a difference between better and worse arises." 14® Dewey
conceives, thus, of morals as involving the conduct of life as a whole.
We cannot see more than a verbal difference between what Dewey calls
"religious" and what an orthodox moralist would call "devotion to the Good.
But Dewey suggests that there is a second difference between "the
religious" and the moral.
What has been said does not imply that all moral faith in ideal ends
is by virtue of that fact religious in quality. The religious is
’morality touched by emotions’ only when the ends of moral conviction
arouse emotions that are not only intense but are actuated and supported
by ends so inclusive that they unify the self. The inclusiveness of th
end in relation to both self and the ’universe’ to which an inclusive
self is related is indispensable. 14®
But unification of the self has often been the result of allegiance to
what are usually regarded as moral ends.
"The religious" is indistinguishable from the moral, if the latter
(1) be conceived as devotion, not to particular, but inclusive ends, and
(2) as resulting in integration of the self.
7. "The religious" and the esthetic . "The religious" is closely
related to the esthetic. (1) The object of faith, in so far as it
possesses unity, has esthetic quality. For Dewey says that "no experience
\
of whatever sort is a unity unless it has esthetic quality." 1^® Unity
is the mark of the esthetic everywhere. Sven
147. HNC, 279.
149. Ibid, 278.
149. CF, 22-23.
150. AaS, 40.
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the most elaborate philosophic or scientific inquiry and the most
ambitious industrial or political enterprise has, when its different in-
gredients constitute an integral experience, esthetic quality.
In so far as the ends of religious devotion are conceived as a unity, as a
whole, it has esthetic quality.
Further, (2) both "the religious" and the esthetic involve imagination
Dewey emphasizes the fact that the object of faith is imaginatively pre-
sented;^-®2 esthetic experience is likewise essentially imaginative. 153
(3) Again, both involve subjection of the resistant to an end, — "dynamic
organization."
In every integral ejqperience there is form because there is dynamic
organization. I call the organization dynamic because it takes time
to complete it, because it is a growth That which distinguishes
an experience as esthetic is conversion of resistance and tensions, of
excitations that in themselves are temptations to diversion, into a
movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close. 154
The realization of the inclusive ends of faith in a world such as ours will
require, also, time and conversion of "resistance and tensions" before
consummation is reached. 155
(4) Religious feeling may be invoked by esthetic perception.
A work of art elicits and accentuates (the} quality of being
a whole and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is
the universe in which we live. This fact is the explanation of
that feeling of exquisite intelligibility and clarity we have in the
presence of an object that is experienced with esthetic intensity. It
explains also the religious feeling that accompanies intense esthetic
perception. We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond this
world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which
we live in our ordinary experiences. We are carried out beyond our-
selves to find ourselves. 156
151. AAE, 55.
152. CF, 33.
153. AAE, 272.
154. Ibid, 55-56
155. Cf. CF, 81.
156. AAE, 195.
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Wherein do "the religious" and the esthetic differ? Chiefly indiffer-
ent interests and purposes that initiate and control them. 157 "The
religious" is interested in certain ideal ends and eventuates consciously
in certain objective activities. The esthetic is interested in the
wholeness of experience for its own sake without reference to further
purposes.
In a distinctively esthetic experience, characteristics that are sub-
dued in other experiences are dominant; those that are subordinate are
controlling — namely, the characteristics in virtue of which the ex-
perience is an integrated complete experience on its own account. 158
8. "The religious " and society . The relationship of "the religious"
to society is clear and can be summarily stated.
To begin with, ideals, which form, in their unity, the object of faith
are socially derived. Man himself is intrinsically social, and his ideals
are shaped by his social relations and are the product of his discontent
with the social conditions in which he lives. 159
In the second place, the "religious" sense can be built up and sus-
tained in society alone. The notion that "the religious" can be developed
in solitary souls is fatuous.
The very attempt to secure integration for the individual, and through
him for society, by means of a deliberate and conscious cultivation of
religion, is itself proof of how far the individual has become lost
through detachment from acknowledged social values The sense of
wholeness which is urged as the essence of religion can be built up
and sustained only through membership in a society which has attained
a degree of unity. The attempt to cultivate it first in individuals
and then extend it to form an organically unified society is fantasy.
157. AAS, 55.
158. Loc. cit.
159. Cf. HNC, 60-63, 260.
160. ION, 64.
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Finally, the ideals which commend the truly religious man’s loyalty
are social ideals.
9. Criticism . Though many criticisms are evoked by Dewey’s theory
of "the religious”, we limit our comments to two observations.
(I) In the first place, the distinction between ’’religion” and ”the
religious” which he employs as a point of departure for projecting a theory
of his own is not well made. It will be recalled that Dewey rejected the
notion that there is in historical religions a universal element of suffic-
ient significance to be called "religion”. He denied that historical
religions have any meaningful common element. Such a contention can
scarcely be sustained for several reasons:
(1) Students of religion have found common, meaningful elements in
historical religions. -^2 While they may be in error, to discuss a
theme such as this, as Dewey does, without acknowledging their labors does
not commend itself to seekers of the truth about historical religions.
(2) It is difficult to understand why it is more difficult to arrive
at the common elements in historical religions than at the common denomin-
ator of the sciences. Dewey frequently employs the term ’’scientific
method.” As a matter of fact there is a multitude of methods used by
161. Gf. CF, 80f f.
162. For example, Schleiermacher
,
— the feeling of dependence as the
common element of religion ( Per christliche Glaube , #4); Troeltsch
who finds an a priori element in religion ( cf. ”Das religiose
Apriori”, Gesarnmelte Schriften
,
II, 754-68); Otto
,
who discovers
a common numinous element ( cf. Das Heilige )
;
_J. Baillie
,
who de-
fines religion after an historical survey, as ”a moral trust in
reality” (IOE, 318).
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the sciences. Further, if we extend our survey backward into the histor
r
of the sciences we discover still more. Yet, Dewey believes that he has
found their common denominator. Why is it impossible with religions?
After all, the fact that religions have contradicted one another does not
invalidate "religion” any more than the contradictions of science spread
upon the pages of its history — and there are many of them — invalidate
the claims of science.
(3) Dewey fails to recognize that evolution has taken place in
religions. In any process of development the elements of meaning are to
be sought for in the later and higher phases. Dewey, however, lumps
together the varied eapressions which religion has taken from the dawn
of consciousness into what Van Dusen calls "an indiscriminate and hetero-
geneous bundle of equal significance," African fetish-worship, the divine
Idea of Plato, the religion of the Sioux Indians, phallic worship, the
religion of the Hebrew prophets, Christianity, and then fails to find a
meaningful common element *163 it is WOrthy of note that when Dewey
seeks the meaningful factors in science he does not bring in the primitive 1
science of the Zulus or the ancient Babylonians together with modern
science in order to seek the common significant element. He begins with
the seventeenth century jl64 why should not religion be interpreted
in terms of its highest phases?
(4) The decisive refutation of Dewey's contention that there is no
163. VanDusen, art. 1, 127; cf. CF, 35-37, 47.
164. Cf. RPH, 28.
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common meaningful element in historical religions is to he found in his
own testimony. After stating in the first chapter of A Common Faith
that there is no significant universal element in historic religions he
closes the last chapter of the book with these words:
We who now live are parts of a humanity that extends into the remote
past, a humanity that has interacted with nature Ours is the
responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding
the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us
may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more
generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements
for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or
race . Such _a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of
mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant 7*”°
(II) It is to be noted that Dewey violates the principle of continuity
which he insists so strongly upon in his theory of nature, when he treats
historical religion. He violates it in two respects. First of all,
he tears faith and its object apart. Historically, religion has had two
inseparable elements, — (1) a subjective — attitude of the worshipper,
(2) an objective — an actual supernatural object of worship. Dewey
has cut these two factors apart and insisted that religion is to be
identified with the first. If Dewey’s strictures are valid against those
who would divide experience into subject and object, or mind and body, or
cause and effect, why is not a protest against the severance of faith and
its object in the historical experience of religion legitimate?
Further, he has snapped the threads of continuity between his own
religion and historical religions. He says plainly that he proposes in
his Common Faith to "wipe the slate clean” of supernatural faiths and
165. CF, 87. (Italics ours.)
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”start afresh.”166 He wants no misunderstanding. ”The opposition
between religious values as I conceive them,” he says, ”and religions is
not to be bridged.”167 Such a position is clearly inconsistent with
the principle of continuity which he affirms to the point of tediousness
in his deliverances on nature.
After all, Dewey prides himself upon being a philosopher of experienc .
He insists that we take experience as we find it and proceed in our
philosophizing from there. Now the only experience of religion that we
have got to philosophize about is historically-experienced religion. Yet,
Dewey expresses his intention of ’'wiping the slate clean” of it and
formulating a theory of his own. Can anything be more unempirical?
E. THE OBJECT OF FAITH
In the previous section we have expounded Dewey’s religious theory
from the standpoint of attitude; in the present section we consider the
object of the religious attitude.
1. "God .” It will be recalled from the preceding chapter that Dewey
censured supernaturalism because of the divorce of actual and ideal con-
tained in it. The ideal was severed from existence. In his own con-
structive philosophy, as we have seen, he endeavors to connect the ideal
with the actual. The connection, as he conceives it, is two- fold:
166. CF, 6.
167 Ibid, 28
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(1) The ideal shapes the actual; the ideal is a determining influence upon
conduct and physical nature. ’’The reality of ideal ends as ideals is
vouched for by their undeniable powers of action.” (2) Yet, the
actual is the matrix of the ideal. The ideal is a ’’possibility of
existence,” realised through the use of natural means by man, who is a
169
part of nature. The objective of faith, then, for Dewey is the
active relationship between the ideal and the actual. The active union
between the two he calls ”God.”
We are in the presence neither of ideals completely embodied in ex-
istence nor yet of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, fantasies,
utopias. For there are forces in nature and society that generate
and support the ideals. They are further unified by the action that
gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation between
ideal and actual to which I would give the name ’God. * 170
2. Analysis . How is this ’’active relation between ideal and actual”
to be conceived? It will be noted that there are two factors contained
in the union which constitutes ”God”, the object of religious devotion:
(A) an ideal, and (B) an actual. A study of Dewey’s notion of "God” will
reveal that Dewey oscillates between emphasis on one and the other. The
result is that there are two variant conceptions of God present in Dewey’s
thought corresponding to the two factors in the definition above.
(A) In the first place, God is represented as the imaginative
synthesis of ideal ends, deriving their origin and support from nature,
though having a determinative influence upon it. This conception of God
168. CF, 43.
169. Cf. ^FC, 299-300.
170 CF, 50-51
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is evidenced by such passages as the following:
(God] denotes the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and
action.171
CGod] means the ideal ends that at a given time and place one
acknowledges as having authority over his volition and emotion, the
values to which one is supremely devoted, as far as these ends, through
imagination take on unity.172
’God* represents a unification of ideal values that is essentially
imaginative in origin when the imagination supervenes in conduct. 173
CDhe idea of God is] one of ideal possibilities unified through
imaginative realization and projection. But this idea of God, or of
the divine, is also connected with all the natural forces and conditions
— including man and human association — that promote the growth of
the ideal and that further its realization. 174
[The faith that is "religious” is] the unification of the self through
allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us
and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our de-
sires and choices. 175
The idealizing imagination seizes upon the most precious things found
in the climacteric moments of experience and projects them. We need
no external criterion and guarantee for their goodness. They are had,
they exist as good, and out of them we frame our ideal ends. 17 **
The object of faith as portrayed in these passages is clear. "God”
is an imaginative synthesis of ideals, possessing no actuality in them-
selves, yet arising out of nature and through human agency effective in
171. •CM8
172. Loc. cit.
173. Ibid, 43.
174. Ibid, 50.
175. Ibid, 33.
176. Ibid, 48
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re-shaping nature.
B. On the other hand, "God" is represented in Dewey’s thought in a
fashion corresponding to the actual factor in the definition. In certain
places in A Common Faith the object of faith is represented as ’’those
factors in existence that generate and support our idea of good as an
end to be striven for;”
The meaning (of the idea of ”God’[] is selective. For it involves no
miscellaneous worship of everything in general. It selects those
factors in existence that generate and support our idea of good as an
end to be striven for.177
Matthew Arnold’s conception of a 'power not ourselves' is too narrow
in its reference to operative and sustaining conditions. V/hile it is
selective, it is too narrow in its basis of selection — righteousness.
The powers that generate and support the good as experienced work with-
in as well as without...... And the powers work to enforce other values
and ideals than righteousness. 178
A humanistic religion, if it excludes our relation to nature, is pale
and thin, as it is presumptuous, when it takes humanity as an object
of worship. 179
In addition to these passages which suggest that the object of faith
is not ideal but actual is a group of passages closely related which
suggest that the end of religious devotion is not so much certain selected
aspects of nature as nature as a whole:
Qn a passage in A Common Faith the object of religious devotion is
set forth as] the Universe (as a name for the totality of conditions
with which the self is connected). 18®
177. CF, 53.
178. Ibid, 54.
179 Loc. cit. 54
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In a genuine sense every act is already possessed, of infinite import.
The little part of the scheme of affairs which is modifiable by our
efforts is continuous with the rest of the world That small effort
which we can put forth is in turn connected with an infinity of events
that sustain and support it. The consciousness of this encompassing
infinity of connections is ideal This ideal is not a goal to be
attained. It is a significance to be felt, appreciated. 181
Infinite relationships of man with his fellows and with nature already
exist. The ideal means, as we have seen, a sense of these encompass-
ing continuities with their infinite reach Even in the midst of
conflict, struggle and defeat a consciousness is possible of the en-
during and comprehending whole. 182
Every act may carry within itself a consoling and supporting conscious
ness of the whole to which it belongs and which in some sense belongs to
it Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves
dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its
presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. 18^
A work of art elicits and accentuates this quality of being a whole
and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is the
universe in which we live It explains also the religious feeling
that accompanies intense esthetic perception. We are, as it were, in-
troduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the
deeper reality of the world in which we live in our ordinary experiences
Where egotism is not made the measure of reality and value, we
are citizens of this vast world beyond ourselves, and any intense
realization of its presence with and in us brings a peculiarly satis-
fying sense of unity in itself and with ourselves. 184
fa passage suggesting the object of devotion as both nature as a
whole and also selective aspects of it0 Fidelity to the nature to which
we belong, as parts however weak, demands that we cherish our desires
and ideals till we have converted them into intelligence, revised them
in terms of the ways and means which nature makes possible. When we
have used our thought to its utmost and have thrown into the moving
unbalanced balance of things our puny strength, we know that though the
universe slay us still we may trust, for our lot is one with whatever
is good in existence
181. HNG
,
262-3.
182. Ibid, 330.
183. Ibid, 331-32.
184. AAE, 195.
185. EAN
,
420-21.
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We have quoted at some length to indicate the fact that there are two
emphases in Dewey's thought about the object of faith, one an idealistic,
another a realistic, which amount to two different conceptions of the
divine. "Ideal possibilities of existence" (A above) and "factors in
existence" (B above) are not the same. They represent the difference
between what is possible and what is actual. One (A) is prospective;
the other (B) is here and now. The object according to one view (A) is
an ideal conception; the object of devotion according to the other (B) is
those aspects of nature that support and condition our ideals. according
to the one view (A) the object of religion might be, let us say, the idea
of a "Beloved Community", — it is a possibility of existence, — in which
all man's needs, biological, esthetic, cultural, would be met. The idea
of a "Beloved Community" would occupy the focus of attention, though it
would be recognized that such a Community is conditioned by natural forces
and will be brought about by natural tools. In the other case (B) the
object of "the religious" would be all those factors in existence that
interact to make a "Beloved Community” possible, such as, let us say, the
reliability or law-abiding character of physical nature, its productive-
ness, tools, scientific method, and the ideal-projecting faculty of man.
We see revealed here again the same difficulty noted elsewhere in
Dewey'
3
philosophy of reconciling the ideal and the real, the possible
and the actual. We have seen that in nature as a whole, in the "Body-
mind" problem, and the relation of values to existence Uewey bridges
genuine differences by resort to verbal expedients. Here again the
same "solution" is in evidence. "God” is the "active relation between
ideal and actual." But when we inquire concerning the "relation" two
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variant conceptions appear, one, ideals forming nature, the other, nature
generating and supporting ideals. The fact that Dewey seems to lean more
to the former does not negate the presence of the other in his thought.
3. Is Dewey a theist ? The question has been raised as to whether
Dewey is a theist. Professor Wieman interprets him theistically
,
and
Professor Iceland classifies his religious views under "empirical theism"
187in his survey of American Philosophies of Beligion.
"Theism", in general, has meant one of three things:
(1) Belief in supernatural powers and agencies.
(2) Belief in the existence of one God, — monotheism.
(3) More particularly, belief in the existence of a God who transcends
created things by his personality and yet is immanent in them. In all
these senses it is opposed to atheism. as (2) it is opposed to poly-
188
theism. (3) stands in opposition to deism and pantheism.
Dewey’s whole polemic against the supernatural would eliminate him as
a theist in either the first or third senses. It is with difficulty that
he is classified as a theist in the second sense. If we take the "ideal"
186. Cf. the controversy "Is John Dewey a Theist?" (Art. 91; Aubrey and
Wieman, Art. 1) Professor Wieman insists that Dewey is a theist;
Professor Aubrey denies it; and Dr. Dewey himself sides with Aubrey.
If one will peruse the passages which V/ieman and Aubrey submit to
establish their respective points of view one will discover that they
correspond to the two interpretations of Dewey’s thought which we
have indicated above. Aubrey insists that "God" is only an ideal
synthesis for Dewey; Wieman points to the fact that the center of
focus is really those aspects of nature which generate and support
ideals. While Dewey lends his sanction in the article cited above
to the "idealistic" interpretation. Professor Wieman is well within
the truth when he points to unmistakable realistic strands in Dewey’s
thought about the object of faith.
187. APR, 273.
188. Cf. Harris, KID, 2139; Thormeyer, PWB, 196; Baldwin, DPP, II, 688-
91; Galloway, PHR, 466; Brightman, ITP, 392.
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interpretation of the object of faith, it is not an existent and hence
will not qualify Dewey as a theist. If we take Wieraan’s interpretation,
Dewey is a theist, in the special sense of believing in one God, though
the fact that this God is not conceived as a person excludes Dewey from
theism in the generally-accepted use of the term. The fact that Dewey
himself rejects the attempts to make him a theist seems decisive against
189
theistic classification.
4. Criticism . In concluding this section a few critical remarks
are in order.
(I) We have already noted the ambiguity in Dewey’s thought about
the object of faith. The "active relation between the actual and the
ideal" can be interpreted either ideally or actually. If we take the
"ideal" interpretation of the object of faith we are confronted with an
ambiguity in the notion of "idea", which we have pointed out in the
discussion of Dewey’s theory of value. An "ideal" for him is a
"possibility of existence", and we have suggested that a "possibility"
is capable of either good or evil connotations.^® If we take the
"actual" interpretation of Dewey’s thought we are met with the problem
of determining whether the object of religious aspiration is those
elements of nature that support ideals, the view mentioned in A Common
Faith
,
or nature as a whole, the view suggested in his other works.
(II) A study of Dewey’s thought will reveal that the same general
objections which he levelled against supernaturalism are also to be urged
199. Cf. Art. 91, 1551-52; Humanist Manifesto, #6.
190. Cf. Supra, 90.
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against his own conception of God, particularly if he holds that the object
of faith is an imaginative synthesis of ideal ends. In the last chapter
we have organized his objection to the supernatural under four categories:
(A) Genetic . We have seen that JDewey belabored supernatural
religions because their objects of worship were projections of the desire
for security. Yet, Dewey acknowledges that his own conception of God is
an imaginative projection, which has to be made if the self is to achieve
191the very desirable state of integration! In what respect, we ask,
is the desire for integration of self such that a faith based on it is
valid while a faith based on desire for security is not?
(B) .Epistemological . Dewey objected to the objects of supernatural-
ism, because they could not be established by scientific method. But, the
object of faith, as he conceives it, cannot be established by scientific
method, either! As Professor flocking has pointed out, Dewey forsakes
1 92his instrumentalism when he formulates his conception of God. We have
seen in the discussion of value that he rejects the notion of a hierarchy
of value, values which are good once and for all as ends of action. He
maintains, instead, that we must proceed from situation to situation,
and when conflict arises imagined ends must be devised as hypothetical ways
191. CF, 18-19. "It is pertinent to note that the unification of the self
throughout the ceaseless flux of what it does, suffers, and achieves,
cannot be attained in terms of itself. The self is always directed
toward something beyond itself and so its own unification depends
upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the
world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe." CF, 19.
192. TDL, 169-71.
1
out of the situation. That way which resolves the conflict is good.193
Dewey explicitly rejects the attempt to elevate principles as such to the
central place in the moral life; a moral principle is merely "a tool for
analyzing a special situation.” 19^
But in his discussion of religion he reverses himself; he says that
the needs of the self for integration can only be met by surrender to an
ideal, which is not a hypothetical way out of a particular situation but
a view of the Universe as a wholel 195 It is to be noted, further, that
the unification of the ideal ends of existence which are to be made the
objects of faith cannot be given to us by science; science can only
suggest possibilities. It is philosophy, by its criticism of the sciaxec,
that projects those ends which are to become the objects of devotion. 196
Thus, Dewey in his formulation of his idea of God turns his back upon
those instrumentalistic premises which he had employed as the basis for
193. Cf. ETH, 230; HNC, 223-27; Ratner, POJD, 374, 375.
194. ETH, 309.
195. CE, 19.
196.
Cf. Supra, 97
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(c) Logical . Dewey condemned supernaturalism because it erected cer-
tain selected aspects of experience into superior realities and the objects
of religious devotion. But when we turn to Dewey* s own thought we find
him doing essentially the same. Hjs object of religious aspiration is not
everything; it is those aspects of experience which are selected because
of their significance.
Use of the words ’God* or ’divine* to convey the union of actual with
ideal may protect man from a sense of isolation and from consequent
despair or defiance.
In any case, whatever the name, the meaning is selective. For it
involves no miscellaneous worship of everything in general. It selects
those factors in existence that generate and support our idea of good
as an end to be striven for. It excludes a multitude of forces that
at any given time are irrelevant to this function.^- 98
If it is legitimate for Dewey to select the objects which seem to him
significant as ends of devotion the choice in itself of certain objects by
the classic tradition for allegiance is not to be condemned.
197. Professor Hocking says: ”It is of great interest to note that
Professor John Dewey comes to... the .... conclusion. . . . that the
meaning of life is not to be reached through the sciences, but rather
by way of the imagination — a conclusion which seems to me in
various ways a welcome departure from positions with which he has
been supposedly identified.
The genius of the instrumental philosophy I take to be this: that
ideas mean what they lead us to — the general idea serves as an
instrument to guide action to some particular experience in which
it is verified. The general means the particular. But in the
great little book of Dewey’s on A Common Faith
,
meaning runs the
other way; particular experiences appear as instrumental to ideas .
The meaning of life is found in serving ideal ends, that is to say,
in attempting to embody them in practice. To find one’s life
integrated, that is to say, whole-hearted and therefore significant,
one must reach the point, says Dewey, where certain ideals present
to imagination dominate conduct.” TDL, 168-69.
198 CF, 53
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The practical limitations of Dewey*
9
point of view will he considered
in Chapter V.
(Ill) Finally, it is to he noted that personal idealism offers an
"active relation between ideal and actual." It conceives of God as an
actual Being, active in the world, realizing ideals. At the same time it
is not guilty of those ambiguities which inhere in Dewey* s conception of
faith and its object, and it provides an end, devotion to which can effect
that unification of the self which Dewey prizes.
F. DEWEY AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION
In this section we shall indicate where Dewey’s thought leads him with
reference to the perennial problems of religion, — personal religion, the
problem of evil, immortality, the Church, and finally the goal of human
history.
1. Personal religion: (a) Religious experience . Since we have al-
ready discussed religious experience in connection with arguments for the
existence of God, a summary statement will suffice. (1) Dewey regards
199
religious experience as genuine. (2) It is not unique, sui
generis
.
Those who hold to the notion that there is a definite kind of ex-
perience which is itself religious, by that very fact make out of it some-
thing specific, as a kind of experience that is marked off from experience
as aesthetic, scientific, moral, political; from experience as companion-
ship and friendship. But ’religious’ as a quality of experience signi-
fies something that may belong to all these experiences. 200
199. CF, 37, 12.
200. Ibid, 10.
-_
.\. ;c Jr-.iti
.
•. : . v.j
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.01 .OS
(3) It is not self-verifying. There is no immediate apprehension of the
divine in religious experience; the interpretation of the experience, the
naming of the object contacted in it, it brought to the experience from
without. 201 (4) The God-concept is not necessary for a genuine religious
experience.
Either.... the concept of God can be dropped out as far as genuinely
religious ejperience is concerned, or it must be framed wholly in terms
of natural and human relationships involved in our straightway human
experience. 202
(b) Prayer and worship . "In place of the old attitudes involved in
worship and prayer," reads the Humanist Manifesto
,
of which Dewey is a
signer,203
the humanist finds his religious emotions expressed in a heightened sense
of personal life and in a cooperative effort to promote social well
being.
As we have seen in considering Dewey’s objections to the supernatural, he
regards worship as a waste of energy and socially unproductive. Prayer,
though he has no specific deliverances on the subject, is easily identifi-
able with that dependence on the supernatural which is anathema to him.
(c) Revelation. Dewey has scant respect for revelation in the
usual sense. With his accustomed low estimate of history he affirms that
traditionalists in appealing to revelation are turning from the relative
enlightenment of the present to the ignorance of ancient men. 204 Further
supposing that ancient revelation was infallible, where is the infallible
201. CF, 13.
202. Art. 90, 394.
203. Cf. Potter, HE, 10.
204. Art. 66; CHE, II, 456.
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interpreter? 205 Characteristically, Dewey regards appeal to the past as
the sign that a society has found ’’growth painful and change disturbing. ”206
We must, Dewey says, turn from the past to the future for the revelation
of truth.
Faith in the continued disclosing of truth through directed cooperative
human endeavor is more religious in quality than is any faith in a
completed revelation Qr/e must trust that} natural interaction be-
tween man and his environment will breed more intelligence and generate
more knowledge provided the scientific methods that define intelligence
in operation are pushed further into the nysteries of the world, being
themselves promoted and improved in the operation.20?
(d) Salvation. ’’Salvation” is another of the watchwords of
traditional religion that comes under Dewey’s fire. In the first place,
the doctrine of sin, which salvation presupposes, is reprehensible. (1)
It implies a pessimistic view of human nature which stultifies human
effort.^®® (2) Further, to trace social evils to general moral causes
such as ’’the sinfulness of man, the corruption of his heart, his self-love”
and the like is an obstacle to the application of intelligence in dealing
with them. It is on the same intellectual level as that primitive science
which referred bodily diseases to the work of demons; modern science was
unable to advance until such explanations were thrown aside, and the
application of scientific intelligence to social problems awaits the dis-
appearance of such abstractions. 2°9 (3) Further, the division of mankind
205. Loc . cit.
206. RPH.
,
159.
207. Of., 26.
208. CF, RPH, 115-16; HUG, 295.
209. CF, 77-78.
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into saved and sinners, as the notion of salvation supposes, is an eneipy
of human brotherhood.21®
Salvation of man is not to be achieved along traditional lines, Dewey
thinks. The historic Christian doctrine of self-denial logically leads
to an inhuman asceticism, creates more problems of self-control than it
solves, and narrows the conception of the good. 21 * Dependence upon the
21£
supernatural for salvation represents a retreat, an escape from existence f
and is too easy a way withal out of difficulties to be practically worth-
119
ful.
213
Salvation for the modern man must come through science, which, by its
method of testing beliefs, gives men the intellectual and emotional peace
214
which once they found in religion, as well as the courage for re-
215
making the world; and through devotion to ideal ends which result
in unification of the self and the fructifying of society^16
2. The problem of evil . Dewey's teachings concerning the problem
of evil are clear cut and consistent with his general point of view.
(1) He regards the problem of evil as an unnecessary one. V/e have it
on our hands because apologists "identified the existence of ideal goods
with that of a Person supposed to originate and support them." 217
210. CF, 33-34,
211. ETH, 366, 367.
212. QFC, 275.
213. CF, 46-47.
214. Art. 66; CHE, II,
215. EAN, iii.
216. Cf. CF, 17ff
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Give up belief in God, Dewey says in effect, and you have no problem of
I
reconciliation of evil in the world with divine love!
(2) The real problem of evil is not a theological or metaphysical one
but ’’the practical problem of reducing, alleviating, as far as may be
removing, the evils of life.” 21 ®
(3) The optimistic view of things — that this is the best possible
world, that fundamentally all is well, etc., — is an obstacle to the
removal of evil, for it tends to make men satisfied with things as they
are.219
3. Immortality . Dewey’s view of the doctrine of immortality is
well-summarized in his contribution to a New York Times symposium: 220
I have no beliefs on the subject of personal immortality. It seems
to be a subject, being one of continued existence, for science rather
than philosophy, or a matter of physical evidence. If it can be
proved, it would have to be along the lines of the psychical research-
ers, and so far I have not been much impressed with their results.
4. The Church . Dewey is severely critical of the Church. He feels,
for one thing, that it has lost itself in ’’cults, dogmas, and norths" and
has obscured and distorted the genuine religious spirit. 221 It has been
a reactionary force in society, — a defender of the status quo
,
a
devotee of the immutable?22 As a consequence "the greatest revolution
218. RPH, 177-78.
219. Ibid, 178-9.
220. Art. 82, 1.
221. HNC
,
330-31.
222. Art. 86, 178-80.
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that has taken place in religions during the thousands of years that mam
has been upon the earth” has occurred. 223 The Church has been
demoted from the central, all-embracing institution of an essentially
religious community to ”a special institution in a secular community.”224
Yet, Dewey does not want to destroy the churches. Rather, he wants
to help them recover their vitality by having them give up their devotion
to the supernatural and claims to exclusive authority and devote them-
selves to social ends. *-25
5. The goal of human history . There is no reference to the Kingdom
of God in Dewey’s writings; he refers to ”the Great Community” in one of
his books, but investigation shows him to be speaking not of an all-
223. CF, 65.
224* Ibid, 61. We allow Professor Van Dusen to answer this statement of
Dewey’s: "What an extraordinary reading of historic records! What,
one might ask Professor Dewey, does he consider to have been the
status of the religion of Socrates in fifth-century Athens, or of
Amos in eighth-century Israel, or of Jesus in Judaea at the turn of
the ages, or of the early Christians in second-century Rome, or of
Savonarola in fifteenth-century Florence, or of John Wesley in
eighteen-century England? However we describe its status within
the community of its day, it was of such a character as to bring
upon its adherents derision, persecution, and in most instances
martyrdom. ’The essential point*. Professor Dewey feels, ’is not
just that secular organizations and actions are legally or extern-
ally severed from the control of the church, but that interests
and values unrelated to the offices of any church now so largely
sway the desires and aims of even believers.’ CPF, 653 A thing
utterly new in history! Could one imagine a more apt description
of the actual situation in Kinevah and Tyre, Babylon and Assyria,
Athens in her decline, imperial Rome, late Renaissance Italy, not
to speak of revolutionary France and Georgian England? The clear
testimony of history is that prophetic religion, living religion is
almost always a special interest within a community which, whatever
its lip service to formal religion, is, at thesprings of its life,
through and through secular. Is there reason to expect that the new
’common faith’ to which we are summoned, if it is to embody living
and socially potent aspiration, will suffer any kindlier fate?”
"The Faith of John Dewey," op. cit., 130-31.
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embracing ideal society but the local community, integrated, democratized
made secure.22 **
Dewey is very chary about predicting the future; such prediction he
holds to be impossible. 227 We create "an unknown future."228 He
229
sets up as a goal toward which we should strive the end of "growth, itself.*]
The lines along which we should proceed are drawn with a broad brush.
Probably the words with which the Humanist Mani festo closes represent
Dewey’s attitude toward the future as well as any: 230
We assert that humanism will: (a) affirm life rather than deny it; and
(b) seek to elicit the possibilities of life, not flee from it; and (c)
endeavor to establish the conditions of a satisfactory life for all, not
merely for the few. By this positive morale and intention humanism wil).
be guided, from this perspective and alignment the techniques and effort^
of humanism will flow.
So stand the theses of religious humanism. Though we consider the
religious forms and ideas of our fathers no longer adequate, the quest
for the good life is still the central task for mankind. Man at last
is becoming aware that he alone is responsible for the realization of
the world of his dreams, that he has within himself the power for its
achievement. He must set intelligence and will to the task.
The foregoing calls for no criticism in this place; it rests upon the
common assumption of so much of Dewey’s thinking, — that experimental
method is the only dependable one for arriving at truth and supplying our
essential needs.
226. Cf. PUB, 211-19.
227. ION, 169-70.
228. Ibid, 171.
229. RPH, 177. As we shall see later
avowed unwillingness to set up a
(infra, 184 ), Dewey, despite
future goal, does in reality
his
do so.
230. CF. Potter, HR, 11-12.
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G. DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND PERSONALISM
In order that Dewey's philosophy of religion may be defined as clear-
ly as possible we shall summarize the main points of agreement and dis-
agreement between it and personalism. By personalism we mean
that philosophical system which holds that the universe is a society
of selves, unified by the will and immanent causality of a Supreme
Self, and which, therefore, defines matter and the whole system of
physical nature in terms of the active, conscious will of that Supreme
Self, while it regards human selves (and whatever other selves there
may be) as enjoying an existence of their own, dependent, it is true,
upon the will of the Supreme Self, yet no part of it.
The Supreme Self of personalism may be identified with God, the
object of religious worship. ^31
The points of agreement are fewer than those of disagreement, but
there are several respects in which the two philosophies of religion
harmonize.
1. Both are opposed to irrationalism in religion. Both deny the
uncriticized claims of religious experience in itself to ontological
validity. Both appeal to reason to substantiate their respective
religious views, though reason is conceived somewhat differently by them.
2. Both Dewey and the personalists insist upon the superior worth
of the human individual. With the latter the intrinsic worth of personality
is a central principle; with Dewey it is not an implication of his meta-
physics or method but appears rather as sin independent insight. ^32
3. Both philosophies of religion axe highly ethical; religion
receives its confirmation in the sphere of conduct.
231. Brightman, Art. 3, 382.
232. Cf. Lyman, MTR, 187
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4. Both Dewey and the personalists insist that religion has social
implications.
While in these broad respects Dewey* s theory of religion harmonizes
with the teachings of Bowne and his disciples, the differences between
them are so great as to place them at almost opposite poles.
1. Personalism’s theory of religion is primarily existential, while
Dewey’s is functional. That is, personalism is interested in establish-
ing the existence of a divine being. Dewey, on the other hand, is un-
concerned as to whether there is such a being or not if those functions
exercised by a divine being in historical religion (which he conceives
to be guardianship of security) can be realized as well or better in
other ways. Personalism is interested in establishing the status of
values: Dewey does not care what their cosmic place may be so long as
they function in human experience. Of course, personalism is interested
in functions and Dewey has a place for existences, but their motives are
primarily as stated.
2* Personalism is metaphysical; Dewey is positivistic (with
occasional sallies into metaphysics). Personalism distinguishes between
phenomenal and metaphysical reality. Dewey regards the
phenomenal world as metaphysical and refrains from judgments about the
supernatural.
God, for personalism, is a real, personal being; for Dewey he is an
imaginative synthesis of ideal ends, having no objective reality (or is
an impersonal concept, nature or certain aspects of nature).
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4. Personalism takes "nature” to mean physical nature; mind, values
and universals are regarded as standing outside nature though interacting
with it. Dewey, on the other hand, takes an inclusive view of nature,
which takes in mind, values, and mathematical and logical object^ as
well as physical existence. He does not, however, interpret the non-
physical aspects of nature in physical terms, as traditional naturalism
did.
5. According to personal istic teaching, religion contains unique
elements, — unique attitudes and experiences, if not certain unique
qualities designated by the term "religious a priori ."233 With Dewey,
however, religion is scarcely distinguishable from morality conceived as
a pursuit of inclusive ideal ends and eventuating in self- integration.
6. Personalism is kindly disposed toward historical Christianity
and seeks to preserve continuity with it. Dewey, as we have seen, has
no high regard for historic faith, and maintains that the breach between
it and his conception of religion cannot be bridged. 23^
7. Personalism holds to belief in immortality as one of the im-
plications of belief in a personal God. Dewey is agnostic with refer-
ence to the possibility of a future life.
9. While both personalism and Dewey are melioristic, personalism
believes that the future rests ultimately with God, with whom we may
233. Cf. Knudson, DG, 222-23.
234. Dewey says that the beneficent effects of believing in "the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" have been, "to put it mildly, much
exaggerated." Art. 99, 194.
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cooperate for the making of a better world. .Dewey, on the other hand,
pins his hopes for the future upon human effort.
If the question should be raised why there should be the sharp
cleavage between personalism and Dewey’s philosophy of religion, the
answer seems to be found in their different conceptions of the method
and criterion of truth. For Dewey experimental verification after the
pattern of the physical sciences is both the method and criterion of truth.
H^s allegiance to scientific method accounts for his functional interest
(1 above), — science has no need of the concept of substance but thinks
in terms of functions or act ivities ,-his positivism (2), and resulting
disbelief in the existence of a supernatural being (3) and life beyond
this life (7), as well as his belief that man (because of the method he
possesses) is equipped to stand on his own and guarantee his own future ( 8 )
D
as we shall see later, Dewey’s depreciation of history (6), is consistent
with the inability of a purely experimental method to get knowledge of
the past. 235
'^hile personalism entertains respect for scientific method, its
criterion of truth is coherence, and its method is synoptic, which allows
for other avenues of truth than those accessible to scientific research.
It supplements the facts brought to light by the sciences with those
derived from other sources.
235. Dewey’s conception of nature as an all-inclusive whole (4), and his
contention that "the religious" is not unique but a possible
accompaniment of all experiences (5)
,
seem to be inspired by non-
scientific motives, probably by the organismic logic of his early
idealism which breaks through his instrumentalism from time to time.
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H. SIMMY
In this chapter we have examined Dewey’s naturalistic interpretation
of religion. We have seen that nature for him is a totality, inclusive
of physical things, mind, universals, and values. Man is a part of
nature and his values are continuous with natural events. It was pointed
out that the problem of the relation of ideal and real in nature (mind
and matter), in man (mind and body), and in value (ideal and existence)
is given only a verbal solution. Rejecting the notion of a universal
content in historical religions, Dewey establishes his own conception of
’’the religious” as an apprehension of and devotion to such inclusive ends
as result in the unification of the self. Such a view of ’’the religious’
is in harmony with science, dependent on philosophy for its ends, closely
related to the moral and esthetic, and eventuates in a social idealism.
The object of faith, or God, is defined as the ”active relation of the
ideal and the actual;” analysis of Dewey’s writings shows that the object
of faith is interpreted now with the emphasis on the ideal element in the
definition — God is the imaginative synthesis of ideal ends — now on the
actual, — God is certain aspects of nature which support ideals, or
nature as a whole. While probably the first view represents Dewey’s
main intent, the second view is present and illustrates again the diffi-
culty Dewey finds in his whole philosophy really to resolve the ideal-
real relationship. It was seen, further, that Dewey’s conception of the
object of faith was not only ambiguous but open to some of the fundamental
objections which he had raised himself to the supernatural. Y/hen the
naturalistic view of religion is applied to the perennial interests of
m-v.i&ja ...
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religion it appears that Dewey is greatly suspicious of personal religion,
as usually conceived, feels that the problem of evil is practical rather
|
than speculative, questions immortality, summons men to a consecration
of the Church to social ends, though offering himself no objective Kingdom
of God as the goal of history. A closing comparison of Dewey’s philosoph;
of religion with personalism revealed that their underlying differences
were due to their varying views as to the significance of scientific method
In conclusion, several items are worthy of note:
1. Dewey’s philosophy of religion is thoroughly naturalistic: (a)
It rejects the supernatural, (b) Man, the bearer of religion, is a part
|
of nature. (c) The ends of faith are possibilities of nature (or nature
itself as a whole or in certain aspects). (d) Religion eventuates in a
re-making of the natural.
2. Despite the naturalistic coloring of his philosophy of religion,
Dewey reveals several elements in his thought that are reminiscent of
his early idealism: (a) The rationalistic axiom of continuity is the
premise of his naturalism, (b) He appeals to the principle of the whole, --
as a criterion of values, in defining the object of religious devotion, —
and wholeness, unification, is made the mark of the ’’religious” self.
(c) He affirms the reality of consciousness. (d) His object of
religious devotion is an imaginative presentation. (e) He conceives of
the present crisis in religion, which raises demand for a new inter-
pretation of faith, as primarily a crisis in the world of thought, (f)
His ultimate appeal for the re-making of the world is to intelligence.
3. It should be pointed out again that what Dewey regards as the
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basic failure of supernatural ism — its divorce of the real and the ideal —
receives only a verbal treatment from him.
4. In this chapter we have seen again the low estimate Dewey places
upon historical religion; though claiming to be a philosopher of experience
he evidences scant regard for the experience of religion as revealed in
history.
5. We note as the premise of Dewey’s rejection of the supernatural
as well as of the formulation of his own theory the implicit faith in
the complete adequacy of scientific experimental method; epistemologically,
it is the only sure method of arriving at truth; practically, it is the
one hope of human progress. We shall examine this premise in the
succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER IV
THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENT
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE CHAPTER
One of the basic assumptions of Dewey’s position with regard to
religion is that scientific method is the only valid method and criterion
of truth. He opposes historical supernaturalism, because it arose out of
a desire for security that can now be satisfied with the cognitive certain-
ty supplied by modern science.* He found supernaturalism epistemologic-
ally defective in that it assumed the existence of objects antecedent to
experimental verification. 2 Practically he condemned historic faith,
because it has stood in the way of the application of scientific methods
to life. 3 He found it futile; prayer, worship, salvation, and revelatior
,
— these are concepts of an outmoded approach to getting what science can
give us.
4
Further; one of the chief considerations recommending his
own view of religion is that it, in contrast with the traditional faith,
can be harmonized with the methods and results of science.
^
Dewey does not allow this conviction that scientific method possesses
exclusive validity to remain an unexpressed premise of his thought. He
1. Supra, 39.
2. Supra, 45.
3. Supra, 52.
4. Supra, 117-19.
5. Supra, 96-7.
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openly affirms it. He tells us that the intellectual crisis in religion
will never find its solution until we admit "that there is hut one method
for ascertaining fact and truth, — that conveyed by the word ’scientific*
in its most general and generous sense."6 He reminds us that doctrines
to be convincing for the modern men must be "brought to agree with the
deliverances of science;"7 for scientific procedure is factual know-
ing" as contrasted with other and inferior types. 6 "Effective and in-
tegral thinking is possible only where the experimental method in some
form is used."^ Knowledge does not eventuate "until some overt ex-
perimental act takes place by means of which an existential incorporation
and organization is brought about. "10 Scientific method is the only
method that has proveda" fruitful" method of thinking,H and it provides
12
us with "the sole dependable means of disclosing the realities of existence".
"Both logically and educationally, science is the perfecting of knowing,
its last stage. "13
It is plain that if what Dewey says in praise of scientific method
is correct, his case is made. If scientific method is the sole valid
approach and criterion to truth, the tenets of historical religion must,
as he says, be given up, and if any human interest is to do business under
6. OF, 33.
7. EAN, 137.
8. QFC, 85-6.
9. HOT, 99.
10. QFC, 189.
11. Art. 42; CHE, II, 774.
12. Art. 86, 178.
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the name of "religion" it must he along the naturalistic lines which he
indicates
.
It shall be the purpose of this chapter to investigate these claims
that are made by Dewey in behalf of the exclusive validity of scientific
method. In the introduction to the dissertation we have suggested that
in evaluating any doctrine we would ask, first, is it self-consistent?
and, secondly, is it consistent with our system of judgments as a whole?
Following out this line of inquiry, we shall first investigate scientific
method, as Dewey conceives it, with a view to discovering whether the
doctrine of the exclusive validity of scientific method can be established
by scientific method itself. If it cannot be, then the notion of its
exclusive validity is no more than an assumption. Then we shall ask
whether those entities that occupy the central place in Dewey’s thought
about religion themselves can be established by scientific method, or must
be assumed. We have chosen four:
(1) The existence of other selves. The notion of society occupies
a central place in Dewey’s thought. He regards man as fundamentally
a social being. His religious ideals are developed and sustained in
society, and according to Dewey’s view, must be social in content.
(2) The past. Dewey’s approach is usually genetic, and his attacks
upon the past of historical religion play a great part in his rejection
of H. 16
14. Supra, 101.
15* Supra, 37-42.
d do: o . dt - it Its »<f imm &i 'noi ' x ,f ,-xt t-r>t
.
'
.
, >iih' J . i r V, ; at % o . ; t -
!
•
' sr ru x Lax v '.\. ioxs
i'll, o: ; 'r •v.-.r. cV .Laatre** ecf
.
......
’
.
-
•
>
'
{
.i
../.A
. . j? I
.
,
(3) Values. It will be remembered that God is defined as the "active
relation between ideal and actual. "16 The notion of value occupies a
central place in Dewey’s philosophy of religion.
(4) The whole. It is the idea of the whole which Dewey tells us is
essential to effecting that unification of self, which is the mark of
"the religious."17
Dewey’s method and criterion of truth should be inclusive enough to
take in these entities, which occupy a central place in his thought; if
not, it is plain that the basic teachings of his philosophy of religion
are gained by assumption rather than established logically.
The problem, then, of this chapter is to discover whether the notion
of the exclusive validity of scientific method can be established by
scientific method, and whether the existence of other selves, the past,
values, and the whole can be verified in the same way. The immediate
task, before undertaking these matters, iy to discover what Dewey means
by scientific method.
3. THE MEANING OF SCIENTIFIC (EXPERIMENTAL ) METHOD
1. Scientific method as experimental . "Scientific method" means
experimental method for Dewey. He defines scientific method as the
method in which
16. CF, 51.
17. Cf. CF, 18-19
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observation is determined, by experimental conditions ddpending upon the
use of certain guiding conceptions; .... r^iection is directed and
checked at every point by the use of experimental data, and by the
necessity of finding such a form for itself as will enable it to serve
in a deduction leading to evolution of new meanings, and ultimately to
experimental inquiry which brings to light new facts. 18
It is the method of ’’making hypotheses which are then tried out in actual
experimental change of physical conditions.” 18 The fundamental distinct ioUi
between ancient and modern science is to be found in that the latter is
experimental.
Ancient science accepted the material of sense-material on its face,
and then organized it, as it naturally and originally stood, by
operations of logical definition, classification into species and
syllogistic subsumption. Hen either had no instruments and appliances
for modifying the ordinary objects of observation, for analyzing them
into their elements and giving them new forms and arrangements, or they
failed to use those which they had. 2^
The striking difference in modern science is, of course, the depend-
ence placed upon doing, doing of a physical and overt sort. Ancient
science, that is, what passed as science, would have thought it a kind
of treason to reason as the organ of knowing to subordinate it to
bodily activity on material things, helped out with tools which are
also material. 1
Modern science is ”a recognition that no idea is entitled to be
termed knowledge till it has passed into such overt manipulation of
physical conditions as constructs the object to which the idea refers* 22
For Dewey ’’scientific method” is equivalent to ’’experimental method.” 23
18. SEL
,
89-90.
19. SAN, 155.
20. QFC, 89.
21. Ibid
,
39.
22. Art
.
37; 62
23. QFC, 24.
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2. The nature of experimental method. What is the meaning of
"experimental method?" Dewey does not define it formally, but he gives
many illustrations of it. His view of it is that usually understood by
the term. Logically, he tells us, it involves five distinct steps:2^
(1) The occurrence of a difficulty . "Thinking takes its departure
from specific conflicts in experience that occasion perplexity and
trouble. "25 The difficulty may be one which the organism comes upon
in its environment; it may be an intellectual problem.26
(2) Definition of the difficulty . This involves observation with
a view to
defining the problem, of locating the trouble, of forcing home a
definite, instead of a merely vague emotional sense of what the diffi-
culty is and where it lies .27
(3) Suggestion of possible solution .
Given data which locate the nature of the problem, there is evoked
a thought of an operation which if put into execution may eventuate
in a situation in which the trouble or doubt which evoked inquiry will
be resolved. 28
These ideas of suggested solutions have a two-fold character: (1)
They are instrumental to resolving the specific problem which called them
forth. 2^ (2) They are hypothetical, to be held tentatively until tested
in action. 30
24. Cf. HWT, 68-78.
25. RPH, 138.
26. Cf. EEL, 10-11; QFC, 228. Dewey is opposed to a purely biological
interpretation of pragmatism. He scores one critic for treating
his doctrine as one that "regards intelligence as a lubricating oil
facilitating the workings of the body." Cl, 62.
27. RPH, 141.
28. QFC, 123.
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(4) Development of the bearings of the idea , "Action is at the
heart of ideas. "In general," says Dewey, following Bridgman, "we
mean by a concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is
synonymous with the corresponding set of operations."*'*’ It is
necessary by deduction to draw out the implications or operational bear-
ings of the idea offered as a solution to the problem in hand.
(5) Experimental verification . Having arrived at a hypothetical
solution for a problem and drawn forth its implications, its consequences,
the final step is to discover whether the consequences required are present.
This involves overt manipulation or experimentat ion . The test of an
idea*s truth is to be found in its consequences . 55 Experimental
method is, thus, both a method of discovering truth and a criterion by
which alleged truths are verified. It is essential to note that the
process of verification is object ive
,
— public and capable of verification
by anyone meeting the conditions of the experiment.
A public and manifest series of definite operations, all capable of
public notice and report, distinguishes scientific knowing from the
knowing carried on by inner ‘mental* processes accessible only to intro*
spection, or inferred by dialectic from assumed premises. 3 *’
31. QFC, 167.
32. P. W. Bridgman, LMP, 5; quoted in QFC, 111.
33. HV/T, 79-80.
34. LCS
,
123.
35. QFC, 128-9.
36.
Ibid, 289.
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3. The dual meaning of verification . The meaning of experimental
method, turns, of course, on the meaning of verification. How does Dewey
conceive of verification? What particular quality of consequences con-
stitutes it? A study of Dewey’s teachings about verification brings to
light the fact that there are two theories concerning it in his writings.
According to the first (which we shall designate as A)
,
an idea is true
if it works successfully in resolving the difficulty or problem which
called it forth. Take a problem P. Several hypothetical solutions
are offered, X, Y, X. If by testing X, Y, and Z it is shown that X
resolves the difficulty (while Y and Z do not), X is held to be the true
idea; it worked successfully. A physician who tries several cures for a
disease until one is discovered which works successfully — the true one —
illustrates this mode of verification.
According to the second theory of verification (B)
,
an idea is true
if accurate predictions can be made from it. Take three ideas, X, Y, and
Z, which are hypothetical solutions of a problem, P. Suppose that by
assuming the truth of X a prediction that M will occur is made, and it
has been discovered experimentally that M does occur (while predictions
cannot be made by Y and Z). Then X is true; it led to a verified
prediction, to results which were as predicted. An illustration of this
type of verification is Einstein’s prediction on the hypothesis of relative
ity that there would be a certain shift in the observed position of certain
stars during an eclipse of the sun, a shift which did occur (though there
are some who question the data) according to the photographs of the stars
37
made during the eclipse of 1919.
37. Cf. Burnham and Wheelwright, IPA, 140.
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Both types of verification are found in Dewey’s thought. Passages
illustrating A are as follows:
Thinking ends in experiment and experiment is an actual alteration
of a physically antecedent situation in those details or respects which
called for thought in order to do away with some evil. 3®
The measure of its success, the standard of its validity, is precise-
ly the degree in which the thinking actually disposes of the difficulty
and allows us to proceed with more direct modes of experiencing, that
are forthwith possessed of more assured and deepened value?^
Ideas are not genuine ideas unless they are tools in a reflective
examination which tends to solve a problem.^
lf_ ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instru-
mental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a re-
moval of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their
validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed
in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they
fail to clear up confusion, to eliminate defects, if they increase
confusion, uncertainty and evil when they are acted upon, then they
are false. Confirmation, corroboration, verification lie in works,
consequences. Handsome is that handsome does. By their fruits shall
ye know them.^1
The test of validity of an idea is its functional or instrumental use
in effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to
a relatively integrated one The ’meaning* or idea as such, having
been selected and made-up with reference to performing a certain office
in the evolution of a unified experience, can be tested in no other
way than by discovering whether it does what it was intended to do and
what it purports to do. 42
Passages illustrating B are as follows:
Experimental science is a recognition that no idea is entitled to be
termed knowledge till it has passed into such overt manipulation of
physical conditions as constructs the object to which the idea refers. 4' 5*
38. EEL
,
31.
39. Ibid, 77.
40. HWT, 109
41. RPH, 156 t
42. SLT, 75, 76.
43. art
.
37, 62.
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To run against a hard and painful stone is not of itself, I should
say, an act of knowing; but if running into a hard and painful thing
is an outcome predicted after inspection of data and elaboration of
a hypothesis, then the hardness and the painful bruise which define
the thing as a stone also constitute it emphatically as an object of
knowledge.44
According to experimental inquiry, the validity of the object of
thought depends upon the consequences of the operations which define
the object of thought. For example, colors are conceived in terms
of certain numbers. The conceptions are valid in the degree in which,
by means of these numbers, we can predict future events, and can
regulate the interactions of colored bodies as signs of changes that
take place. The numbers are signs or clues of intensity and direction
of changes going on. The only things relevant to the question of thei
:
validity is whether they are dependable signs. 45
Final certitude can never be reached except experimentally — except
by performing the operations indicated and discovering whether or not
the intended meaning is fulfilled jLn propria persona .45
In the case of knowledge of a star the visible light is a necessary
part of the evidence on the basis of which we infer the existence, plajQ
and structure of the astronomical star, and some other perception is
the verifying check on the value of the inference. 4 ?
An experience is a knowledge if in its quale there is an experienced
distinction and connection of two elements of the following sort: One
means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in
which itself is already present, while the other is that which, while
not present in the same fashion, must become so present if the meaning
or intention of its companion or yoke fellow is to be fulfilled through
an operation it sets up. 45
44. EEL
,
15.
45. QFC, 128-29
46. IBP 103n.
47. EEL, 260.
48 Art. 35, 301
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There is no inherent contradiction or incompatibility between these
two notions of verification. Yet, there are some significant differences
between them;
(1) In A the basic reference of the corroborating evidence is to a
sit-oat ion which it clears up; in B the basic reference is to an idea whose
predictions it fulfills.
(2) In A the decisive element in determining the truth of an idea is
a value-element (it works successfully ) ; in B the decisive factor in deter-
mining the truth of an idea is intellectual (the agreement of two ideas).
49
B is, thus, more precise than a,
(3) 3 is the method of verification employed in the abstract or
physical sciences, where mathematically verifiable predictions are possible.
A is the method employed in the everyday conduct of life and to consider-
I able degree in the more concrete sciences, where prediction is difficult
' or impossible. a past event, strictly speaking, can never be verified
according to method B, for prediction (which involves future verification)
cannot be made with regard to the past. Historical sciences employ method
A; they declare those hypotheses true which work successfully, which
harmonize best with the facts as a whole.
49. It may be said that the most significant difference between James’s
and Dewey’s pragmatism is the difference between these two modes of
verification. Both philosophers, of course, expound both types of
verification. But a study of their writings will reveal that James
was interested in the broader, more evaluational type of verification
(A) while Dewey’s primary interest was in the narrower (B) . In Dewey’s
review of James’s Pragmatism he points out, in effect, this difference.
(Cf. EEL, 303-34) He says that James’s formula telling us to look
’’towards last things
,
fruits
,
consequences
,
fact
s
, ** (PH, 55) may be
used to determine either (l) our proper conception of objects
, (2) the
meaning of ideas
,
or (3) the value of beliefs. (EEL, 303-11) Dewey
says that in distinction from James his primary interest is in (1) and
(2), — in determination of the meaning of objects and ideas, — while
James was more deeply concerned with (3)
,
— the value of beliefs.
(Cf. EEL, 316.)
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4. Experimental method as the method of the physical sciences . When
Dewey speaks of "scientific method", which of these modes of verification
is he thinking of? He employs both, but B seems to be his real intent.
While both appear in Dewey's writings, in his later works, Experience and
Nature and the Quest for Certainty
,
he thinks of "scientific method" in
terms of the experimental method of the physical sciences, which employ
the method designated above as B.
In Experience and Nature Dewey makes an analysis of the object of
"science", which he says "in effect is the object of physics."*5® He
finds four characteristics of it:
(1) It is a constant, capable of mathematical formulation. 5*
Immediate things come and go; events in the way of direct seeing,
hearing, touching, liking, enjoying and the rest of them are in rapid
change; the subject-matter of each has a certain uniqueness, unre-
peatedness. Spatial-temporal orders, capable of mathematical formu-
lation are, by contrast constant. They present stability, recurrence
at its maximum, raised to the highest degree. Qualitative affairs like
red and blue, although in themselves unlike, are subject to comparison
in terms of objects of physics; on the basis of connection with orders
of sequence, a qualitative spectrum or scale becomes a scheme of
numberable variations or a common unit.
(2) It is capable of mutual substitution with other objects. 52
The technique of equations and other functions characteristic of
modern science is, taken generically, a method of thoroughgoing
substitutions. It is a system of exchange and mutual conversion
carried to its limit. The cognitive result is the homogeneous natural
world of modern science, in its contrast with the qualitatively hetero-
geneous world of ancient science.
50. EAJtf, 139.
51. Ibid, 142.
52. Ibid, 142-3.
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(3) It is a numerically discrete unit; the things of experience are
treated as composed of these units.53
(4) It is generic in character. Objects of science "are not individu-
alized but are instances, cases
,
specimens
,
of some generical
relation or law.**54
It is clear, upon the face of this analysis of the object of science,
that Dewey is thinking of science in terms of the natural sciences, of
which physics is a model.
When we turn to the Quest for Certainty we find Dewey again inter-
preting scientific method in terms of the experimental method of the
physical sciences. The burden of the argument of the Quest far Certainty
is to show the superiority of the procedure of modern science to the science
and philosophy of the ancient world. As he compares the modern and the
ancient and traces the transition from the latter to the former, it is
the methods of the physical sciences that are taken as distinguishing
modern science from that of the ancient and medieval world. The signi-
55ficant feature of the change he describes thus:
All that counted for science became mechanical properties formulated
in mathematical terms: — the significance of mathematical formulations
marking the possibility of complete equivalence or homogeneity of
translation of different phenomena into one another's terms.
53. EAN, 143.
54. I"bid, 146.
55. QFC, 97.
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The work of Galileo, who, Dewey tells us, initiated the revolution thal
brought modern science to birth is characterized thus: 5^
It marked a change from the qualitative to the quantitative or metric;
from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous; from intrinsic forms to
relations; from esthetic harmonies to mathematical formulae; from con-
templative enjoyment to active manipulation and control; from rest to
change; from eternal objects to temporal sequences.
After having described ancient science, bewey turns to "elucidate the
constructions of tradition which are involved in the actual procedure
and results of knowing" in the modern sense and finds his example " in
physical inquiry , He adds that physical inquiry "is taken as the type
and patterh of knowing since it is the most perfected of all branches of
intellectual inquiry." While Dewey admits that everyday conduct
embodies experimental procedure, overt manipulation, the respect in which
scientific procedure differs from it is evident
The important thing in the history of modern knowing is the rein-
forcement of these active doings by means of instruments, appliances
and apparatus devised for the purposes of disclosing relations not
otherwise apparent, together with, as far as overt action is concerned,
the development of elaborate techniques for the introduction of a much
greater range of variations — that is, a systematic variation of con-
ditions so as to produce a corresponding series of changes in the
thing under investigation. among these operations should be included
of course, those which give a permanent register of what is observed and
the instrumentalities of exact measurement by means of which changes ar<!
correlated with one another.
56
.
QPC
,
94-95
.
57. Ibid, 72. The italics are ours.
58. Loc. cit.
59.
Ibid, 87
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It is not necessary to multiply illustrations. While Dewey gives
verbal allegiance to the principle that every subject-matter should he
treated hy the method best suited to it^® (which would open the door to
theology if seriously carried out!), it is the method of the physical
sciences that Dewey is thinking of when he eulogizes ’Scientific method.”
Summing up the results of our discussion, then, we may say that by
"scientific method" Dewey means (1) experimental method and (2) es-
pecially that form of it exemplified by the physical sciences. It in-
volves (a) formulation of a problem to be solved, (b) projection of
hypotheses, (c) deduction of verifiable consequences, (d) overt experi-
mentation, (e) precise (mathematical) verification by prediction. Is
the method thus outlined the only valid method of discovering and testing
truth? It will be the problem of the chapter to answer the question.
G. THE CLAIM OF EXPERIMENTAL METHOD TO EXCLUSIVE VALIDITY
There are three ways in which the claim to exclusive validity of
experimental method might be established. First, it might be shown
that experimental verification is involved in the very concept of
knowledge or truth. Secondly, a critique of other criteria of truth
might be made which showed, by a process of elimination, that all other
methods and criteria are invalid. Thirdly, a consistent pragmatist
might show that the assumption of the exclusive validity of scientific
method has been successful. An analysis of Dewey's writings reveals
that Dewey employs all three.
60. QFC, 220
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1. Dewey* s theory of judgment as practical . In the first place,
Dewey attempts to show that the very activity of judging involves experi-
mental verification. Judgment bears an intrinsic reference to action;
ideas have a practical character. Judgments of practice, which Dewey
assimilates to judgments of fact, are judgments of the form: "M. N. should
61
do thus and so ; it is better, wiser. ... .etc. to act thus and so."
They possess, according to Dewey, six traits: (1) "Their subject-matter
implies an incomplete situation;" something must be done to complete the
62
(2) They choose the alternative to be
63
presented state of affairs.
acted upon and thus shape to that extent the course of affairs. (3)
"There is something objectively at stake in the forming of the proposition
(4) Practical judgments are judgments "that the given is to be treated in
a specified way; also that the given admits of such treatment."
Thus, judgments of practice involve not only ends but judgments of fact
with regard to means, which "exist only for the sake of an intelligent
66
determination of what is to be done." (5) These statements of fact
are necessarily hypothetical, since their relevance to the problem at
67
, .hand can always be questioned. (6) The truth or falsity of practical
judgments is constituted by their outcome: "thearents or issue of such
68
action _is the truth or falsity of the judgment." If Dewey's view
%
65
61. EEL, 335.
62. Ibid, 337.
63. Ibid, 338-39.
64. Ibid, 339.
65. Ibid, 340.
66. Ibid, 341.
67. Ibid, 345-46.
68. Ibid, 346.
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of judgment is sound, experimental verification would seem to be involved
in the very notion of truth; if concepts have meaning only in so far as
they can be formulated in terms of operations, Dewey has at least es-
tablished experimental verification as the sine qua non of intelligible
interpretation of the world. To that extent, at least, experimental
method could claim exclusive validity.
Unquestionably there is a relationship between judgment and action,
probably a more inclusive relationship than traditional logicians have
been willing to admit. Possibly most judgments result ultimately in
action. That does not signify, however, that all judgments are operative
in character (which Dewey must establish if he would prove his point) nor
that their meaning is exhausted by the performance of operations, if they
were. It is patent that there are purely retrospective meanings which
cannot be verified experimentally in the sense in which Dewey usually
employs the term "verified." The scent of a rose, to use Love joy’s
illustration, may beget an anticipation of the experience of finding and
seeing the rose. But it may, equally well, beget a reminiscence of an
experience of childhood with which the same odor is connected.
In the one case, as in the other, the olfactory sensation serves
as the cue which evokes the representation of something else. In both
cases alike, the something else is present-as-absent; but in the latter
case it is no part of the meaning of the experience that the thing
meant shall ever itself ’become present’ in the fashion in which the
other elements of the experience (whether the memory-evoking odour or
the memory- image) are now present. ^9
69. Lovejoy, Art. 1, 53.
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There are notions such as the center of the earth, the other side of the
moon, the inhabitants of Mars, the life of a pre-historic man, — to mention
only a few, — that have meaning for us. But it is playing with words
to say that they mean for us only the consequences they may have upon us
or the operations necessary to verily them. The doctrine of the opera-
tional meaning of judgments and concepts is false as a generalization.
There are passages in Dewey which suggest his recognition of this
fact, despite his adherence to the operational theory. He says, in
speaking of scientific meanings in one place.
Scientific meanings were superadded to esthetic and affectional mean-
ings when objects instead of being defined in terms of their conse-
quences in social interactions and discussion were defined in terms of
their consequences with respect to one another.'
Again, he denies in another place that scientific objects must be defined
with reference to human use.
Many critics take an 'instrumental 1 theory of knowledge to signify
that the value of knowing is instrumental to the knower . . . . .But 'instru-’
mentalism* is a theory not about personal disposition and satisfaction
in knowing, but about the proper objects of science, that is 'proper*
being defined in terms of physics71
The doctrine of judgments as practical, because not exclusively valid
in itself, cannot be said to establish the exclusive validity of experi-
mental method.
2. The attack on the other criteria of truth. A second way in
which Dewey seeks to establish the validity of his method is by impugning
70. SAN, 189.
71 Ibid, 151.
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the validity of other methods and criteria of truth. Most of them come
under his fire:
(a) Sense-expe rience . It is not a valid criterion of knowledge: All
knowledge is relational, connected; 7 *” sensations are not knowledge in
themselves hut incitements to knowledge. 73
Sensations are not parts of any knowledge, good or had, superior or
inferior, imperfect or complete. They are rather provocations, in-
citements, challenges to an act of inquiry, which is to terminate in
knowledge....; as interruptions, they raise the questions: Y/hat does
this shock mean? V/hat is happening? YVhat is the matter?
Y/hat should he done about it? How shall I readjust my behavior
in response? Sensation is thus, as the sensationalist claimed, the
beginning of knowledge, hut only in the sense that the experienced
shock of change is the necessary stimulus to the invest igating and
comparing which eventually produce knowledge.
(h) Intuition . This is not a valid criterion of truth, either. (1)
There is no such thing as pure knowledge by acquaintance; there is always
an element of mediation in it. 7^ (2) Further, both valid and invalid
meanings are apprehended; action upon them is necessary to distinguish
them. 75
(c) Rationalistic criterion . This criterion makes knowledge consist
in some form of identification with premises or objects securely known.
It is defective at several points: (1) It appeals to some prior form of
knowing; what guarantees the latter's validity? 7G (2) If taken
72. Ratner
,
Op . <
73. RPH, 89-90.
74. Art
.
35, 294
75. EAR, 320-321
207 .
76 QFC
,
183-84
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consistently it would provide no place for real novelty, real knowledge. 77
(3) Syllogistic logic is practically barren; it provides no way by which
we can get truth about matters of existence.78
(d) Correspondence . The correspondence criterion is not adequate:
(1) It must assume the immediacy of knowledge: the idea must correspond
with a reality which must be known in some way previously. 78 (2) It
assumes an epistemological dualism, inheriting all the difficulties in-
herent in it. 8^ (3) In the last anlysis, the "agreement" which the corres-
pondence theory requires is but another way of expressing the notion of
experimental verification. How is "agreement" brought about except
through action? 9^
(e) Coherence . When we come to the coherence criterion of truth we
discover a very significant fact: Bewev does not reject it . He is
explicit in his attacks on other criteria. A sworn foe of Absolutism, —
we should expect him to condemn the criterion of truth to which it appeals,
Yet he does not. Take, for example, his well-known essay on "The
Intellectualist Criterion for Truth", directed against Bradley. 82 One
would expect that Bewey would assail the coherence criterion. Instead,
he admits that consistency is a criterion of correct thought. What
he objects to is making the criterion of thought the criterion of reality,
as Bradley does.
77. QPC, 184.
78. BAN, 380.
79. QFC, 181.
80. BEL, 231.
81. Ibid, 238-40.
82. IBP, 112-53.
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Thinking without doubt must he logical; hut does it follow from this
that the reality about which one thinks, and about which one must think
consistently if one is to think to any purpose, must itself he already
logical? 83
Dewey* s real quarrel with Bradley is over his transformation of logic into
a metaphysical system, which is a different question from that of the
validity of the coherence criterion as such.
Dewey’s attack on Absolutism in general, as Feldman points out, is
three- fold: (1) Practical ly , he opposes Absolutism because intelligence
cannot function in a block universe.
A theory which ends by declaring that everything is, really and
eternally, thoroughly ideal and rational, cuts the nerve of the
specific demand and work of intelligence.
(2) Logically , it assumes the reality of experience in order to get
its dialectic started and then ends by pronouncing the very thing upon
84
which it rests, experience, an unreality.
(3) Ethically , absolutism is not relevant to the actualization of
values in human living. 85
Is any value more concretely and securely in life than it was before?
Does this perfect intelligence enable us to correct one single misstep,
one paltry error, here and now? Does this perfect all-inclusive good-
ness serve to heal one disease? Does it rectify one transgression?
Does it even give the slightest inkling of how to go to work at any
of these things? No; it just tells you; Never mind, for they are al-
ready eternally corrected, eternally healed in the eternal conscious-
ness which alone is really Real.
83. IDP, 129.
CD SAN, 61; cf. supra, 48.
85 IDP, 24
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It is apparent that none of these arguments is directed against the
coherence criterion.
The truth is that not only does Dewey not oppose the coherence critaicn,
but he employs it constantly. (1) His theory of knowledge is relational.
To assume that anything can be known in isolation from its connections
with other things is to identify knowing with merely having some object
before perception or in feeling, and is thus to lose the key to the
traits that distinguish an object as known The more connections
and interactions we ascertain, the more we know the object in question.
Thinking is search for these connections.
(2) He represents the end of science as the putting of facts ”into
87
coherent form” and its goal a ’'coherent and self-luminous system of
88
meaning.”
(3) We have already seen that he employs coherence as an ethical
criterion.
(4) He represents the office of philosophy , which is the ultimate
arbiter of the sciences, to subject ’’values, criticisms, and critical
methods” to a criticism ”as comprehensive and consistent as
86. QFC, 267.
87. LGS, 115.
68. EEL, 90.
89. Cf. supra,86; ”There is nothing intrinsically bad about raw impulse
anddssire. They become evil in contrast with another desire whose
object includes more inclusive and enduring consequences. Y/hat is
morally dangerous in the desire as it first shows itself is its
tendency to confine attention to its own immediate object and to
shut out the thought of a larger whole of conduct.” ETH, 201.
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possible.” 90
The significance for the problem of this chapter of Dewey’s employ-
ment of coherence cannot be over-estimated. In order to establish the
exclusive validity of experimental method as criterion of truth it is
necessary toinvalidate the others. Inasmuch as Dewey not only does
not eliminate coherence as a criterion but actually employs it, his
claim to exclusive validity for experimental ism can scarcely stand.
3. The pragmatic sanction of the exclusiveness of experimental
method . A consistent pragmatist would not, however, adopt either of
the two approaches already considered, i. e. that experimental verificatioi
is involved in the act of judgment and that other criteria of truth are
not valid, for such approaches in themselves imply the validity of co-
herence (that is, they seek to show that experimental method is internally
consistent and externally coherent). A consistent pragmatist would act
as though experimental method were the only one and would show that the
results of such an assumption justify it. In many of Dewey’s writings
90. EAN, 404. One of the assumptions of Dewey's philosophy is the
principle of the whole. He says that "philosophical dualism is but
a formulated recognition of an impasse in life.” (EAN, 241) His
writings are full of attacks made upon dualisms from the standpoint
that they violate the integrity of the whole:
(1) Man-nature. Of. supra, 73.
(2) Body-mind. Supra, 79.
(3) Self-its deed. ETH, 123.
(4) Theoxy-practice. QFC
,
24.
(5) Truth-means of acquiring it. IDP, 139-40.
(6) Subject-object. EAR
,
8-9.
(7) Reason- experience. RPH, 83ff.
(8) Cause-effect. Cf. Supra, 62-63.
(9) Means-ends. Cf. supra, 87.
(10) Ideal-real; value-existence. Cf. supra, 87-88.
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that point of view is taken. In Reconstruct ion in Philosophy and the
Quest for Certainty the burden of the argument is to show the results
which have come from exclusive preoccupation with the experimental methods
of science as distinguished from the unfruitful methods of ancient
science.^ It is not necessary to rehearse the facts; experimental
science has unquestionably revolutionized and in most respects enhanced
the common life. So successful have the results been that Dewey is
willing to accord to science rational certainty, logical warranty.
"Theoretical certitude is assimilated to practical certainty; to security,
trustworthiness of instrumental operations." 9 *-*
But Dewey’s task is to establish the exclusive validity of experi-
mental method, and a rehearsal of its successes does not constitute cer-
tainty that it is the only method and criterion of truth. To make a
successful journey to New York by train, — yes, to make a thousand
journeys to the metropolis by train, — does establish beyond reasonable
doubt that transportation by train is a satisfactory way to go. But a
thousand successful journeys by train do not demonstrate that a railroad
is the only means of transportation to New York. Put logically, it seems
to us that the fallacy in the pragmatic argument for the exclusive validity
of scientific method is one of faulty conversion. In effect Dewey con-
verts
91. Cf. RPH, chapters I, II, III; QFC, chapters I, IV, XI.
92. DEB, 224.
93. QFC
,
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"All results of scientific research are cases of knowledge" into
"All cases of Icnowledge are results of scientific research", which,
when faced with the necessity of confuting his enemies, is contraposed
into
"No results of non-scient ific research are cases of knowledge," In
the conversion of the first proposition into the second the distribution
of the predicate of the first is illegally increased,
Dewey fails to establish his belief that experimental method is ex-
clusively valid. His doctrine of meaning as practical does not tally with
experience. His elimination of competing criteria fails to take in the
coherence criterion, which he employs. His argument from the successes
of experimental method is essentially irrelevant to establishing its claim
to sole validity. The doctrine of exclusive validity of experimental
method is a dogma, an assumption, which cannot be established on the basis
of its own logic. It is no better grounded, logically, than are the
assumptions upon which religious theory moves into the supernatural. The
argument for the supremacy of scientific method stands on the same level,
logically, with the argument of the eleventh chapter of Hebrews for the
supremacy of faith.
D. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD aND KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER SELVES
Is it possible by experimental method to gain a knowledge of other
selves? We do not know that Dewey ever puts the question in just this
way. In fact, he would object that the question as thus phrased is an
artificial problem. He maintains that inner experience is an abstraction
..
•
*
•
. JlC'U
-JX . lo".
He opposes those who would make social interactions
products of a ready-made specific physical or mental endowment of a self-
sufficing individual, wherein language acts as a mechanical go-between
to convey observations and ideas that have prior and independent exist-
ence.
"
Social experience is not something that we acquire after we have attained
self-consciousness. Rather, inner experience is the product of social
relations. 95
When the introspect ionist thinks he has withdrawn into a wholly
private realm of events disparate in kind from other events, made out
of mental stuff, he is only turning his attention to his own soliloquy.
If we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never
talk to and with ourselves. Because of converse, social give and
take, various organic attitudes become an assemblage of persons engaged
in converse, conferring with one another, exchanging distinctive ex-
periences, listening to one another, over-hearing unwelcome remarks,
accusing and excusing. Through speech a person dramatically identifies
himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many roles, not in
successive stages of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama.
Thus mind emerges.
Communication arises from the successful results of acting in certain
fashion. The assumption that other people share our meanings enables
us to get on.^
Several observations suggest themselves at once. In the first place,
Dewey's genetic argument that social experience is the condition of self-
consciousness is beside the point. However consciousness may have arisen,
we unquest ionably distinguish between ourselves and others. Dewey does
not assume any more than anyone else in his right mind that he alone exists.
We have a right, then, to ask what our grounds are for assuming the
existence of others and whether our conviction of others' existence can
94. DAN, 169.
95. Ibid, 170.
96.
Cf. ibid, 176-81.
.,
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be established by the method and criterion of truth which we employ.
Having disposed of the denial of our right to put the question,
analysis shows, in the second place, that the existence of other selves
cannot be established by experimental method in the exact sense. %
friend’s idea of my self-consciousness cannot lead to the concrete fact
which is my self-consciousness. To be sure, he may identify my self-
consciousness with certain overt organic movements which he can submit
to verification. But that is behaviorism, a theory which we have
Q 7
seen Dewey characterize as inadequate and grossly over-simplified.
There is no way by experimental method that he can enter into my mind and
verify the object of his hypothesis (my self-consciousness). The fact
is that Dewey admits it.
Psychology of course does not aim at reinstating the immediate ex-
perience of the individual; nor does it aim at describing that ex-
perience in its immediate values, whether esthetic, social or ethical.
It reduces the immediate experience to a series of dispositions,
attitudes, or states which are taken as either conditions or signa-
tures of life-experience. It is not the full experience-of-seeing-a-
tree it is concerned with, but the experience reduced by abstraction
to an attitude or state of perception; it is not the concrete getting
angry, with all its personal and social implications, but anger as one
species of a generic psychic disposition known as emotion.
Dewey says, further, that consciousness is ”gratuitous
,
super-
fluous, and inexplicable when reality is defined in terms of the relation-
al objects of science.” 99
97. Supra, 77.
98. LCS, 132-33.
99.
EM. 104,
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The only way the existence of other selves can be experimentally
verified. is in the sense of working successfully.
100
That is the
method Dewey actually employs in his long analysis of communication in
Experience and Nature.
1 ^ 1 But that is the rough-and-ready procedure
of the everyday world; Aristotle and the ancients were as familiar with it
as we. It cannot be identified with the highly-refined methods by which
the natural sciences have transformed the modern world.
It is to be noted that Dewey assumes with regard to other selves
what he wants. He does not, confesses he cannot, establish their ex-
istence by the method to which he has sworn first allegiance. And his
102
assumption is metaphysical. Other persons are metaphysical so far
as my consciousness is concerned; no prediction verifiable in sense-
experience can reveal to me the inside of another's mind. Logically, the
existence of other selves can no more be established by strict science
than the existence of God. Practically, the religious man has the same
right of assuming the existence of a metaphysical Person or God, because
the hypothesis "works” (in the most general sense), as Dewey has in
assuming the existence of other human selves, because that hypothesis
works successfully.
E. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE PaST
Can knowledge of the past be established by the experimental method
100. Method A; see supra.
101. Cf. especially, 176-81.
102.
Cf. Brightman, RV, 151
.'
.
.
.
of the physical sciences? Bewey seems to believe that it can. He de-
plores the divorce which is often attempted of the natural and historical
sciences. They are not rivals, for all natural existences are histories.
Aside from mathematics, all knowledge is historic; chemistry, geology,
physiology, as well as anthropology and those human events to which,
arrogantly, we usually restrict the title of history. Only as science
is seen to be fulfilled and brought to itself in intelligent manage-
ment of historical processes in their continuity can man be envisaged
as within nature, and not as a supernatural extrapolation. Just
because nature is what it is, history is capable of being more truly
known — understood, intellectually realized — than are mathematical
and physical objects. **
Acknowledging that history is known by scientific methods, the
question arises as to its extent. newey’s answer is that knowledge of
the past is possible only to the extent that past events have ’’effects
still directly observable. ’’Thoughts about the past hang upon present
|
observable events and are verified by future predicted or anticipated
events which are capable of entering into direct presentation.” ^5
’’Knowledge where the past is implicated is logically knowledge of past-
as-connected-with-present-or- future. ”106 To illustrate:
I see a letter box; there is an observed thing. It is a commonplace
that every recollection starts, directly or indirectly, with something
perceived, immediately present. It suggest a letter. This may re-
main a mere suggestion. Thou^it of a letter written yesterday or
last year may become simply something for fancy to sport with — an
esthetic affair, what I call a reminiscence. Truth or falsity does not
enter into the case. But it may give rise to questions. Bid I actual-
ly write the letter or only mean to? If I wrote it, did I mail it or
leave it on iry desk or in my pocket? Then I do something. I search my
103. EAN, 163-64.
104. Art. 59, 311.
105. Ibid, 310.
106. Ibid, 309.
Ibid, 310-11.107 .
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pockets. I look on ay desk. I may even write the person in question
and inquire if he received a letter written on a certain date. By
such means a tentative inference gets a categorical status. A logical
right accrues, if the experiments are successful, to assert the letter
was or was not written. Generalize the case and you get the logical
theory concerning knowledge about the past.
If a past event has no consequences continuing in the present it is
meaningless so far as knowledge is concerned. Such questions as "What
did Brutus eat for his morning meal the day he assassinated Caesar?**
cannot be answered, for his breakfast has left no consequences which are
now observable. Such a matter is purely an "esthetic fancy.*’1®8
So far as the meaning is wholly of and in the past, it cannot be re-
covered for knowledge. This negative consideration suggests that the
true object of a judgment about a past event may be a past-event-
hav ing-a- connect ion- cont inuing- into-the-present-and- future
.
1® 8
The issue is clear. Dewey affirms that the past can be known by ex-
perimental method in so far as it has consequences verifiable in the
present or future. But this theory is open to objection. To begin
with, in sponsoring such a theory of knowledge of the past Dewey has
departed from the strict experimental method of the physical sciences.
He forsakes it in two respects. First of all, he gives up overt
manipulation of the object of investigation, which forms such an essential
part of physical science.HO For the past cannot be manipulated. The
108. Art. 59, 311.
109. Ibid, 311.
110. ’’Experimental science is a recognition that no idea is entitled to
be termed knowledge till it has passed into such overt manipulation
of physical conditions as constructs the object to which the idea
refers.** Art. 37, 65.
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past, as Love joy puts it, ”is just blankly there
,
unmodifiable irremedi-
ably external to the f present concrete situation.*” To be sure,
Dewey suggests that we do not need to experiment with the past, for the
progress of history itself does the experimenting for us.^2
History offers to us the only available substitute for the isolation
and for the cumulative recombination of experiment. The early periods
present us in their relative crudeness and simplicity with a substi-
tute for the artificial operation of an experiment: following the
phenomenon into the more complicated and refined form which it assumes
later, is a substitute for the synthesis of the experiment.
But that suggestion does not strike very deeply. There is an ongoing
process, apart from man, taking place in the world today. No scientist
would urge, however, that experiment is unnecessary because history
(in this case, contemporaneous history) is performing experiments for
list In historical method the all-important element of overt manipulation
of the object i8 absent.
Further, judgments about the past cannot be verified in the strict
sense. Dewey has said that we have an experience of knowledge
if, in its quale
,
there is an experienced distinction and connection
of two elements of the following sort: one means or intends the
presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already
present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same
fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its
companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it
sets up. 113
111. Love joy. Art
112. Art. 24, 113
113. IDP, 90
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But the past cannot ’’become present” in the sense uewey speaks of. The
past ex hypothesi is inaccessible to us, and hence "we can never compare
it with our idea of it, nor determine which of our ideas of it are true
and which are false. ”114 Dewey affirms, in discussing the verification
of meanings, that an intended meaning must be fulfilled ” in propria
persona . ”115 Since the past is irrevocably gone, its fulfillment in
ropria persona in present experience is impossible. 116
114. Love joy, Art. 1, 66. Dewey seems almost to recognize this in
one passage. ”How can the present belief jump out of its present
skin, dive into the past, and land upon just the one event (that
as past is gone for ever) which, by definition, constitutes its
truth? I do not wonder the intellectual ist has much to say about
’transcendence* when he comes to dealing with the truth of judg-
ments about the past; but why does he not tell us how we manage
to know when one thought lands straight on the devoted head of
something past and gone, while another thought comes down on the
wrong thing in the past.” IDP, 160.
115. IDP, 10 3n.
116. Dewey argues, however, that the ’’content” of a judgment must not
be confused with ’’the reference of that judgment.” ’’The content
of any idea about yesterday’s rain certainly involves past time,
but the distinction or characteristic aim of judgment is none the
less to give this content a future reference and function.” (ID?,
161) We have already seen, however, that the doctrine that all
meanings imply future operation is not tenable. (Of. supra, 146)
Further, not only the content of the judgment supplied by Dewey
but the reference of the content is to the past. ”It is yesterday
that I ’mean’, and not tomorrow, and no logical hocus-pocus can
transubstantiate the meaning ’yesterday’ iiito the meaning *to-morIaw„ ,, ,,
Love joy. Art. 1, 67.
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The only way history can be known experimentally is in the broad.
pragmatic sense of the term. Our hypothesis regarding a past event
works; it fits in coherently with our judgments about history as a whole,
j
Dewey seems to acknowledge the fact when he says, 117
If we could free ourselves from a somewhat abject emotion, it would j!
be clear enough that what makes any proposition scientific is its
power to yield understanding, insight, intellectual at-homeness, in
connection with coherent and tested meanings. The case of history
is typical.
1 IS
There is no one method applicable to all sorts of facts. Ex-
perimental method in the abstract mathematical sense does not apply to the ;
concrete facts of human history. Knowledge of the past cannot be gained
j;
by strict scientific method. The natural sciences have no place for
history. As Cohen points out, the more developed a science is the less
use it makes of history. 119 Is not Dewey’s depreciation of history,
,
which we have noted again and again, partially the result of his insistence
upon the exclusive validity of a method that is not adapted to the
—
117. EAN, 163.
118. Rickert’s words are relevant. ”Es giebt . . . . . .keine wissen-
schaftliche Universalmethode .V/ohl ab
f
er sind wir sogleich
orientirt und auf dem Wege zu einem Verstandniss der wissen-
schaftlichen Th&tigkeit, wenn wir uns klar machen, dass in dem
Material der Wissenschaft ein prinzipieller Unterschied besteht,
insofern die Kulturvorg&nge sich durch ihre Bedeutung f’ur den
Menschen aus der Gesamtwirklichkeit herausheben und urn dieser
Bedeutung willen auch eine wissenschaftliche Erforschung verlangen, i
die sie nicht unter ein System allgemeiner Begriffe bringt
,
sondern
j;
in ihrem einmaligen individuellen V/erden verfolgt.” GNB, 593.
119. ’’History has no applications in mathematical investigations, and
next to none in physical researches. tfith the recent growth of
experimental and scientific methods in biology and the realization
!|
of the inadequacy of the supposed law of parallelism between onto-
geny and phylogeny, the historical point of view has been losing
the importance it once had in the study of life phenomena.”
RAN
,
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treatment of historical fact? 120
Thus, we find Dewey* s method inadequate to establish another one of
the major principles of his philosophy.
F. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND VALUES j!
What is the relationship of experimental method to values? Can valxesj
The jl
The |!
con-
j|
is
ii
merely "the ’is’ of action." 124: There is no real difference between
j
1
;
saying "this act is the one to be done, this act will meet the situation,"
and saying "The act ought to be done."123 Knowledge begins with the 1
ji
ordinary things of experience, the things we prize and desire. They form
j
the data of the knowing procedure. By abstraction the sciences ascertain
j
certain basic relations obtaining between these prized things and other
j!
120. The pragmatic attitude is not congenial to the treatment of history.
Although James was certainly friendly to religion in the metaphysical!
sense, Cohen notes that in his Varieties of Religious Experience
,
"none of the great historic religions receives any attention."
Op. cit., 454.
121. Cf. supra, 85-91.
122. QFC, 218-19.
123. Ibid, 265.
124. Ratner, POJB, 374.
be known? We have already expounded Dewey’s theory of value. 121
relationship between experimental method and values is instrumental,
knowing process is an instrument by which the things we desire, the
possibilities of experience, may be securely experienced. As
have seen, for Dewey judgments about values are "judgments about the
ditions and the results of experienced objects." 123 The "ought"
II
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existents. The sciences then return to experience from their abstractions
with knowledge of the conditions to be observed if the valued objects will
be had and thus provide the instruments by which desired objects may be
made secure. 12®
The world as we experience it is a real world. 3ut it is not in
its primary phases a world that is known, a world that is understood,
and is intellectually coherent and secure. Knowing consists of
operations that give experienced objects a form in which the relations,
jj
upon which the onward course of events depends, are securely experi-
enced. It marks a transitional redirection and rearrangement of the
real. It is intermediate and instrumental; it comes between a
relatively casual and accidental experience of existence and one
relatively settled and defined. 127
What shall we say of this account of value? (I) In the first place,
experimental method cannot tell us what we ought to do. It can supply
us with facts about the conditions and results of certain types of ex-
perience. But natural science cannot give us a true science of value
for several reasons. (A) For one thing, as we have already seen, its
theory of value- judgments is not tenable. 12® Judgments of value
cannot be reduced to judgments of practice. What we can do (Dewey’s
definition of value; the possible) 12® and what we ought to do are not
the same. (B) Further, Dewey implicitly recognizes this fact when he
assigns to philosophy the task of criticizing the results of the sciences
jj
with an eye to rendering them ’’more coherent, more secure, and more
significant.” 1 *50 If the sciences can reveal in themselves what ought i|
to be done, the critical function Dewey gives to philosophy would not
126. QFC, 218-19.
127. Ibid, 295.
128. Cf. supra, 90-91.
129. <iFC, 299-300.
130.
BAN, 408
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have to be exercised. (C) Again, experimentation, in the sense Dewey
conceives it, is impossible of execution for two reasons at least: (1)
Values are not amenable to mathematical treatment, as are the facts of
the natural sciences. Dewey admits that the hedonistic calculus of
Bentham and his followers involved them in insuperable difficulties .131
(2) The objectivity of the natural sciences is lacking in axiology by
virtue of the fact, which Dewey admits, that the subject and his in-
fluence cannot be eliminated from the situation.-*-^
(II) In the second place, it is a very significant fact that in the
Quest for Certainty
,
one of Dewey* s last major works, we find him ad-
mitting that knowledge is not the only approach to the real. The meaning
of the Copernican revolution, he tells us, is "that we do not have to go
to knowledge to obtain an exclusive hold on reality. Knowledge
transforms "disturbed and unsettled situations into those more controlled
and more significant ," but it does not encompass the world. After
all, he confesses, "hopes and fears, desires and aversions, are as truly
j
responses to things as are knowing and thinking. While knowledge
is an "indispensable medium" for securing the objects which we prize,
our affections, when they are enlightened by Tinderstanding, are organs
by which we enter into the meaning of the natural world as genuinely
as by knowing, and with greater fullness and intimacy. 1^6
131. ETH, 263.
132. LCS, 27-28
133. QFC, 295.
134. Ibid
,
295,
135. Ibid
,
297.
136. Loc. cit
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In effect, in setting forth these doctrines Lewey is renouncing his
doctrine of the exclusive validity of scientific method. He is admitting
that other interests than the cognitive have a hold on reality. To he
137
sure, he says that science alone "knows*' the real. But there is no
need of quarrelling over terms so long as it is granted that value-ex-
138perience is a legitimate mode of apprehending the real.
(Ill) Finally, Lewey recognises that experimental method depends for
its validity upon moral considerations.
The system of science (employing the term ’science' to mean an
organised intellectual content) is absolutely dependent for logical
worth upon a moral interest: the sincere aim to judge truly. Remove
such an interest, and the scientific system becomes a purely esthetic
object, which may awaken emotional response in virtue of its internal
harmony and symmetry, but which has no logical import.
Thus, in his treatment of values we see Dewey virtually forsaking his
experimental method and criterion of truth again. It is another
illustration of the fact that for all his bludgeoning of his opponents with
"scientific method", the keystones of his own philosophical structure are
not established by appeal to that method.
G. E3UPERIMSNTAL kETHOL ALL HNOWLEhGE OF THE WHOLE
Lewey tells us in the Common Faith that the self is dependent for its
own unification upon "the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes
137. Cf. QFC, 296.
138. "One mode of experience is as real as any other." QFC, 219.
139. LCS, 125
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of the world, into that imaginative totality we call the universe.” 140
The final question of the chapter is whether this totality so essential
to the religious life, as Dewey conceives it, can be known by scientific
experimental method.
We need not delay long over the answer, which Dewey gives without
equivocation. ^41
The limited world of our observation and reflection becomes the
Universe only through imaginative extension. It cannot be apprehended
in knowledge nor realized in reflection.
In other words, the most real reality of all — the universe — cannot be
known by scientific method but must be apprehended by non-cognitive ex-
perience.
We see, then, that the religious self for Dewey is dependent on a
reality that cannot be known. The self must rely upon a reality which
in its totality transcends cognitive experience. The self in Dewey's
philosophy of religion thus possesses precisely the same epistemological
status as the self in those (to Dewey) highly offensive supernatural
religions which put their trust in powers unverifiable by scientific
research!
H. CONCLUSION
In the preceding chapters we have seen Dewey attack the rpn-scientific
foundations of historical religion and attempt to build a new conception
140. CF, 19
.jir- '.i ••••.
.
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of faith in harmony with science, — the premise of both Dewey’s de-
structive and constructive efforts being the doctrine of the exclusive
validity of scientific method. Discovering that by scientific method
Dewey means the experimental method and predictive verification of the
physical sciences we have investigated in this chapter whether Dewey’s
premise is sound by asking two questions: (1) Is Dewey’s method and
criterion of truth self-consistent: can the exclusive validity of
scientific method be established scientifically? (2) Can the essential
momenta in Dewey’s own philosophy of religion — (a) society, (b) the
past, (c) values, (d) the whole — be established by scientific method?
In answer to (1), we discovered that Dewey’s key principle is an
assumption: it does not follow from his theory of judgment; the attempt
to establish it pragmatically is logically defective. In fact, we saw
that while Dewey is an enthusiastic prophet of experimental method and
an avowed antagonist of other methods and criteria, he makes extensive
use of the coherence criterion, which in itself is sufficient indictment
of his extreme claims for scientific method.
In answer to (2) we found that the central concepts of his own
philosophy cannot be established by the method to which he ascribes
exclusive validity, (a) He lays claim to being a social philosopher, and
yet the existence of other selves cannot be experimentally verified by it.
(b) He condemns supernatural religion for its unworthy past, when, in
the strict sense, past events, whether good or bad, could never be known
by his own predictive, future-directed experimental method, (c) He lifts
values to the place occupied in historic religions by God, though his own
....
method can never establish what ought to be. (d) He claims that the
supreme quality of the religious life, the vital unification of the self,
rests upon devotion to an idea of the universe in its totality, and then
confesses that the universe can never be known. The conclusion of the
investigation is: the premise of Dewey’s philosophy of religion is an
assumption, nothing more; the epistemological attacks on the supernatural
lose their cogency; the objects of humanistic faith have the same status
so far as knowledge is concerned as the objects of supernaturalism.
Shall we, then, renounce Dewey’s teachings? Bather, we ought to
develop the valid insights of his thinking, as they have appeared in this
chapter. (1) The recognition that the validity of science rests upon
moral — ideal — considerations. (2) The admission that there are other
approaches than science to the real. (3) His actual appeal to coherence
as the ultimate criterion of truth. (4) H^s implied teaching that the
existence of other selves is not a matter of immediate knowledge but a
working hypothesis to account for certain levels of meaning. (5) His
implicit recognition that men may gain help from relations to an object
of faith transcending cognitive experience. Let these insights be
followed out and Dewey’s philosophy of religion will eventuate in a
doctrine not easily distinguishable from theism.

CHAPTER V
THE DOGM* OF HUMAN PROGRESS
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE CHAPTER
As was pointed out at the close of Chapter III, the underlying
premise of Dewey's rejection of supernatural ism, as well as of his own
theory of religion, is the adequacy of scientific method. This premise
expresses itself in two ways: Epistemologically
,
it affirms that
scientific method is the only,sure method of arriving at truth. Practic-
ally, it asserts that scientific method is the one hope of human progress. !
tfe have considered the epistemological implications of scientific method
in Chapter IV. In this chapter our purpose is to expound Dewey’s
doctrine of progress as grounded in science and to inquire into the
validity of his teaching.
For the moment we shall define "progress” in the broadest fashion
as meaning "advance," including within it all forms of physical, mental,
and moral betterment. The idea of progress in its broad meaning
involves three notions at least: (1) That the present is superior to or
marks an advance over the past. (£) That the future will be still
better. (3) That such advance as has been or will be made is a human.

as distinguished from a divine achievement 1
The conviction of human progress is the silent assumption of much
that Dewey has written about religion. We have seen that he objected
to historic religion from a genetic standpoint; he held it simply to be
a primitive attempt to gain security or as an outgrowth of myths.
It is implied in the argument that we have progressed beyond the myth-
ological stage, while science’s development has outmoded need of appeal
to supernatural powers. 5 He attacked historical religion, too, from
a practical standpoint, and the assumption of progress is present there,
too. Religion was said to be a subversive influence, retarding the on-
ward march of science, the assumption of progress being plainly revealed. 4
It was said that supernatural religion cannot solve our specific problems;
while science, the argument presupposes, has developed to the place where
it can. 5 It was said that supernaturalism is inimical to human
endeavor; and this objection takes its point from the supposition that men
through their unaided effort are capable of genuine advance.**
i
,i
j
1. Otherwise, the doctrine of progress would be scarcely distinguish-
j
able from the doctrine of Providence. As Bury points out, speaking
from the historical point of view, ’’The undermining of the theory
of Providence is very intimately connected with our subject; for it
was just the theory of an active Providence that the theory of Progress*
was to replace; and it was not until men felt independent of Provi-
dence that they could organize a theory of Progress.” IOP, 73.
2. Supra, 37ff.
3. Supra, 39. it will be remembered that Dewey admits the genetic argu-
ment is not a logical refutation of supernatural ism but a practical
consideration designed to show its outmoded character. Supra, 42. |
4. Supra
,
52.
5. Supra 53-54.
i
6 . Supra 54-55.
X
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ii
Not only are the objections to supernatural ism grounded in the notion
of progress, but his constructive view of religion is as well. He affirms
that a theory of religion such as his own is called for because historical
7
religions have been outmoded by science. His conception of God is a
8
projection of the possible. Salvation is to come through the ever-
g
advancing methods of science, while revelation, appeal to historic
events or creeds, has been supplanted by ’’the continual disclosure of
truth through directed cooperative human endeavor In short,
Dewey conceives of supernatural religion as belonging to a stage of
human development that was left behind when science appeared on the scene,
and his own theory of religion is designed to harmonize with the ever-
advancing character of science.
It will be noted that Dewey f s assumption here is not so much logical
as practical. It is not so much the notion that traditional religion is
untrue as that it is no longer needed. The problem of the chapter will
be to expound this practical argument further and to ask whether it is
valid.
7. CP, 29-33.
8. ’’God" is "the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and
actions." CF, 42. The "ideal" is defined as "the oossible." QFC,
299-300.
9. Art. 66; CHE, II, 457; EAN, iii.
10. CF, 26.
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B. LEkVBT’-S CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS
1. Progess as increase of meaning : value . Lewey defines progress
several times in essentially the same way:
Present reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness of meaning. ii
....Remedial action. ... .endeavor in order to convert strife into
harmony* monotony into a variegated scene, and limitation into ex-
pansion. The converting is progress, the only progress conceivable
or attainable by man.!2
Progress means increase of present meaning which involves multipli-
cation of sensed distinctions as well as harmony, unification. 3
If history shows progress it can hardly be found elsewhere than in.,
complication and extension of the significance found within experience 148
Progress, as these definitions would agree, is increase of meaning.
"Meaning" is variously defined in Dewey’s writings.^ (1) Some-
times it is regarded as a relationship of purely physical events, as the
relation of consequence to antecedent. The quenching of thirst is, thus,
a meaning of water. !® (2) In other places it is regarded as the
apprehension of the relation of things to one another. Meaning is defined
as a sign or clue of a reality to be realized through action, "aware-
ness" of the consequences of an event before it occurs,!® or "the
11. HNC, 281.
12. Ibid, 282.
13. Ibid, 283.
14. Ibid, 284.
15. For a good discussion of the point,
16. Cf., EEL, 246.
17. Cf. EEL, 248.
18. EMI, 324.
see Feldman, PJX), 77.
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potent iality" of an event, expressed "in expectation, beliefs, inferences."
(3) Finally, meanings are regarded as methods of action, ways of using
things *20
Meanings are rules for using and interpreting things; interpretation
being always an imputation of potentiality for some consequences.
Since (3) is chiefly identified with Dewey’s behavioristic moods,
which we have seen are not most characteristic of him, (1) and (2)
represent his meaning of "meaning." There is no contradiction between
them; (1) is the relationship of purely physical things; (2) is the
relationship as apprehended. In either case "meaning" is synonymous
with "consequences" for Dewey.
To judge that this object is sweet, that is, to refer the idea or
meaning ’sweet’ to it without actually experiencing sweetness, is to
predict that when it is tasted — that is, subjected to a specific
operation — a certain consequence will ensue. 2l
"Meanings" are synonymous with "values." We have already seen that
"a judgment of value is simply a case of a practical judgment about the
doing of something, "22 while "in general, we mean by any concept
nothing more than a set of operations."23 Values are "ends or con-
sequences not now existing but which the actual may through its use
bring into existence."24 Values are the possibilities of existence. 2^
19. EAN, 324 *
20. Ibid,
,
188.
21. §FC, 137.
22. EEL
,
358.
23. QFC, 111.
24. Ibid,
,
299.
25. Loc. cit
.

Hence, progress as the "increase of meaning" is "the increase of value",
the increase of the possibilities of existence.
2. Progress as growth : the end as immanent . Progress is often con-
ceived as the approach of society or civilization to a goal lying in the
future. "Progress means," Lyman contends, "proceeding toward a goal,
advance toward an end, approach to the realization of value.
"
2^ Bernard
defines progress as
an approach to an end or result which is regarded as more nearly per-
fect or complete than the antecedent stage in the development process
with which the end or result is compared. 2 ?
According to these definitions progress has an end external to the process,
which is the goal of the advance.
jjewey, however, will have nothing to do with such a view. Indict-
ments of the notion that there are certain definite ends toward which
mankind is progressing are to be found in almost all of Dewey’s writings.
The following are some of the objections raised to such a notion of
progress:
2^1) The notion of a fixed end or goal is a vestige of supernatural-
ism.
(2) The idea of a goal or perfect end breeds despair and discourage-
ment in those who seek to realize them. 2 ^
(3) Concentration of attention upon a distant goal tends to distract
thought and energy from making the most of the present. 3^
26. MTR, 7.
27. Bernard, Art. 1, 21.
28. RPH, 162-3; HNC, 236-237; 241-42. These arenot direct quotations.
29. HNC, 232-33, 274-75, 288.
30. ^rt. 86, 179; HNC, 261, 266.
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(4) An infinite goal gives no insight into the immediate steps to be
taken. 31
(5) Only the present is in our control. Why yield to the distant,
the uncontrollable?32
(6) "Means-consequences” is an undivided situation; there are no
fixed ends as such. 33
(7) Progress is a process in which aims or purposes are continually
being realized and new ones are being projected. The notion of fixed
ends does not do justice to the perpetually changing nature of the
process. 34
Progress is not, thus, for Dewey the pursuit of fixed goals, as it is
often conceived.
Nor is progress for him a matter of mere change. Not only are
they not the same, but progress does not depend on the existence of social
change, "but on the direction which human beings deliberately give that
change . " 35
Rather, progress is a matter of growth . The moral life is not
striving for certain all-inclusive ends or goals, as we have said. There
are many meanings and purposes in life; no one can be singled out as
supreme. 35 Our task is to "wrest from each changing situation of ex-
perience its own full and unique meaning. "37 The goal of progress lies
31. HNC
,
283-4; 298-89; ION, 164-5.
32. HNC 266-71.
33. RAN, 397; RPH, 171-75; HNC, 226-27, 232
34. R2E 361.
35. art. 53; CHE, II, 322.
36. art
.
96, 179.
37. Loc. cit
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within action, not without. 38 It is the process of growth itself. 39
The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning
to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no
matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better. 4^
The axiom of progress is: ”So act as to increase the meaning of present
experience.” ^
The process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the
static outcome and result, becomes the significant thing. Not health
as an end fixed once and for all, but the needed improvement in
health — a continual process — is the end and good. The end is no
longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process
of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final
goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining
is the aim in living Growth itself is the only moral ”end.”4<i
3. Progress as a^ human achievement . Heedless to say, uewey con-
ceives of progress as a purely human achievement. The notion that
progress is inevitable, that evolutionary process guarantees that we
shall reach certain desirable ends willy-nilly, that advance is automatic,
— these ideas bewey repudiates in the sharpest fashion. Progress rests
upon human intelligence and activity alone. Writing during the Great
... .. 43
war, newey said.
38. HNC, 223.
39. RPH
,
177.
40. Ibid, 176.
41. HNC 283.
42. RPH, 176-77
43 Art. 53, 324.
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The doctrine of evolution has been popularly used to give a kind
of cosmic sanction to the notion of an automatic and wholesale progress
in human affairs. Our part, the human part, was simply to enjoy the
usufruct. Evolution inherited all the goods of divine Providence and
had the advantage of being in fashion. Even a great and devastating
war is not too great a price to pay for an awakening from such an
infantile and selfish dream. Progress is not automatic; it depends
upon human intent and aim and upon acceptance of responsibility for
its production. It is not a wholesale matter, but a retail job, to
be contracted for and executed in sections. I doubt if the whole
history of mankind shows any more vicious and demoralizing ethic
than the recent widespread belief that each of us, as individuals
and as classes, might safely and complacently devote ourselves to in-
creasing our own possessions, material, intellectual, and artistic,
because progress is inevitable anyhow.
4 . The doctrine of progress : convergence of philosophical prin-
iples . The meaning of ’'progress’’
,
then, for Lewey may be defined as
follows: Progress is a process of perpetual growth which is directed,
not toward fixed goals or ends, but toward the transforming of existing
situations so that an increase of value (meaning, possibilities) results.
It is a purely human process and is exemplified both in the lives of
individuals and society at large.
This concept of progress represents a convergence of five signifi-
cant principles of his philosophy:
(1) Temporalisra: To exist is to be in process. 44
(2) Darwinism: The notion of experience as interaction of the
organism with the environment .4^
(3) Emergent evolution: Its doctrine of increase of meaning. 46
44. Supra, 72.
45. Supra, 27. Dewey usually takes the biological point of view. ’’The
brain, the last physical organ of thought, is a part of the same
practical machinery for bringing about adaptation of the environ-
ment to the life requirements of the organism, to which belong legs
and hand and eye.” PAC, 44.
46.
Supra, 73-74,
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(4) Instrumentalist ic theory of knowledge; The test of meaning is
to he found in the success with which difficulties are resolved; meaning
47lies in future consequences.
48
(5) Theory of value: Values are possibilities of present existence.
C. PROGRESS MD THE PAST
1. Scientific progress . Having considered bewey’s theory of
progress we turn to the past for evidences of it. Has there been a
process of increase of value in the past? We are directed at once to
the wealth of possibilities that science has brought into being. The
whole argument of Reconstruct ion in Philosophy and The Quest for
Certainty pivots about the world-transforming progress the sciences have
made in three centuries and the reconstruction in the higher life which
this progress calls for. We are reminded again and again of what
science has done for us.
The combined effect of science and technology has released more
productive energies in a bare hundred years than stand to the credit
of prior human history in its entirety. Productively it has multi-
plied nine million times in the last generation alone. The prophetic
vision of Francis Bacon of subjugation of the energies of nature
through change in methods of inquiry has well-nigh been realized. The
stationary engine, the locomotive, the dynamo, the motor car, turbine,
telegraph, telephone, radio and moving picture are the fruit of
methods that first penetrated to the working causalities of nature
and then utilized the resulting knowledge in bold imaginative ventures
of invention and construction.^ 9
47. Supra, 138.
48. Supra, 87.
49. LSA, 73-74.
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With the introduction of steam-power, the fifty years from 1780 to
1830 were marked by more changes than are found in any previous
thousand years. The advance of chemical techniques and in use of
electricity and radio-energy in the last forty years makes even this
last change seem awkward. 0
Because of science for the first time man is relieved from over-
hanging fear, with its wolflike scramble to possess and accumulate,
and is freed to consider the more gracious question of securing to
all an ample and liberal life. 51
The machine age has resulted in a transformation of the locus of the
ideal of a larger and more evenly distributed happiness and leisure
from heaven to earth. 52
In general, Dewey outlines four stages of development which science
has undergone: (1) A stage when there is no problem at all, when facts
and relations are "taken for granted."53 (2) The empiric sta&e: After
the problem has dawned, — "a period of occupation with relatively crude
and unorganized facts."54 (3) The speculative stage: "a period of
guess, of making hypotheses, of framing ideas which later on are labelled
and condemned as only ideas." 55 (4) "Finally, there comes a period
of fruitful interaction between the mere ideas and the mere facts." 56
This is the stage of modern experimental science. The progress which
science has made consists in the fact that science has changed from "an
art of accepting things as they are " and has become "an art
50. PAC, 318-19.
51. IDP, 58.
52. Art. 80, 323-4.
53. EEL, 89. Dewey organizes the four stages a bit differently in an-
other place: (1) Dogmatism, (2) Discussion (Sophists) (3) Proof
(Aristotelian philosophy)
, (4) Empirical science. (EEL, 185-209)
54. Ibid, 89.
55. Loc. cit.
56. Ibid, 89.
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of control.” 57 In modern experimental science men have at last come
upon a method which gives "experience and its potentialities a radically
58
new meaning," and a means of controlling their own destiny.
2. The absence of progress in non-scient ific fields . When we
turn, however, from the world-transforming progress of science to other
fields of human endeavor a drab picture is painted for us. Dewey tells
us that the ideas dominant today in morals and political matters are
%
those "which universally obtained in Europe till the seventeenth cen-
tury;" 59 they are pre-scient ific. Philosophy "has remained, as
far as possible, true to conceptions formulated more than two thousand
years ago in Greece, when the experimental method was not dreamed of.'^°
The institutional and legal concepts which are in use were framed In the
feudal period. As for religion, its sorry plight has been already
exposed. It is still a compensatory device, as it was in the days
before we had science. ^ It is fighting a losing battle with science. 5 ^
Its institution, the Church, has been demoted from the central, all-
embracing institution of an essentially religious community to "a special
64institution in a secular community." In short, "the outer arena of
57. QEC
,
99- 100.
58. Art
.
86, 177*
59. RPH, 75.
60. Art 80, 317
61. ION, 74.
62. Supra, 38ff,
63. QSPC 303 •
64. OF, 61.
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life has been transformed by science. The effectively working mind
and character of man have hardly been touched." 65 This fact consti-
r /•
tutes the deepest contradiction of our culture.
The impartial student cannot fail to be impressed with the narrow
empirical basis of belief in progress, as Dewey conceives it. In time
the period of progress extends over a mere three centuries. In range
of operation we see it taking place in but one field of human endeavor, —
the scientific. Is this a sufficient basis for discounting man’s
traditional religious interest, which has manifested itself now for many
centuries and over wide fields of human effort?
D. PEOGRESS xjIJD THE FUTURE
1. Dewey’s meliorism : optimism . Dewey believes that the success
of the sciences has been so great in the past three hundred years that
we may look to the future with optimism. He acknowledges, of course,
that the future cannot be predicted; any affirmations about the future
67
are pure prophecy. As we have seen, he rejects the notion that
progress is certain or inevitable. He defines his position regarding
the future as melioristic : ’’the belief that the specific conditions
which exist at one moment, be they comparatively bad or comparatively
65. PAC, 326.
66. Cf. ION, 35-37.
67. "Where are we going? Toward what are we moving? The value of any
changing thing lies in its consequences, and the consequences of the
present conditions and forces are not here. To make an evaluation
is to prophesy and where is there the astronomer who can predict
the future of our social system?” art. 79, 256.
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68
good, in any event may toe "bettered."
and because the future can toe bettered, Dewey has faith that it will.
His meliorism turns to optimism when he views prospectively what
scientific method, when made universal in its application, will accomplish,
Great though the achievements of the last century have been, liewey tells
us that "they are not to toe compared with those which will emerge when
6 9
our faith in scientific method is made manifest in social works."
Though revolutionary progress in science has been made, the great
scientific revolution, — when scientific methods are applied to the
70
securing of social values, — is still to come. While the obstacle!
in the path of such a revolutionary application of science are enormous,
"an idealism of action", armed with the methods of intelligence, is in-
71
vincible and will finally triumph. Other civilizations have decayed
or stagnated, tout "wholesale permanent decays of civilization are
72impossible" now, because we have a "sure method."
While the modern man was deceived about the amount of progress he
had made, and especially deceived about the automatic certainty of
progress, he was right in thinking that for the first time in history
mankind is in command of the possibility of progress. 73
68. EPH, 178.
69. PAC, 330.
70. Ibid, 329-30.
71. Cf. QPC , 394
72. Art. 53; CHE
73. Loc. cit •

The success of science ensures the ultimate triumph of democracy and
liberty, which depend upon it for their strength. While they shall
undergo periods of trial and eclipse they cannot be forever obscured,
for "intelligence after millions of years of errancy has found itself
a method, and it will not be lost forever in the blackness of night.
The path by which Dewey’s logic of faith moves is evident.
Science has made progress in the past; this shows that progress is
possible in the future. "In the end, men do what they can do;" 75
because the possibility of progress is open, they will avail themselves
of it. Thus, Dewey argues from past progress to future progress.
2. The direction progress should take : democracy . We have seen
that Dewey refuses to predict the exact course that future progress will
take. 3ut we may ask, what direction should it take? In a sense the
asking of such a question is contradictory to Dewey’s conception of
progress. For, as we have noted, he conceives of progress as the re-
solving of specific, existential situations; an external goal toward
which progress should move is obnoxious to him. Progress is simply
"growth." But as Professor Lyman has pointed out, progress is some-
thing more than mere growth for Dewey. He would not regard "growth"
7fiin the direction of a Fascist regime as progress. The fact is that
Dewey is not consistent at this point in his concept of progress. He
denounces, first of all, the notion of ends and then makes "growth" the
74. LSA, 93.
75. IDP, 74.
76.
MUR, 187.
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end of progress
l
77 Then he goes on to define ’’growth” in terms of a
still further end! The "end” (Dewey uses the term) to which liberal-
ism — which is the philosophy of progress, — is committed, he tells us,
is ”an end that is at once enduring and flexible: the liberation of
individuals so that realization of their capacities may be the law of
their life.” 78 The goal of progress should be self-realization.
Government, business, art, religion, all social institutions have
a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to set free and to develop
capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class
or economic status. 79
This is what democracy means. 80
3. Conditions of future progress : What are the conditions upon
which progress such as Dewey hopes for is to be had? Four conditions
appear in his writings:
a. Desire for progress . The first essential, if progress is to
be a reality, is that men shall want it. 8 ^
It seems to me that about all that I can say about the future of
progress at the present time is that it depends upon man to say
whether he wants it or not. If we want it, we can have it — if we
are willing to pay the price in effort, especially in effort of in-
telligence.
b. Intelligence : use of scientific method . As may be expected,
a sine qua non of progress is the use of intelligence, which is another
term for the experimental method of the sciences. 82
77. RPH, 177.
78. LSA, 56.
79. RPH, 186.
CDo Loc. cit
.
81. Art
.
53; CHE,
CD to Cf. QFC
,
200.
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In dwelling upon the need of conceiving progress as a responsibility
and not as an endowment, I put primary emphasis upon responsibility
for intelligence, for the power which foresees, plans and constructs
in advance.®3
One of the only two articles that remain in iqy creed of life is that
the future of our civilization depends upon the widening spread and
deepening hold of the scientific habit of mind; and that the problem
of problems in our education is therefore to discover how to mature
and make effective this scientific habit. 8^
Science is the sole instrumentality of conscious, as distinct from
accidental progress. 85
Ultimately and philosophically science is the organ of general social
progress. 8 ®
Every step forward in the social sciences — the studies termed
history, economics, politics, sociology — shows that social questions
are capable of being intelligently coped with only in the degree in
which we employ the method of collecting data, forming hypotheses,
and testing them in action in which we utilize in behalf of the
promotion of social welfare the technical knowledge ascertained by
physics and chemistry. 87
The patient and experimental study of nature, bearing fruit in
inventions which control nature and subdue her forces to social uses,
is the method by which progress is made. 88
c. Communication of knowledge
.
Quite as important as the results
of scientific method is the dissemination of them so that they may be
a force in forming public opinion. 88
toCD Art
.
53, CHE, II, 824.
84. Art. 42; CHE, II, 765.
85. DEE, 266.
86. Ibid,
,
270.
t-a> Ibid,
,
333.
CD CD EPH, 49.
89. Art. 86, 181.
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Controlled moral progress can begin only where there is sifting and
communication of the results of all relevant experiences of human
association, such as now exists as a matter of course in the experi-
ences of science with the natural world.
d. An ?f°ectiv social organization . All of these things mentioned
would come to little good if there is not an effective social organization
to establish them. "The greatest educational power, the greatest force
in shaping dispositions and attitudes of individuals, is the social
90
medium in which they live.” Hence, one of the prerequisites of
true progress is the formation of "a social organization that will make
possible effective liberty and opportunity for growth in mind and spirit
in all individuals."^
4. Progress and nature . as one studies Dewey’s conditions of
progress one is impressed with the minor role that physical nature plays
in them. One would think that nature’s evolution, its future course,
would determine to a great extent what man's future course would be,
whether he would progress or not. Dewey, naturally, admits that man
is dependent upon nature, and that he cannot wholly control it.^2 But
he chooses to leave such considerations out of account when he talks
about progress. In general, theories of nature are inimical to human
endeavor: optimism, the doctrine that this is the best possible of
worlds, ’’becomes too readily the creed of those who live at ease;”
pessimism, on the other hand, which declares the world evil, "makes
90. LSA, 91.
91. Ibid, 57.
92. CF, 24-25.
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futile all efforts to discover the remediable causes of specific evils
and thereby destroys at the root every attempt to make the world better
and happier. Nature for Dewey is essentially indifferent to mans
in some respects it is his friend; in others his energy. 94 Hence, it
is simply a background before which man plays his part, or, better, the
material which he fashions to suit his needs. Dewey chooses to
leave it out of account. 95
In summary, Dewey’s theory of progress is this: Progress is a
process of perpetual growth by which existent situations are so trans-
formed that increase of value results. Past progress has been confined
to science, technology, but the successes of science will be carried
over into all realms of human endeavor in the future. The end toward
which this future progress in the several fields should be coordinated
is the development of the capacity of human individuals, which is
democracy. VThile he is optimistic with regard to the future, Dewey
acknowledges that future progress depends not upon God or physical
nature, but upon human attitudes and achievement: the desire for progress,
|j
intelligent method, communication, an effective social organization.
93. RPH, 178-9.
94. CP, 65-56.
95.
Dean Knudson distinguishes two conceptions of progress: the
naturalistic
,
which conceives of progress as belonging to the very
structure of reality and having about it ,Tall the certainty and
inevitableness of a scientific law;” and the ethical
,
according to
which ’’science does not reveal progress as a law of nature; it
furnishes the means by which it may be achieved.” PTR, 53, 54. In
this sense Dewey’s theory of progress is ethical rather than natur-
alistic.
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E. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NOTION OF PROGRESS FOR RELIGION
What ia the significance of scientific advance for religion? It
goes almost without saying that the religio-philosophical problem of
the past fifty years has been one of reconciling the claims of science
and religion. The attempts at harmonization have met with no little
success. The procedure employed by most religious and scientific
thinkers has been one of partition of territory. It may be along the
dividing line between phenomenon and noumenon, as with Bowne. Or it
may be along the line which separates values from existence, as was
the case with Ritschl. While Dewey is opposed to such divisions in
the realm of nature, 96 the distinction between the province of science
and that of religion has been widely accepted. There are thinkers who
write as though the relationship between science and religion had been
settled, and religion has nothing to fear from science.
It is important to note, however, that the reconciliation just
referred to is what may be called conceptual . Modern theology has en-
deavored to show that there is no basic conflict between the concepts
of science (law, electrons, evolution, and the like) and those of
religion (God, freedom, immortality, etc.). Naturalism, however, such
as Dewey’s, does not strike solely at the intellectual framework of
religion, as the older naturalism did. It strikes religion on its
functional side, which requires a new adjustment of science and religion.
96 Cf. CF, 34-35.
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Religion has been defined as "the feeling of dependence on a personal i
God and the will to cooperate with God in the conservation and in-
97
crease of values," Science does not deny the existence of a personal
God; it threatens the feeling of dependence which lies so close to the
heart of religion. It is making us less and less dependent on anything
other than ourselves. This is an indirect effect of science on religion,
and as Dewey rightly points out, it is of far greater moment than the
98influence of science upon the creeds. Conceptually there may be no
inherent contradiction between science and religion; but funct i onal ly
science is usurping more and more of the historic functions of religion.
The real issue is not "Can scientific doctrines and the tenets of religion
I be reconciled?" but "Is there anything that religion can do for us that
science cannot do?" It is at this point that a theory of progress
such as Dewey's, which affirms that man can realize his needs by scientific
method, gives its greatest challenge to supernatural religion. For
there is an "Occam's razor" at work in the practical realm as well as
the theoretical. Occam argued that what can bje explained well on one
ground is not to be explained again on another. The practical principle
of parsimony says that what can be done easily and effectively by one
means (by science) will not be tried by another (by appeal to God and
97. Brightman, IT?, 321.
93. Of. OF, 62-65
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Herein lies Dewey's contribution to the philosophy of religion. His ji
attacks on the supernatural from the standpoint of epistemology can hard- 1
ly claim validity, as we have indicated in the preceding chapter. But
;!
in his attack on religion from the functional side he has struck a more
vital blow at the traditional faith. Suppose that there is good
reason for believing in the existence of a God. If I can get everything 1
I need by scientific means, — strength, security, courage, understand-
ing, — what is the difference whether there is a God or not? Theologians
of the years to come will not answer a Common Faith by the -usual dogma
that science and religion do not conflict, but by showing there are
certain essential functions in life that religion alone can fulfill.
F. CRITICISM
'./hat shall we say of ^ewey*s theory of progress? We shall be con-
cerned in this section with three general considerations. First, we
shall endeavor to indicate briefly the contradictions contained in the
theory. Secondly, we shall inquire whether his doctrines in themselves !
99. The writer recalls hearing Anna Louise Strong, the Russian correspond-f;
ent, relate the explanation a Russian farmer gave for his apostasy Ji
from the Orthodox faith. "We used to have the priests come out and,|
bless the fields in the springtime to ensure a crop. But we don’t
!j
need them any more. We have tractors." This is an illustrationL1
at a primitive level, of the principle under discussion. If men’s
actual needs can be supplied as well or better by science, religion Ij
of a supernatural sort becomes irrelevant. This is the real
force of Dewey’s thrust at theism. In our judgment it is the
most difficult of all Dewey’s attacks to meet.
as we shall see later ( infra ,L96-201)
,
Dewey effectually answers his
own objection by his confession that there are a number of needs
science cannot meet which (he reluctantly admits at times) tradition-ii
al religion supplied.
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do not admit that there are certain needs science cannot supply. Finally,
we shall point out again that despite Dewey’s alleged appeal to experience,
in matters of religion he depreciates religious experience where it has
appeared in the course of history.
(1) a close scrutiny of Dewey's philosophy of progress will reveal
several difficulties inherent in it. (1) There is the contradiction,
already noted, between Dewey’s polemic against ends of progress and his
elevation of growth itself, and finally, self-realization to the status
of end.100
(2) Dewey’s doctrine of progress violates his principle of continuity.
As we have already seen, Dewey opposes a separation of man and nature as
violating the principle of continuity. ^1 But we have seen also in
the present chapter that in so far as progress is concerned, Dewey sharp-
ly distinguished between man and nature. Man is progressing; nature
as a whole is indifferent to progress. Unlike the historic doctrine
of progress, which was grounded in a metaphysic of evolution which made
human and natural progress co-ordinates, ^ewey distinguishes in effect
102between that which progresses and that which does not. Thus, the
breach between man and nature which he attempted to close with his
doctrine of continuity is opened by his doctrine of progress.
(3) It is to be noted, too, that Dewey’s conviction of progress
100. Supra, 184-85.
101. Cf. SAN, vii
.
102.
Supra, 187-88,
.• J J <*<$•.. m
. , ..
'
•
.
.
-
193
is never proved by him; it is a matter of faith, not knowledge.
In its strict sense, knowledge can refer only to what has happened I;
and been done. What is still t_o be done involves a forecast of a
future still contingent, and cannot escape the liability to error
in judgment in all anticipation of probabilities. 1 ^ 3
That knowledge will increase indefinitely, that man’s nature is capable !
of indefinite improvement, that natural events will not forestall progress,!
that the population of the earth will not increase so as to threaten
man’s means of sustenance (Malthus), indeed, that there will be a
future, — all of these are assurapt ions . 1(^ From the standpoint of
scientific knowledge Dewey's faith in progress has the same standing as
faith in immortality. The progress which Dewey envisions will never
be realized within his life-time; like immortality it lies beyond. That
the one will take place cannot be established any more than the other. 10^
Once again i^ewey does what he forbids the supernaturalists to do, — he
has faith in an object which cannot be established by scientific method.
103. PUB, 178.
104. For good statements of some of the assumptions underlying the notions
of progress, see Inge, IOP, 11-16, Hertzler, SPR, 140-44, and Bury,
3-4. See Whitehead, SIM, 65 and Love joy. Art. 1, 70-71, for the
argument that the existence of the future is an assumption.
105. It may be objected that life after death is of a different order of
j
experience from that in which future progress will take place. This,)
of course, is true. 3ut we are thinking now solely about the
possibility of scientific verification. Future progress can no
more be scientifically verified than a future life, not because the
future belongs to a different order of experience, but because, as
Dewey suggests in the quotation above, knowledge in the strict
sense can refer only to what has happened . No categorical judg-
ments can be made about the future by its very nature: scientific
predictions are hypothetical, ”if-then.” (Cf. Brightman, F0C, 19)
To affirm on the basis of past experience that progress will take
place in the future is faith; just as the affirmation of a future
life on the basis of ’’intimations of immortality” is faith.
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’’Progress" mast be added to the existence of other selves, the past, value,
and the whole as entities having a central position in his thought but
which cannot be established by his method of knowledge.
(4) Again, we have already seen how Dewey berates the supernatural-
ist for his projection of the object of worship into the unknown in
order to fulfil a desire.*®® tfhat he does not see is that progress
is a projection, too. Its reality cannot be proved, and, as the work
of imagination, is under the influence of desire.*® 7 If projections
r se are to be thrown out as objectionable, as one gathers from Dewey's
deliverances on supernaturalism, by the same logic his doctrines of
progress must be denied.
(5) Finally, it is to be observed that there is an element of
finality in Dewey's thought, despite his polemic against finalities.
That "finality" is anathema to Dewey, whether it be in the form of an
Absolute, an a priori
,
an antecedent reality, a fixed goal, an eternal
principle, a static Good, or a finished world, is familiar to every
student of his philosophy. Yet, in the notion of universal progress,
as Dewey expounds it, there is one factor that we shall never progress
beyond, — scientific method. "Both logically and educationally.
106. Supra, 39.
107. PAC, 120.
;; U: v
,
J
.•
,f S - -Wt
r.t ttw-r-ji no
' j
•
rr .• . . . ,J»' 70 T -•
•
1
-r .
• *
<
’ '
-
' L
—” —:i -
.
n ;< •
T
.
" >*
•
108 The pro-science is the perfecting of knowing, its last stage.”
cedure of science represents the limit of methodological advance. ^fter
tracing the stages of the development of science he concludes his dis-
109
cuss ion by saying.
Modern scientific procedure, as just set forth, seems to define the
ideal of limit of this process. It is inquiry emancipated, uni-
versalized, whose sole aim and criterion is discovery, and hence it
makes the terminus of our description.
(II) Not only does Dewey’s doctrine have serious internal diffi-
culties, but an inquiry into it will show its incompleteness. In order
to have decisive weight against supernatural religion it must be shown
that with the aid of science man can get for himself the things he most
needs. an analysis of ^ewey’s thought, however, reveals that on Dewey’s
own principles there are at least four important factors in the higher
life of man that scientific method cannot achieve.
108* DEE, 256.
109. art. 23, 486-7. Bury calls the difficulty we have cited above
’’the illusion of finality” (I0P, 351). He notes its presence in
Hegel, who traces the progressive development of the World Spirit
through the cultures of many peoples until he lets it culminate
in the Germanic world and in the philosophy of the Absolute (Ibid,
255). Comte, too, brilliantly set forth the laws of human develop-
ment until he came to positivism, — there development stopped!
(Ibid, 351)
It must be said in defense of Dewey, Hegel, and Comte, however,
that the difficulty under consideration arises really out of the
nature of truth. In every true judgment there is an element of
permanence, finality. Sven the judgment that everything changes
has significance only as we assume that its meaning, at least, does
not change. Likewise, any doctrine of progress must presuppose
entities that do not progress.

1. Scientific method cannot create goodwill Y/e have noted that
Dewey lists the will to progress as one of the conditions of progress.^0
It is a sine qua non of a better world. Yet, Dewey confesses that the
achievements of science in creating morally better purposes have been
disappointing.
Only a blind man would deny that characteristic traits of present
life are a mad scramble for material commodities, a devotion to
attainment of external power, and an insensate love of foolish
luxuries and idle display.
We seem to find everywhere a hardness, a tightness, a clamping down
of the lid, a regimentation and standardization, a devotion to
efficiency and prosperity of a mechanical and quantitative sort.l^
It must be admitted that to a considerable extent the progress thus
procured by scientific methods has been only technical: it has pro-
vided more efficient means for satisfying preexistent desires, rather
than modified the quality of human purposes.
Dewey’s answer, of course, to the failure of science to improve the
quality of human purposes is that we have yet to apply science directly
to human acts and attitudes. Science can be the means by which
human morality is bettered. But this answer is inadequate for a number
of reasons: (1) It is only a conjecture; there is no evidence thus far
that science can elevate the moral quality of human acts. In fact, the
opposite would seem to be the case. As we saw in Chapter IV, Dewey’s
110. Supra, 185.
111. Art. 80, 324.
112. Art. 79, 257.
113. DEE, 262.
114. PAC, 324
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ideal of science is the procedure of the physical sciences, which reduces
the qualitative to the quant it at ive. 1 3-5 If science, so conceived,
becomes more and more dominant, it is folly to think we shall have
anything else but that "efficiency and prosperity of a mechanical and
quantitative sort” which Dewey condemns. .Dewey says that the chief
indictment of our present civilization is "its devotion to quantity at
the expense of quality." 116 It is a cause for wonder that a thinker
ordinarily so sensitive to sociological interconnections as he should
fail to see a relationship between this devotion to the quantitative
at the expense of the qualitative and that scientific revolution, which,
in .Dewey's words, "marked a change from the qualitative to the quant ita-
117tive from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous."
(2) Further, this notion that science can ennoble men’s purposes
is opposed by another consideration in .Dewey's philosophy. He is strong
in insisting that science in itself is ethically neutral, capable of
11 qbeing put to uses both good and bad.
Science is strictly impersonal; a method and a body of knowledge.
It owes its operation and its consequences to the human beings who
use it. It adapts itself passively to the purposes and desires which
animate these human beings. It lends itself with equal impartiality
to the kindly offices of medicine and hygiene and the destructive
deeds of war. It elevates some through opening new horizons; it
depresses others by making them slaves of machines operated for the
pecuniary gain of owners.
115. Supra, 141-43.
116. Art. 79, 272.
117. QFC, 94.
119 PAG. 319
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How can that which is in itself ethically neutral, which "adapts itself
passively to the purposes and desires which animate" human beings, be
the agent of moral elevation?
(3) Finally, it is to be remembered that control of nature and con-
trol of human nature are quite different in character. Dewey admits
that he cannot predict even the general course of human events; yet,
an astronomer can predict the course of bodies light-years away. Pre-
dictability, and hence control, is much less possible in dealing with
human nature.
While goodwill is necessary for the building of a better world,
it would seem from Dewey’s own thought that we shall have to look to
some agency beyond science for it.
2. Scientific method cannot give meaning to life as a whole .
Dewey practically admits the failure of science to bestow meaning upon
life as a whole. As we have already seen in his discussion of the
office of philosophy, 120 it is necessary for philosophy to exercise
a critical eye upon the sciences, because their interpretations of life
are partial and spotwise. In Dewey’s address before the Sixth Inter-
national Congress of Philosophy he deplores the "worship" of science,
the "immense amount of dead, specialized work in the region of ’facts,*"
119. Supra, 122.
120. Supra, 97.
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which forgets that facts are only data, — “fragmentary, uncompleted
meanings.” 121 We hear him summoning philosophers to more "specula-
tive audacity” and the "sloughing off” of "a cowardly reliance upon those !
partial ideas to which we are wont to give the name of facts.”122 If
we interpret him correctly he is pleading for ideas that will unify
life and give it meaning as a whole.
While deploring our loss of perspective upon life as a whole, Dewey
admits that historic religion did give a meaning to life that we do
not have. 123
Whether even in the ages of the past that are called religious,
religion was itself the actively central force that it is sometimes
said to have been may be doubted. But it cannot be doubted that it
was the symbol of the existence of conditions and forces that gave
unity and a center to men's views of life.
3. Scientific method, further, cannot integrate the self . This
fact is admitted. It is a function which Dewey confessedly turns over
to religion. 124
It is pertinent to note that the unification of the self throughout
the ceaseless flux of what it does, suffers, and achieves, cannot be
attained in terms of itself. The self is always directed toward
something beyond itself and so its own unification depends upon the
idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that
imaginative totality we call the Universe.
121. P6IC
,
542.
122. Loc. cit.
123. ION, 62.
124. CF, 19. It is interesting to note that
on religion, in which he appeals to the
into life, he comes around to the point
his antagonist for so many years. Cf.
in Dewey's latest work
imagination to bring unity
of view of Irving Babbitt,
Babbitt, RAR, xiii-xv.
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Here again we see Dewey creating a breach between man and physical
nature, despite himself. He gives us a picture of man cherishing his
ideals and seeking to realize them while nature, in the silent background
keeps an indifferent peace. How long, one wonders, can man hold out
against the universe? In fair weather men can go their own passably well
But what about when they become tired of their ideals? What about
discouragement? What about the many vicissitudes that often take toll
of the stoutest souls? Can the self hold out in defiant loneliness
against the universe, then? Or, losing its hold upon its ideals, will
it not disintegrate? It is a question not amenable to decisive proof.
But one surmises that there is more than a little truth in an opinion
Dewey uttered in those early days before his antipathy to metaphysical
religion became so pronounced:
I question whether the spiritual life does not get its surest and
most ample guarantee when it is learned that the laws and conditions
of righteousness are implicated in the working processes of the
universe; when it is found that man in his conscious struggles, in
his doubts, temptations, and defeats, in his aspirations and successes
is moved on and buoyed up by the forces which have developed nature;
and that in this moral struggle he acts not as a mere individual but
as an organ in maintaining and carrying forward the universal process.
4. Finally, scientific method cannot effect social unity . Dewey
confesses that the great failure of liberalism, — and liberalism is the
movement most intimately connected with the use of scientific method,
— has been its failure "when faced with the problems of social
125. Art. 20, 341.
126. Cf. . IDP. 61.
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organization and integration." But he has hopes that in the future
liberalism will be able to remedy the defect through scientific intelli-
gence.128
It is to be noted, again, that this is a faith, a dogma, and little
more. Further, it is hard to see just how a unity can be achieved with-
out a will to unity, and we have already explored a few of the diffi-
culties in the way of science* s effectually elevating human purposes.
Dewey thinks that it can be done by a true religious attitude, —
devotion to ideal ends, — which would enlist all genuinely religious
129
men. (The fact that the task should be turned over to religion
is suggestive of the failure of science at this point.) But sooner
or later "the ideal ends" of "the religious attitude" will have to be
defined. When that time arrives it is difficult to see how we shall
escape the present disunity that prevails with the various conceptions
of God. To think that men can be united about a "religious attitude"
is as naive as to think, to use Professor VanDusen*s illustration, that
a lasting union of all those who are characterized by a "political
interest" can be 6 ffacted.^-3®
(Ill) Finally, let us consider briefly again Dewey’s treatment of
historical religion.
127. LSA, 28.
128. Ibid, 73.
129. Cf. CF, 80-87.
130. VanBusen, Art. 1, 131
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Dewey prides himself on being an empiricist; he calls his thought
1 31
’’empirical naturalism.” He considers the method of experience
1 32
as the philosophic method. He insists that knowledge must be
1 33
experienced to be known. He tells us that we must go to experience
1 34if we would know what things are. ’’Man discovers” for instance,
”how it i_s possible to walk or talk or fly by examining how these things
are actually done.” ° He tells us that ”the failures of philosophy
have come from lack of confidence in the directive powers that inhere
in experience. From first to last, Dewey emphasizes the
137
”necessity of reference to experience.”
Further, Dewey contends that there must be continuity between present
and past experience.
We cannot lay hold of the new, we cannot even keep it before our
minds, much less understand it, save by the use of ideas and knowledge
we already possess. 3ut just because the new is new it is not a mere
repetition of something already had and mastered. The old takes on
new color and meaning in being employed to grasp and interpret the
new. 138
131. EAN2
,
ii.
132. Cf. EAN, 2.
133. Ibid, 31.
134. IDP, 239.
135. Art. 80, 321
136. EAN2
,
iii.
137. EEL
,
64
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138. EAN2
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It is antecedently certain that continuities there must be; the new
idea must be generated out of the old; it has its basis in them; and
in the end its justification is found in the completion and organiza- !
tion which it contributes to them.139
If a philosopher ignores traditions his thoughts become thin and
empty.140
The notion of continuity and experience are fundamental to Dewey’s
philosophy. Yet, the surprising thing is that when he comes to consider !
the historical experience of religion he violates both of them. So
far as the principle of continuity is concerned, he says frankly that
in projecting his own view of religion he hopes to ’’wipe the slate clean
j
ij
and start afresh,” — the opposition, he says, "between religious values
j;
as I conceive them and historical religions cannot be bridged.” 141
So far as experience is concerned, the only experience of religion
that there is is historical experience. The only data from which we
may proceed in formulating a philosophy of religion are historical data,
it
facts about religion as it is historically experienced. Yet, as we have
j
indicated more than once, Dewey depreciates the historical experience of i
religion. He associates it with the primitive. 142 He identifies it
with the more unworthy psychical phenomena of projection and compen-
sation. 14 ° He insists that it has no meaningful essence of content. 144
He accuses it of cowardice, represents it as futile in dealing with
!l
139. Art. 75
,
1.
140. .art. 80
,
330.
141. OF, 6, 28.
142. Supra
,
39-40.
143. Supra, 40.
144. Supra 92-93,
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human problems, a barrier in the way of scientific development, and a
counterpart of human slothfulness
«
14^ He denies that it has pro-
gressed, but maintains that it has declined and is on the way to
oblivion. 146
Such a depreciation of an aspect of experience is not in harmony
with Dewey's own principles nor does it commend itself as true to the
spirit of philosophy. 147
'Why, then, is there this failure to appreciate the past? Several
considerations offer themselves. In the first place, we have already
seen that Dewey's method is forward-pointing and ill-adapted to the
acquisition of knowledge of past events 148 Secondly, the remark-
able progress of science has tended to accentuate whatever superiority
the present may possess and to associate ancient institutions, philoso-
phies, and religions with ancient techniques and world-views that have
been outmoded. Further, it must not be forgotten that Dewey before
everything else is a reformer and has the reformer's sensitiveness to
the contrast between what might be and what is and has been. This
tends to depreciate the past. Finally, it must be confessed that
145. Supra, 52-56.
146. Supra, 47, 96, 103, 121. CF, 29-34.
147. Tennant: "Contempt for the 'merely historical*, entertained by those!]
who would ground their beliefs on present experience alone, to the ji
exclusion of all connexion with the implications of past Objective
fact, is no philosophic habit of mind: it evinces the mistaken
view that 'reality in the making* is more 'real' than 'reality* i
which has been made." (PT, II, 238) Berdyaev: "The doctrine
of progress is first and foremost an entirely illegitimate
deification of the future at the expense of past and present, in a |i
way that has not the slightest scientific, philosophical or moral 'j
justification." (DDH, 197.)
149. Supra, 160-61.
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Dewey* s neglect of historical religion is due, to some extent at least,
j,
to an unaffected blindness for the values of historical faith. Religious ,l
i
values in the usual sense do not fit into his scheme of things; he simply
,j
can find no place for them. "Every age produces people," Whitehead
tells us, 149
with clear logical intellects, and with the most praiseworthy grasp
of the importance of some sphere of human experience, who have
jj
elaborated, or inherited, a scheme of thought which exactly fits those lj
experiences which claim their interest. Such people are apt reso- j:
lutely to ignore, or to explain away, all evidence which confuses their
J;
scheme with contradictory instances. What they cannot fit in is for j!
them nonsense.
Dewey appears to be one of those people!
G. SUMMARY
The taste of Chapter V. was to expound and to evaluate Dewey’s doctrin<
of progress, which, we have seen, is one of the premises of his philoso-
;
phy of religion as well as his rejection of supernaturalism. We found
jj
that he conceives of progress as a process of perpetual "growth" by
which an increase of value is realized. We saw that three centuries
of science provide the basis for his belief, and that while other
achievements of man have scarcely kept up with his scientific develop-
ment, Dewey was optimistic about the results when science is given uni-
versal application. Analysis of Dewey’s hopes for the future revealed
that he conceived of genuine progress as more than mere "growth”, but,
rather, growth in the direction of a social order designed to liberate
149. DMW, 268.
V "(< • (T.-i
'
j
.a©
«
r
.
and encourage the development of human capacities. Needless to say,
this progress is a human achievement, dependent on human desires, in-
telligence, and powers of organization.
It was argued that the doctrine of progress such as Dewey outlined
offers the most serious threat to metaphysical religion and that Dewey's
most fruitful contribution to religious philosophy is his practical
insistence on a functional interpretation of religion.
When Dewey's theory of progress was subjected to criticism, however,
it appeared that his doctrine was neither self-consistent nor in harmony
with some of the basic principles of his naturalism. Further, it was ij
-
I
seen that .his own teachings force the admission that scientific method 'j
,1
cannot supply some of the elements necessary for that better order which |i
Dewey sees* Again, it was pointed out that his depreciation of
the historical experience of religion is not in harmony with his own
fempiricism.
In concluding the two chapters of criticism it is to be noted that
Dewey’s positive theory of religion is open to the same general objections
j|
as he raised against the supernatural. (1) He contends that religion
took its origin in desire. Yet, we have seen that his own religion
arises from desire, — the desire of the self for integration and for
progress. (2) He argued that supernaturalism was epistemologically
defective: its claims cannot be validated by scientific method. But it
was pointed out that the central objects of Dewey's own religious teach-
ing — society, the past, values, the whole (in Chapter IV), and progress
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fin Chapter V) — are incapable of strict scientific verification. (3)
Dewey maintained that logically supernatural ism is guilty of what he
calls "the fallacy of selective emphasis." Certain aspects or factors
of experience, rather than experience as a whole, are elevated to the
status of religious objects. In Chapter III, however, we cited Dewey’s
own words to the effect that the object of faith for him is certain
selected factors of existence. In Chapter V we saw .oewey concentrating
upon the possibilities of human achievement, leaving the destinies of
—
physical nature out of account. (4) Dewey raised practical objections
to the historical faith, but in this chapter it became clear that science,
too, has decided limitations to its practical effectiveness as a melior-
ative agent.
Thus, we find an inner contradict ion in Dewey’s position with regard
to religion between its positive and negative sides. If Dewey’s
grounds for negating supernaturalism are valid, then his humanism has
to be denied along with the theism he opposes, for the objections to
the one are applicable in principle to the other. If, on the other
hand, Dewey’s humanism is valid, with its faith in that which confessedly
j
rests on desire (the desire for progress)
,
is scientifically indemon-
strable (society, values, the whole, progress), plainly selective in
character (man as distinguished from physical nature), and subject to
practical limitations, then the strictures raised against supernaturalism
do not hold. uewey is caught in hopeless contradiction as his
philosophy of religion stands.
5 v . . ;>•> il i... . it': t oi*uj ' o
. 0 Q*I . ) i r.: , Vi •:> .
lx o' a . . . . C
.
Ibslti . lii
ill I X'C
. }
II t
There is a possible synthesis for the contradictions of Dewey’s
philosophy, however, at a higher stage of the "dialectic.” The essential
truth of Dewey’s attack on supernaturalism is: The object of religion
should be real, and the real is that which functions in human experience
for the increase of value. The burden of his attack on historical
religion, as we have seen repeatedly, is that the traditional faith has
not dealt with realities nor been fruitful in the enhancement of human
experience. The essential truth of his own conception of religion
is: The increase of value in human experience depends on factors that
are (1) personal and (2) wholes. We have seen that uewey’s major
concern is with the personal; for all his talk about "means" and
"instruments" it is to be remembered that they are instrumental to per-
sonal life. Whatever goods there be, they are personal and achieved
through personal functioning. Human beings cannot be developed in
isolation but require the cooperation of all other relevant persons.
Further, the underlying principle of his metaphysics is continuity, which
implies that anything less than a whole is unreal. We have noted
that the mark of "the religious" in hewey's eyes is integration of the
self ( wholeness ) and that that unification is effected through allegiance
to a whole, whether it be conceived as an imaginative synthesis of ideal
,
ends or an objective reality.
a synthesis of the essential truths of the two sides of Hewey’s
i
philosophy may be phrased thus: The object of religion is the universe,
conceived as a personal whole (the universe is the ultimate whole)
,
and ji
functioning in human experience for the increase of value.
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We repeat, Dewey's philosophy of religion as it stands is involved
in contradiction. But if the legitimate implications of his view
be developed the result is not inconsistent with theism.
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The preliminary chapter of this dissertation was concerned with
certain introductory matters. It contained first of all, a section
devoted to v&ney*B life and achievements, followed by a statement of the !*
problem and a word about the term "naturalistic", which figures so large- ij
ly in the discussion. Then a sketch of the organisation of the
dissertation was given. There came next a survey of the meager
!jliterature on Lewey’s interpretation of religion and a chronological
classification of the sources on which this study is based. The re-
mainder of the first chapter was a brief exposition of Lewey’s views
on religion in the early period of his development (roughly, before 1890),
!
when his position was quite different from that which later characterizes
|
him.
In Chapter II the argument proper began. as every student of
ii
Lewey’s philosophy is aware, for a period of thirty-odd years Lewey
maintains a relentless attack upon what he calls "the supernatural",
which occupies a central place in the religious tradition of the Western
world. We sought to analyze "the supernatural" and came to the con-
clusion that his polemic is directed against the ascription of normative I
worth and superior reality to entities lying beyond the bounds of
scientific verification. We organized his objections to the super-
natural under four heads: (1) Genetic , — the supernatural arises out of
jj
desire, or myth, a fact which discredits its claims to objective validity.
|:
(2) Epistemological , — the supernatural rests on premises belonging
to the prescient ific era. (3) Logical, — it is self-refuting and
ii

guilty of hypostatizing eventual functions of experience into antecedent
realities. (4) Practical , — belief in the supernatural is inimical
to the development of science, human amelioration, the exercise of human
endeavor, and the practice of true religion. We saw that Dewey’s
attitude toward the traditional arguments for God is essentially that of
post-Kant ian religious philosophy.
Upon examination of the objections to the supernatural we observed
that the genetic argument is irrelevant, even on a pragmatic basis, for
antecedents are not the criteria of truth. The epistemological
objection presupposes the exclusive validity of scientific method. The
third objection, — the logical, — is decisive against an impersonal
idealism. The practical objection we noted to be weakened by un-
guarded generalizations and to rest on the pragmatic criterion of truth.
From Dewey’s critique of historical religion we turned, in Chapter
III, to an exposition of his positive doctrine on religion. Every
religious philosophy must take a position with respect to (1) nature,
(2) man, and (3) value. We saw concerning (1) that Dewey holds nature
to be a totality, inclusive of physical things, mind, universals, and
values. Man (2) is, thus, an integral part of nature and the values
which he cherishes (3) are continuous with nature, being the possibili-
ties of existence. Rejecting the notion of a universal content in
historical religions, we noted that Dewey establishes his own conception
of ’’the religious” as an apprehension of and devotion to such inclusive
ends as result in the unification of the self, a view of ”the religious”
-j i4i J. :• v : ttffo
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that is in harmony with science, dependent on philosophy for its values,
closely related to the moral and esthetic, and eventuating in social
idealism. The object of faith, or God, Dewey defines as "the active
=4
relation of the ideal and the actual." When we inquired into the
nature of the relationship we found that two interpretations emerge in
Dewey's writings, — God as an imaginative synthesis of the ideal
ends, or possibilities, of existence, and a realistic view, nature as
a whole or those selected aspects of nature which support ideals. While I
the first interpretation probably represents Dewey's main intent, the
second is present and illustrates the difficulty Dewey experiences in
his whole philosophy of resolving the ideal-real relationship. We
commented not only on the fact that the basic concept of his philosophy
of religion is ambiguous but that it is open to the same fundamental
objections which he had laid himself at the door of the supernatural.
When we investigated Dewey's position with reference to the perennial
problems of religion we found that he is suspicious of personal piety,
feels that the problem of evil is practical rather than speculative,
questions immortality, and summons men to a consecration of the Church
to social ends. We compared Dewey's philosophy of religion with
personalism and found that, apart from the fact that the one gives a
conceptual interpretation of religion as distinguished from a funct ional
(Dewey)
,
the basic difference between them arises out of their divergent
appraisals of the scope and validity of scientific method. While
personalism recognizes the importance of science in the discovery of
truth, its method is synoptic: it takes into account non-scientific
-,
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data as well. On the other hand, Dewey’s whole polemic against
traditional religion, and his own positive doctrine rests on the assump-
tion of the exclusive validity of scientific method.
This assumption expresses itself in two ways: (1) in the
epistemological doctrine that scientific method is the only certain
method and test of truth, and (2) in the practical teaching that science
offers the one hope of human progress. In Chapter IV we took (1) -under
consideration. IVe found that by scientific method Dewey means the
experimental method and precise, predictive verification of the physical
sciences. In order to test the validity of the assumption referred to
above we asked whether this method and criterion of truth is self-
consistent: Can the exclusive validity of scientific method itself be
established scientifically? Three ways were indicated by which this
question might be affirmatively answered, — (a) by showing that ex-
perimental verification is involved in the very notion of truth, (b) by
demonstrating that all other criteria are invalid, (c) by contending
pragmatically that the assumption of the exclusive validity of science
works. »Ve discovered that Dewey employs all three. 3ut none of
them is adequate to establish the premise under consideration. So
far as (1) is concerned, we saw that Dewey’s theory of judgment as
practical is untenable. Y/ith regard to (2) we found that Dewey rejects
all significant criteria, — except coherence! Not only does he re-
frain from criticism of it, but he uses it extensively, a sufficient
commentary in itself on his extreme claims for scientific method. It
was pointed out that (3), the pragmatic argument, is logically defective

and does not establish the exclusive validity of science, which is the
point at issue.
We tested Dewey’s claims for scientific method, further, by asking,
not only whether they are self-consistent, but whether the essential
momenta in Dewey’s own philosophy of religion can be established by
scientific method. We discovered (a) that though Dewey is a
philosopher of society, the existence of other selves cannot be verified
by the precise methods of the sciences; (b) that while Dewey condemns
supernatural religion for its unworthy past, in the strict sense past
events, whether good or bad, could never be known by methods of the
precise physical sciences; (c) that though he elevates values to the
place occupied by God in historical religions, he could never establish
what ought to be by scientific method; (d) that the concept of the
Universe in its totality, devotion to which the vital integration of the
self — the supreme mark of ’’the religious” — depends, is by his own
confession incapable of being known. The conclusion which follows
naturally is that the premise of both the negative and positive elements
of Dewey’s philosophy of religion, — the notion of the exclusive
validity of scientific method, — is an assumption and nothing more.
Thus, the attack on the supernatural loses its cogency, and the objects
of Dewey’s humanistic faith enjoy no preferential status over the objects
of supernaturalism.
The last chapter was concerned with the practical assumption
(£ above) that science is not only exclusively valid, so far as knowledge
•'
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is concerned, but that it offers the one sure hope of human progress.
We found that Dewey conceives of progress as a process of perpetual
•'growth" by which an increase of value is realized,. When we in-
vestigated the grounds for progress in the past we discovered that
science is the only field of human endeavor in which perceptible progress
has been made; men's other achievements have scarcely kept up with
scientific development. Nevertheless, Dewey is optimistic with regard
to the future. He believes that future progress should be in the
direction of a social order designed to liberate and encourage the
development of human capacities and will take place when allegiance to
the supernatural is given up and science is universally applied.
When this theory of progress was subjected to criticism, however,
several internal difficulties came to light: the conflict between the
teaching that progress has no ends and the doctrine of self-realization
as an end, the lack of harmony between the thorough-going application
of the principle of continuity in his metaphysics and his singling out
man alone, apart from that which supports him, as the agent of progress,
the fact that future progress is incapable of scientific verification,
and the inconsistency in attacking supernatural religion as projection
when the idea of progress is itself a projection. Further, it was
seen that his own teachings force the admission that scientific method
cannot supply some of the elements essential for the better order which
Dewey sees, — goodwill, meaning for life as a whole, integration
of the self, and social unity.
-- ••
; ]
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Despite these limitations, however, it was pointed out that a doctrin^
of progress such as Dewey's constitutes a serious threat to metaphysical
religion and that his most fruitful contribution to religious philosophy
is his practical insistence on a functional interpretation of science
and religion.
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1. Lewey’s interpretation of religion is fundamentally naturalistic
in that (a) it rejects the supernatural, (b) considers main, the bearer
of religion, as a part of nature, (c) the ends of faith as the possibili-
ties of nature, (d) the means
,
the method of the natural sciences, (e)
the fruition
,
a re-making of the natural.
2. Respite his avowed naturalism, there are pronounced idealistic
elements in his thought (especially his doctrines of mind, continuity,
the efficacy of intelligence, and the primacy of the ethical), which are
only verbally reconciled with his realism.
3. The supreme instance of his difficulty in resolving the ideal
and the real is his conception of God as "the active relation between
ideal and actual,” which is capable of either idealistic (God as the
imaginative synthesis of the ideal possibilities of existence) or
realistic (nature, in whole or part, as the support of ideals) inter-
pretation.
4. While Lewey claims to be an empiricist in his general philosophy,
his philosophy of religion is non-empirical
,
since he depreciates
historical religion, which provides the data of religion.
5. Both the negative and positive elements of Lewey’s religious
philosophy rest on the assumption of the exclusive (epistemological)
validity and (practical) efficacy of scientific method.
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